. NMT05-T0025
Volume V · Page 25
| committed an action which, let us suppose, represented a war crime or a crime against humanity within the meaning of the Control Council Law, then in any case Lorenz himself cannot be considered as a perpetrator or as an accomplice in the sense of Article II, 2a and b. If he did not know of the act, then he also could not have participated in it through his consent (Art. II, 2c), nor could he have been then related to the planning or the carrying out of an action (Art. II, 2d), the intent and execution whereof he did not know. There remains therefore solely the question of whether in such cases Article II, 2e of Control Council Law can be applied, that is to say, whether Lorenz belonged to an organization or association, namely the VoMi, which was connected with the execution of the crime. The wording of the law shows that the organization or association must have had such a relation to the crime, whether its entire purpose was a criminal one, or whether it resorted to criminal means in the execution of its tasks. The criminal aspect thus must be connected with the organization as such; individual excesses on the part of subordinates; the overstepping of the sphere of competency in isolated cases; all the acts of subordinate elements insofar as they did not systematize and thereby draw the organization as such into the chain of crimes; do not make the chief of the organization responsible, according to Article II, 2e. Moreover, since section II, 2e belongs to the definitions of participation, the accomplice must have willed and consequently have been conscious of the criminal result which was to be brought about by another.¹ Insofar as crimes of subordinates should thus exist, it is a question of Lorenz's knowledge. For this reason all the verdicts of the American Military Tribunals to date have attached decisive weight to such knowledge. As the verdict of the American Military Tribunal II against Pohl et al., states,² a consenting knowledge in the sense of a positive attitude is essential. The premises for this must be proved by the prosecution. The principles also apply to the relations of Lorenz with Behrends. Behrends was a very independent, ambitious worker. Lorenz did not know, and could also not foresee, what steps Behrends would resort to and what attitude he would take to particular problems. A responsibility of Lorenz for possible actions on the part of Behrends, which would be relevant before this Court, can thus be established only if Lorenz knew of the measures taken by Behrends and approved of them. In this respect also the burden of proof lies with the prosecution. |
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¹ "Das Organisationsverbrechen", Haensel, 1947, p. 36.
² United States vs. Oswald Pohl, et al., Case 4, Judgment, Sec. VIII A.
