. NMT05-T0027
Volume V · Page 27
| responsibility was
concentrated, such as Goering, Himmler, and others. All these men are dead. On
the other side is the gigantic administrative machinery of the state. Certain
cogs of this machinery you find as defendants in this Court. The truth is, of course, that those actually responsible were not able to attain their aims without the administrative machine. On the other hand, however, the individual officials of the numerous departments belonging to that machine were hardly in a position, beyond the functions specially assigned to them, to keep themselves informed of the activities of the other departments; still less to examine the lawfulness of their actions. On the contrary, the Germans were brought up in a way which caused them to presume as a matter of course that state measures were lawful and leggy and to feel that it was improper to question them. This applied even more to the National Socialist dictatorship, under which the German nation placed all its trust on Hitler and invested him with all-embracing powers. It applied still more in war time when it was not only considered an improper interference to question the measures of other departments but it constituted at the same time a violation of the secrecy regulations then in force. In this proceeding, the charge is of participation in a systematic government program of genocide. The question in issue is, therefore, whether and to what extent participation within the meaning criminal law can be established. The relevant provisions in Article II, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10. These forms of participation are defined in such a sweeping way that they could apply to all branches of the entire State d. Party machinery. Such interpretation, however, is barred by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, according to which only the "major war criminals" are to be punished. |
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| It has been an axiom at all times that the occupying power must apply the law of the occupied country. The main purpose of this principle is the protection of a defendant. It is also based on the consideration that habits and customs vary in the different countries, and — a point which I consider particularly important in this connection — the fact that the administrative machinery and the division of responsibility vary. Different standards are applied. In this case, your Honors, you are applying a law which overrides the national laws of the individual states. But except for common crimes committed in war, this law can affect only those persons whose special responsibility puts them apart from the ordinary members of the machinery of administration. It can only apply to those to whom the rules of international law are addressed. It cannot be the task of this Tribunal to lose itself |
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