. NMT05-T0153
Volume V · Page 153
| The acts and conduct, as set forth in this
judgment, and as substantially charged in the indictment, constitute crimes
against humanity as defined in Article II (c) of the Control Council Law
No. 10, and are violative of international conventions, and particularly of
Articles 23, 45, 46, 47, 52, 55, and 56 of the Hague Regulations (1907), and
are violative of the general principles of criminal law as derived from the
criminal laws of all civilized nations and of the internal penal laws of the
countries in which such crimes were committed. The acts and conduct set forth in this judgment, and as substantially alleged in the indictment, also constitute war crimes, as defined in Article II (b) of Control Council Law No. 10, and are violative of international conventions, and particularly of Articles 23, 45, 46, 47, 52, 55, and 56 of the Hague Regulations (1907), and are violative of the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations and of the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed. During the course of the trial defenses common to all defendants have been urged. It has been insisted repeatedly by the defendants that numerous activities were not within their sphere of competency but on the contrary some other person or some other organization was charged with the performance of these various tasks. We have given careful consideration to these assertions, and in instances we have determined that certain assertions of this nature were creditable; and in such instances the defendant has not been held responsible for those activities. However, a complete and irrefutable answer to many of these assertions is found in the words of the defendants themselves in many orders, directives, and memoranda issued under their own signature while the barbarous Germanization program was in full swing. We can give no credence to such defenses when the words of a defendant absolutely refute the contentions now urged. It is no defense for a defendant to insist, for instance, that he never evacuated populations when orders exist, signed by him, in which he directed that the evacuation should take place. While in such a case the defendant might not have actually carried out the physical evacuation in the sense that he did not personally evacuate the population, he nevertheless is responsible for the action, and his participation by instigating the action is more pronounced than that of those who actually performed the deed. Another defense urged is that, in performing certain functions, the defendants were acting under superior orders. By Control Council Law No. 10 it is expressly provided that superior orders |
