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the spot. Amt A IV did audit the receipts and
disbursements of about 300 garrison cashiers, together with the records of
Amtsgruppen A, B, and D of the WVHA. Vogt's duties never transcended those of
an auditor. He was never a financial director; he did not authorize purchases,
requisition material, direct distribution, order payment, or in any other way
control fiscal policy. His sole task was to inspect and analyze the records
(which others had made) of past transactions.
The prosecution seeks to
inculpate Vogt on two grounds that he took a consenting part in and was
connected (1) with the mistreatment of concentration camp inmates, or at least
in the employment of slave labor in the camps, and (2) with the atrocities
incident to Action Reinhardt.
As to the first specification, there is
no claim that Vogt was either a principal in, or an accessory to the actual
mistreatment or enslavement of the concentration camp inmates. The most that is
claimed is that because of his position he must have known about them and
therefore tools a consenting part in and was connected with them. His consent
is not objectively shown. He nowhere expresses or implies consent. The only
consent claimed arises from imputed knowledge nothing more. But the
phrase, "being connected with" a crime means something more than having
knowledge of it. It means something more than being in the same building or
even being in the same organization with the principals or accessories. The
International Military Tribunal I recognized this fact when they placed
definite limitations on criminality arising from membership in certain
organizations. There is an element of positive conduct implicit in the word
"consent." Certainly, as used in the ordinance, it means something more than
"not dissenting." Perhaps in the case of a person who had power or authority to
either start or stop a criminal act, knowledge of the fact coupled with silence
could be interpreted as consent. But Vogt was not such a person. His office in
WVHA carried no such authority, even by the most strained implication. He did
not furnish men, money, materials, or victims for the concentration camps. He
had no part in determining what the inmates should eat or wear, how hard they
should work, or how they should be treated. Nor is there any proof that he knew
what they did eat or wear, or how hard they did work. or how they
were treated. The most that can be said is that he knew that there were
concentration camps and that there were inmates. His work cannot be considered
any more criminal than that of the book keeper who made up the reports which he
audited, the typist who transcribed the audit report, or the mail clerk who
forwarded the audit to the Supreme Auditing Court. |
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