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already been served in this trial, Dr. Buergin was arrested in France
by order of the prosecution. He was unable to take any effective steps against
his extradition as, in France, he was without the means which would enable him
to enlist the services of a lawyer. He was brought to Nuernberg and there saw
the indictment as a whole for the first time, having previously been informed
in Aix-en-Provence of the charge of complicity in the use of so-called slave
labor and alleged collaboration in the Four Year Plan. He was taken into
custody, a charge was brought against him, and he was brought to trial without
having had any previous opportunity to explain his position, to clear himself,
or to refute the accusations contained in the indictment. Thus, Dr. Buergin has
been involved in a trial despite the fact that the material submitted by the
prosecution brings no proof whatsoever to substantiate special accusations
which could justify the monstrous charges brought in the indictment. One
cannot, therefore, help feeling — and in this trial, the defense is
dependent to a large extent upon hypotheses in assessing the prosecution's
evidence — that Dr. Buergin is held responsible by the Court less on the
grounds of specific accusations, but chiefly because he was a member of the
Farben Vorstand.
In its opening statement, the prosecution raised the
question of the collective guilt of the Vorstand and concluded, naturally, that
the guilt was collective. It is hardly appropriate to gauge the depths of such
a difficult question in this opening statement. I should, however, like to
stress the point that such a complicated and unusual legal construction of the
facts can come into consideration only if certain minimum requirements have
been proved by the prosecution. This would necessitate proof of the fact that
members of the Vorstand actually have committed crimes, the judgment of which
falls within the province of this Court; that those members of the Vorstand,
who had no part in the commission of crimes, had full knowledge of the facts of
the case and were in agreement with criminal actions taken; and that they did
nothing to prevent the continuation of such criminal actions, although being in
a position to do so.
In my opinion, there can be no question of the
prosecution's having brought any such proof.
If one rejects this
conception of the collective guilt of the Vorstand, which, though interesting
as a concept, is impracticable, counts one and five of the indictment would
seem to seek legal justification (in the case of Dr. Buergin) mainly in the
provisions of Article II 2(f) of the Control Council Law, because he
occupied a high position in the industrial and economic life of Germany.
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