[Tri…] bunal, and have previously expressed my dissent therefrom based on the provisions of Military Government Ordinance No. 7. But the ruling was made early in the presentation of the evidence for the defense, and the defendants, relying on the ruling, may possibly have been led into not presenting additional counterevidence. Justice requires, therefore, that the ruling be respected for the purposes of final judgment, as the strategy of the case was fashioned on that theory. There remains the question of the weight to be attached to von Schnitzler's statements as evidence against von Schnitzler himself. Being deprived of the benefit of any examination of this defendant in open court, and faced with his attempts at correction and retraction, I conclude that the incriminating statements made by von Schnitzler should not be accorded weight sufficient for a conviction in his case. I reach this conclusion not without misgivings. In all pretrial interrogations, von Schnitzler apparently talked so willingly and his statements, obviously not under duress, were so complete as to raise question as to the extent to which he would retract or repudiate them upon final exhaustive examination by counsel before the Tribunal. But in the present state of the record, I do not feel warranted in expressing dissent as to the acquittal of von Schnitzler on the basis of his affidavits and interrogations.”*