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| that that madman (referring to Hitler) would bring us to ruin because
the world in the long run would not tolerate his actions and his offensive
speeches. I disapproved of the movement of troops into both Austria and
Czechoslovakia. However, my feelings concerning the use of force to effect the
Anschluss were influenced by a strong feeling, which I hold to this day, that
Austria and Germany are basically one nation and that the Austrians wanted a
union with Germany. Therefore, the propaganda and the reports which came out
concerning Austria, just before and just after the Anschluss, did not
necessarily appear exaggerated to me. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia
(leaving aside the occupation of the Sudetenland after the Munich Agreement) in
March, 1939, was an entirely different matter for me. This military invasion
simply shocked me to the deepest depths of my heart. The occupation occurred
when I was in Duesseldorf at the German-English conference of industrialists.
On the way to a luncheon party at this time, Sir Francis Larke of England gave
his reaction to this terrible step. My opinion was identical to his. I was just
as shocked as he was and had neither an explanation nor an excuse. I always
considered that Czechoslovakia was a godchild of the United States and that
this occupation would deeply offend America. The 13th of March 1939 is the
decisive date for me with respect to the foreign policy of the Hitler regime.
On that date it became absolutely clear to me that Hitler would lead Europe to
ruin. I so expressed myself to my close friends, and proof of this can be
obtained from them. From the very first moment it was clear to me that it was a
terrible wrong to mankind which was done by the occupation of Prague. I knew
only too well many Czech people not to be fully aware that they were not
Germans, and that they did not want to have a German domination. After the
Sudetenland was incorporated into the German Reich, I did not believe a word of
the propaganda against Czechoslovakia. With respect to the Polish question, I
distinctly disapproved from the first moment of any coercive or forceful
measure. I didn’t accept the Polish border “incidents” as true
nor did I accept the propaganda concerning Poland. But, on the other hand, I
didn't believe them to be as artificial as I recognized them to be after the
collapse of Germany, because I felt that hatred was being made by both sides
and that there was injustice concerning the Polish Corridor and East Prussia. I
did not think the Polish question would come to war because I thought Hitler,
following his policy of bluff, backed up by the strong fist, would secure his
demands of the Poles by his bluff. However, I was among that group of Germans
who were worried that Hitler might not get away with his
bluff |
1523 |
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