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1. In my affidavit of 2 April 1947 (NI-5188), paragraphs 14 and 22, I
have stated the principal objections which I had to the Nazi regime. At no time
during the Nazi regime did I offer any kind of resistance to the regime which
in any way endangered my personal liberty, my freedom, or my property. Because
of the restraint upon freedom of expression, I did not talk about my feelings
to the regime openly, but I expressed many of my concerns often within
confidential circles and especially to a few of my close friends or
collaborators, including Dr. Bernhard Buhl, Prof. Erwin Selck, and Dr. Karl
Lueer. However, my lack of enthusiasm for the Nazi regime and the NSDAP were
sufficiently well known so that I don't think anyone considered me an active
supporter of the NSDAP. I consider myself as one of Bosch's closer associates
and as he was our great man his ideas and reactions have at all
time impressed me very much. He once told me, The great thing is that
I.G. Farben must outlast the Nazis.
2. Quite soon after the Nazis
came to power, I felt so strongly in opposition to the Nazi regime that I
seriously considered resigning from my position in I.G. Farben and retiring
from active participation in German industrial life. In late 1934 or early
1935, the matter had gone so far that I had a long discussion on the matter
with Prof. Erwin Selck, an old friend of mine. I told him that I felt extremely
upset by a number of happenings in Germany, that many things in Germany were in
contradiction to my convictions, including the Roehm affair, and that I thought
it best to resign my position altogether. Selck thereupon became extremely
lively in his conversation. He said that I was absolutely wrong; that the only
hope for Germany was that the Party would get over the revolutionary stage and
become more reasonable; and that at last reason would prevail in Germany. Selck
said that persons like me had to remain and do their duty to avoid replacement
by men closely connected with the Party who would overrun everything in I.G.
Farben if men like me were replaced. Selcks viewpoint finally prevailed
and thereafter I never seriously considered resigning again.
3. For the
period from my conversation with Selck to the Anschluss, I want to state the
following. Most Germans considered Germany's foreign policy before 1938 a good
deal from the consideration of what other countries might have done, but did
not do, to interfere. When there was no interference by the other countries,
there was little incentive to interfere within Germany. Moreover, it certainly
seemed to me that Hitler tried to come to an agreement with England, and after
the German-British Naval Treaty of 1935, I thought there might be some
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