 |
[imme...] diate punishment
against anyone doing anything that could be construed as obstructing or
hindering the carrying out of governmental regulations or
decrees.” |
After having covered to the best of my ability the field of the
general theory of responsibility, I may now, for Your Honors’ convenience,
briefly summarize my observations as follows:
1. Under the rules of
criminal law there is no collective responsibility. Criminal guilt can only be
personal.
2. In the case of major German Stock Corporations which had
several Vorstand members in their management, a dividing of working fields and
responsibilities among the various Vorstand members was customary and
admissible both according to actual practice and to law.
3. In I. G.
Farben such a dividing up of working fields and responsibilities was carried
through to a considerable degree, owing to the peculiar circumstances which I
took the liberty to outline to Your Honors.
4. There existed no duty on
the part of the defendants based on law or actual practice to check constantly
without any reasonable ground on the activities of a colleague. In view of the
fact, that it was the practice in I. G. Farben in selecting its executives, to
demand the highest standards in regard to character and professional
qualifications, each defendant could rely on the correct conduct of business by
his colleagues. On the other hand, each defendant was preoccupied to the limit
of his working capacity by the special tasks assigned to him, and therefore in
the first place had to see to it that his own work was done in a proper and
orderly way.
5. As far as reports and decisions in the full Vorstand or
in the TEA or Commercial Committee are concerned, only those points which
appeared in the report or were discussed were relevant for these defendants who
were not familiar with the subject. Moreover, it had to be assumed that the
experienced knowledge of the reporting Vorstand member and his familiarity with
the issue concerned was superior to that of his colleagues.
6. The
prosecution has not established that any of the defendants in any particular
case had reasonable grounds, deriving either from the special circumstances of
the case or from the personality of another Vorstand member, to consider
objectionable any specific activities of said colleague which are now charged
under one of the counts of this indictment, and to investigate these activities
accordingly. Therefore, in no case a violation of the duty to supervise and
intervene, and consequently no “closing of the eyes” or “turning
away,” has been established by the prosecution.
7. The crimes
covered by this indictment can be committed only deliberately and willfully,
and not out of negligence. Therefore a |
987 |
. 
