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It was natural that the people of Germany listened to and read, his
utterances in the belief that he spoke the truth.
It is argued that
after the events in Austria and Czechoslovakia, men of reasonable minds must
have known that Hitler intended to wage aggressive war, although they may not
have known the country to be attacked or the time of initiation. This argument
is not sound. Hitler's moves in Austria and Czechoslovakia were for the avowed
purpose of reuniting the German people under one Reich. The purpose met general
public approval. By a show of force but without war. Hitler had succeeded. In
the eyes of his people he had scored great and just diplomatic successes
without endangering the peace. This was affirmed in the common mind by the
Munich Agreement and the various nonaggressive pacts and accords which
followed. The statesmen of other nations, conceding Hitler's successes by the
agreements they made with him, affirmed their belief in his word. Can we say
the common man of Germany believed less?
We reach the conclusion that
common knowledge of Hitlers plans did not, prevail in Germany, either
with respect to a general plan to wage aggressive war, or with respect to
specific plans to attack individual countries, beginning with the invasion of
Poland on 1 September 1939.
Personal Knowledge
It is a
basic fact that a plan or conspiracy to wage wars of aggression did exist. It
was primarily the plan of Hitler and was participated in, as to both its
formation and execution, by a group of men having a particularly close and
confidential relationship with the Dictator. It was a secret plan. At first, it
was general in scope and, later, became more specific and detailed. This is
established by unquestioned events. Its purpose was to make Germany the
dominant military and economic power of Europe by militant diplomacy, and
finally by conquest. It started more as an objective than as a plan complete in
detail. From time to time it bore offsprings the specific plans for
conquest.
It is not clear when Hitler first conceived his general plan
of aggression, or with whom he first discussed it. He made a definite
disclosure at a secret meeting on 15 November 1937. The persons present were
Lieutenant Colonel Hossbach, Hitlers personal adjutant; Goering,
Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe; von Neurath, Reich Foreign Minister;
Raeder, Commander in Chief of the Navy; General von Blomberg, Minister of War
and General von Fritzsch, Commander in Chief of the Army. This meeting was
followed by other secret meetings of special significance on 23 May 1939, 22
August 1939, and 23 November 1939. Thus three of the meetings preceded the
invasion of Poland. None of the defendants attended any of these meetings.
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