 |
| effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the
waging of war." (IMT judgment, vol. 1, p.
330.) |
| |
Conspiracy
We will now give brief consideration
to count five, which charges participation by the defendants in the common plan
or conspiracy. We have accepted as a basic fact that a conspiracy did exist.
The question here is whether the defendants or any of them became parties
thereto. It is appropriate here to quote from the IMT judgment |
| |
| The prosecution says, in effect, that any significant
participation in the affairs of the Nazi Party or Government is evidence of a
participation in a conspiracy that is in itself criminal. Conspiracy is not
defined in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal the conspiracy must
be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not be too far removed
from the time of decision and of action. The planning, to be criminal, must not
rest merely on the declarations of a party program, such as are found in the 25
points of the Nazi Party, announced in 1920, or the political affirmations
expressed in Mein Kampf in later years. The Tribunal must
examine whether a concrete plan to wage war existed, and determine the
participants in that concrete plan.*: |
| In order to be participants in a common plan or conspiracy, it is
elementary that the accused must know of the plan or conspiracy. In this
connection we quote from a case cited by both the prosecution and defense,
Direct Sales Company vs. United States, 319 U. 5. 703, 63 5. Ct. 1265.
In discussing United States vs. Falcone, 311 U. S. 205, 61 S. Ct. 204,
85 L. ed. 128, the Supreme Court of the United States said: |
| |
That decision comes down
merely to this, that one does not become a party to a conspiracy by aiding and
abetting it, through sales of supplies or otherwise, unless he knows of the
conspiracy; and the inference of such knowledge cannot be drawn merely from
knowledge the buyer will use the goods
illegally. |
| Further along in the opinion it is said with regard to the intent of
a seller to promote and cooperate in the intended illegal use of goods by a
buyer: |
| |
This intent, when given
effect by overt act, is the gist of conspiracy. While it is not identical with
mere knowledge that another purposes unlawful action, it is not unrelated to
such knowledge. Without the knowledge, the intent cannot exist. (United States
vs. Falcone, supra.) Furthermore, to establish the intent, the
evidence of knowledge must be clear, not equivocal. (Ibid.)
|
__________ * Trial of the Major War
Criminals, Volume I, p.
225.
1127 |