 |
| Thus, von Schnitzler and Kugler, in a letter to Farben representative
Kramer, in Paris, said |
| |
“It is quite obvious that
our tactical position towards the French is by far stronger if the first
fundamental discussion takes place in Germany and, more particularly, at the
site of the Armistice Delegation; and if our program, as outlined, will be
presented, so to say, from official quarters.” [NI-15228, Pros. Ex.
2142.] |
He personally served the ultimatum containing Farben’s demands,
described by the French as a “dictate,” on the representatives of the
French dyestuffs industry. He subsequently supervised and was appraised of the
conference and negotiations conducted by subordinate Farben employees. He
personally signed the Francolor Convention, whereby the French dyestuffs
industry, in opposition to its wishes, was forced to cede a 51 percent interest
in the French industry to Farben. It is clear from this recital of the evidence
that von Schnitzler was a party to the illegal acquisition by Farben of
permanent property interests in France during belligerent occupation. This
constitutes violation of the rights of private property protected by provisions
of the Hague Regulations. Von Schnitzler is found Guilty under count two of the
indictment.
Gajewski. The defendant Gajewski was not personally
active in any of the specific acts of spoliation charged in the indictment. The
prosecution’s case against him under this count, therefore, depends
entirely upon Gajewski’s alleged participation in Farben’s plunder
and spoliation activities predicated upon his regular presence at meetings of
the Vorstand, TEA, or other committee groups at which the various acquisitions
in occupied countries came up for discussion, planning, information, or
approval. It is contended that he knew of and approved such acquisitions
constituting spoliative transactions. As we have heretofore indicated, a
defendant can be held guilty only if the evidence clearly establishes some
positive conduct on his part which constitutes ordering, approving,
authorizing, or joining in the execution of a policy or act which is criminal
in character. It is essential, in keeping with the concept of personal and
individual criminal responsibility, that, when seeking to attach criminality to
acts not personally carried out, the action of a corporate officer in
authorizing illegal action be done with adequate knowledge of those essential
elements of the authorized act which give it its criminal character. With
regard to transactions apparently legal in form, this means positive knowledge
that the owner is being deprived of his property against his will during
military occupancy. We have carefully examined the minutes of the Vorstand and
other Farben groups relied upon by the prosecution to establish Gajewski’s
criminal complicity in the crimes charged under count two, and we cannot find
|
1157 |
. 
