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evidence alone, the prosecution contends, it could be properly
concluded that the defendants, leading officials of Farben, were fully apprised
of, and believed that Germany would ultimately wage aggressive war, if
necessary, and that their activities were directed toward that end. However, in
addition to a volume of evidence bearing upon the nature, scope, character and
timing of Farben's activities, the evidence provides a number of particularly
significant specific indications relied upon by the prosecution to show the
state of mind of Farben’s leadership. This specific evidence includes
admissions, statements, letters, reports of conferences and other action which,
taken together and joined with the general evidence, it is contended, should
serve to dispel any reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a guilty state
of mind or criminal intent.
The following matters are deemed worthy of
note. They by no means constitute a complete review of the evidence on the
subject of knowledge.
a. On 26 May 1936, after he had been
appointed coordinator for raw materials and foreign exchange by Hitler, Goering
held a top secret meeting with his advisory committee of experts. Defendant
Schmitz attended as representative of Farben. It was a meeting at the highest
level, composed of selected representatives of industry and of such top ranking
officials as Keitel, Chief of Staff to the Minister of War; Under State
Secretary Koerner of the Four Year Plan and Keppler, Hitler’s economic
advisor.
In opening the meeting, Goering emphasized the confidential
and secret nature of the data to be discussed, He expressly declared that the
figures about to be disclosed were to be treated as a state secret. He warned
the participants that they were to see that notes did not fall into the wrong
hands. A lengthy discussion of ways and means of improving the raw material
situation ensued. It was frankly stated that the increased consumption of
materials was due to the requirements of the Wehrmacht, including demands of
the Navy. The importance of having an adequate supply of oil on hand for the
case of war (A-Fall) was emphasized as was the necessity of developing
synthetic production of oils. The report of the meeting states [NI-5380, Pros. Ex.
400]: |
| |
“Min. Pres. Goering:
Emphasizes that in the A-case (A-Fall) we would not, under certain
circumstances, get a drop of oil from abroad. With the thorough motorization of
army and navy the whole problem of conducting a war depends on this. All
preparations must be made for the A-case so that the supply of the wartime army
is safeguarded.” |
| The discussion moved to factories under construction and to the use
of American processes. The report states: |
1218 |
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