 |
| opinion, establish the defense of necessity even under the conditions
which existed in Nazi Germany. Recognition of such a defense is, in my view,
utterly inconsistent with the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10 which
indicate quite clearly that governmental compulsion is merely a matter to be
considered in mitigation and does not establish a defense to the fact of guilt.
Thus Section 4 (b) of Article II of Control Council Law No. 10
provides: |
| |
“The fact that any person
acted pursuant to the order of his government or of a superior does not free
him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in
mitigation.” |
Under the evidence it is clear that the defendants in utilizing
slave labor which is conceded to be a war crime (in the case of non-German
nationals) and a crime against humanity, did not, as they assert, in fact, act
exclusively because of the compulsion and coercion of the existing governmental
regulations and policies. The record does not establish by any substantial
credible proof that any of the defendants were actually opposed to the
governmental solution of the manpower problems reflected in these regulations.
On the contrary, the record shows that Farben willingly cooperated and gladly
utilized each new source of manpower as it developed. Disregard of basic human
rights did not deter these defendants. At times they expressed concern over the
inefficiency of compulsory labor but they willingly co-operated in the
tyrannical system. Far from establishing that the defendants acted under
“necessity” or “coercion” in this regard, I conclude from
the record that Farben accepted and frequently sought the forced workers,
including compulsory foreign workers, concentration-camp inmates and prisoners
of war for armament work because there was no other solution to the manpower
needs. Farben and these defendants wanted to meet production quotas in aid of
the German war effort. In fact, the production quotas of Farben were largely
fixed by Farben itself because Farben was completely integrated with the entire
German program of war production. Farben’s planners, led by defendant
Krauch, geared Farben’s potentialities to actual war needs. It is totally
irrelevant that the defendants might have preferred German workers. That they
would have preferred not to commit a crime is no defense to its commission. The
important fact is that Farben’s Vorstand willingly cooperated in utilizing
forced labor. They were not forced to do so. I cannot agree that there was an
absence of a moral choice. In utilizing slave labor within Farben the will of
the actors coincided with the will of those controlling the government and who
had directed or ordered the doing of criminal acts. Under these circumstances
the defense of necessity is certainly not admissible.
I am convinced
that persons in the positions of power and influence of these defendants might
in numberless ways have avoided the widespread participation in the slave-labor
utilization that was prevalent |
1309 |
. 
