“The value of circumstantial evidence depends upon the conclusive nature and tendency of the circumstances relied on to establish any controverted fact. The circumstances must not only be consistent with guilt, but they must be inconsistent with innocence. Such evidence is insufficient when, assuming all to be true which the evidence tends to prove, some other reasonable hypothesis of innocence may still be true; for it is the actual exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt which invests mere circumstances with the force of proof. Therefore, before a court will be warranted in finding a defendant guilty on circumstantial evidence alone, the evidence must show such a well connected and unbroken chain of circumstances as to exclude all other reasonable hypotheses but that of the guilt of the defendant. What circumstances can amount to proof can never be a matter of general definition. In the final analysis the legal test is whether the evidence is sufficient to satisfy beyond a reasonable doubt the understanding and conscience of those who, under their solemn oaths as officers, must assume the responsibility for finding the facts.”

“This Tribunal, before all others, must act in recognition of these self evident principles. If it fails, its whole purpose is frustrated and this trial becomes a mockery. At the very foundation of these juridical concepts lie two important postulates: (1) every person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent, and (2) that presumption abides with him until guilt has been established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

"Unless the court which hears the proof is convinced of guilt to the point of moral certainty, the presumption of innocence must continue to protect the accused. If the facts as drawn from the evidence are equally consistent with guilt and innocence, they must be resolved on the side of innocence. Under