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“The atmosphere of threats,
of intimidation, of lawless acts, the spirit of force and the utter disregard
for the basic rules of law which prevailed inside Germany, were good
indications of what the Nazis could be expected to do in the international
field. This was more clearly indicated by the methods they used in connection
with the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the remilitarization of the
Rhineland and the repudiation of the Locarno Agreement, rearmament, etc. The
final confirmation was easily obtained by observing the progressive trend of
the foreign policy after 1938 as illustrated by the annexation of Austria, of
the Sudetenland, and finally, and most strikingly, of the rest of
Czechoslovakia.”¹ (NI-7765, Pros. Ex. 358.)
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The defendants were in an even better position than Paul Otto Schmidt
to understand the implications of the Nazi program. All of Germany knew the
program announced in “Mein Kampf,” but only an armament firm, such as
Krupp, knew how swiftly action had been taken to put that program into practice
upon the seizure of power. From their share in the rearmament program they had
some idea of the extent of rearmament, and of the tremendous investment in the
equipment that would become obsolete if not employed within a reasonable
period. They also knew of the preoccupation on all sides with the problems that
would arise in the event of war.
Schacht has claimed that “when he
discovered that the Nazis were rearming for aggressive purposes he attempted to
slow down the speed of rearmament,” and the International Military
Tribunal found that he, “as early as 1936, began to advocate a limitation
of the rearmament program for financial reasons.”²
During the
Krupp fiscal year 1937-1938, which saw the march into Austria on 12 March 1938
and which ended with the invasion of the Sudetenland, Krupp, on the contrary,
nearly doubled the armament orders on its books.
Knowledge of the
extent of Krupp participation in the rearmament program was necessarily general
among the top personnel of the concern. Krupp's production of tanks, guns,
submarines, naval turrets, and its part in the fortification of the West Wall,
in the Four Year Plan and in all other aspects of the Nazi prepa-
[…rations] |
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¹ The prosecution
introduced in evidence two affidavit, of Schmidt, Document 3309-PS. Prosecution
Exhibit 357 (cited above as quoted in the judgment of the IMT), and Document
NI-7765, Prosecution Exhibit 358 (quoted in part). Schmidt also appeared as a
witness for both the prosecution and defense before the Tribunal (mimeographed
transcript. 6 February 1948. 2 April 1948, pp. 8817-3388, 5348-5367). None of
this evidence is reproduced in this volume, except for the parte quoted in the
prosecution brief. In the earlier volumes on the Farben case, United States
vs. Carl Krauch, et al.. (Vols. VII-VIII, case 6) testimony by Schmidt
on the same subject has been included.
² Trial of the Major War
Criminals op. cit., supra, vol. 1, p. 300.
388 |
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