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[Tri…] bunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated.
“Leaders, organizers, instigators
and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan
or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all
acts performed by any persons in execution of such plans.” |
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The prosecution contends that to be guilty of participation in the
preparation and waging of aggressive war, under count two of the indictment in
the case before the International Military Tribunal, it was not necessary that
the individual be one of the small circle of conspirators around Hitler, not be
informed of the decisions taken in that circle. Participation in the
preparation and waging of aggressive war, it is claimed, was obviously
considered a crime different from participation in the common plan to wage
aggressive war.
The prosecution claims that the conclusion follows that
participation in the preparation of or waging of aggressive war is a crime
different from the crime of participation in the common plan conceived by
Hitler to wage aggressive war; that is, to be guilty of such participation, it
is not necessary to have attended the conferences at which aggressive war was
planned, or to be advised as to what took place at them, and that such
participation may take place even in advance of the crystallization of a
conspiracy to wage aggressive war.
The prosecution further says that
Control Council Law No. 10 makes not only the preparing of or waging of
aggressive war criminal, but also makes criminal participation in a common plan
or conspiracy, having as its objective, such preparing or waging of aggressive
war. It is claimed that it follows that participation in a plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of acts of the character adjudged by the International
Military Tribunal to constitute preparing or waging aggressive war under count
two of the indictment filed before that Tribunal, is criminal, even though
neither the conspiracy nor the acts form part of the “Nazi
conspiracy” charged under count one. It is also contended that both law
and logic support this conclusion and that if an individual can be guilty of
preparing for, or waging aggressive war, even though he did not participate in
the conspiracy around Hitler, there would appear to be no reason why a group of
individuals should not be held responsible for collectively conspiring toward
the same end. It is claimed that this is what the defendants did in this case.
The claim is made that acting together, but not as part of the “Nazi
conspiracy”, they took action that had as |
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