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special task. I approved of the suggestion and only then was it
possible to smooth out the path for Mr. Siegmann to take over the task in the
Krupp concern which he did in October. First of all, he took over duties within
the working cooperative, and later on in the Krupp concern, direct.
Q.
Did Krupp continue to meet the production quotas after the concern had been
turned back to them in September or October? No, not September or October. It
was finally turned back to them after your expert was put in there and
demonstrated how to do the job?
A. Yes, in April, on the explicit
demand of the firm, I think it was even before the quota was fully met,
production was returned to Krupp. Mr. von Bohlen came personally to Mr. Speer
and asked for it, and Mr. Speer inquired from me whether this could be done,
that the transfer should be carried out earlier than was originally intended,
and I think negotiations took place in March for transfer to be carried out on
1 April 1944.
Q. Getting back to your proposition, the production of
these howitzers from April to September — that was an important program, I
assume?
A. Yes, it was a very important program.
Q. Why was it,
if the Krupp officials were as concerned about it as your cross-examination
seems to indicate, about the pressure that was put on industry, why was it you
fooled with them from April 1943 until September in order to get the production
up? Could that have been accomplished by threats sooner than that?
A.
Minister Speer was against any kind of coercive measures in industry and proved
his attitude more than once, because he did not want to leave the system,
devised by himself, of the self-reliability of industry a mere theory. He had
always been convinced that he would succeed by using the most capable men in
industry and giving them responsibility and the possibility of recruiting the
other people from their own ranks, and settling all the preliminaries and
prerequisites essential for such production. As I said, Mr. Speer was convinced
that such a method would eventually succeed, even if there were some incidental
disappointments. The only goal was to achieve total production. He more than
once laid those principles down in writing, and in his efficiency report of 27
January 1945 he proved his principles by showing that the average German war
production of tanks, weapons, munitions, cars, railroad cars, airplanes, ships,
from the year 1940 until the year 1944 —
Q. Wait a minute. You are
wandering and the time is short. There are only one or two more questions. The
sum and substance is that Speer was absolutely opposed to coercive measures,
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