. ©MAZAL LIBRARY

NMT09-T1437


. NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL
Volume IX · Page 1437
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Table of Contents - Volume 9
necessity i.e., when the life of one person can be saved only by the sacrifice of another, will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. The issue, it should be observed, is not simply whether a particular life is to be sacrificed in case of necessity, but whether it is right for a person to commit a crime in order to save his life. The canon law prescribes that a person whose life is dependent on immediate relief may set up such necessity as a defense to a prosecution for illegally seizing such relief. To the same general effect speak high English and American authorities. Life, however, can usually only be taken, under the plea of necessity, when necessary for the preservation of the life of the party setting up the plea, or the preservation of the lives of relatives in the first degree.”
As the prosecution says, most of the cases where this defense has been under consideration involved such situations as two shipwrecked persons endeavoring to support themselves on a floating object large enough to support only one; the throwing of passengers out of an overloaded life boat; or the participation in crime under the immediate or present threat of death or great bodily harm. So far as we have been able to ascertain with the limited facilities at hand, the application to a factual situation such as that presented in the Nuernberg trials of industrialists is novel.

The plea of necessity is one in the nature of confession and avoidance. While the burden of proof is upon the prosecution throughout, it does not have to anticipate and negative affirmative defenses. The applicable rule is that the prosecution is compelled to establish every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt in the first instance. However, if the accused’s defense “is exclusively one of admission and avoidance, or if he pleads some substantive or independent matter as a defense which does not constitute an element of the crime charged, the burden of proving such defense devolves upon him. As a general rule, in matters of defense, mitigations, excuse, or justification, the accused is required to prove such circumstances by evidence sufficient to prove only a reasonable doubt of his guilt. And if the circumstances relied upon are supported by such proof as produces a reasonable doubt as to the truth of the charge against the accused when the whole evidence is considered by the jury, there must be an acquittal”.* The question then is whether, upon a consideration of the whole evidence, it can be justly said that there is such a doubt.

The defense of necessity is not identical with that of self-defense. The principal distinction lies in the legal principle in- […volved.]  
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* Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, op. cit. supra, section 211, pages 236 and 237.
 
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