 |
smelled too much of defeatism; therefore, we had to retain a certain
amount of bonds.” The witness further testified that this was very
dangerous and hence was done with great secrecy. He justified the policy upon
the theory that the firm had a responsibility toward the workers whose
livelihood depended upon them.
Whatever the reason, the sale of these
bonds amounted to treason under the laws of the Reich for which the penalty was
death. It was the very type of thing which the dread Gestapo, of which so much
is said in this case, was supposed to detect and prevent.
It is true
that the sale of the bonds was not openly made but if it be conceded that in
the case of individuals so influential and important as the owners and
officials of the Krupp firm that the risk was great, it must also be conceded
that it was readily incurred whenever they thought there was involved interest
of sufficient importance to justify such a course. |
| |
| |
| LAW AS TO INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY |
| |
| As already said, we hold that guilt must be personal. The mere fact
without more that a defendant was a member of the Krupp Directorate or an
official of the firm is not sufficient. The rule which we adopt and apply is
stated in an authoritative American text as follows: |
| |
“Officers, directors, or
agents of a corporation participating in a violation of law in the conduct of
the company's business may be held criminally liable individually therefor. So,
although they are ordinarily not criminally liable for corporate acts performed
by other officers of agents, and at least where the crime charged involves
guilty knowledge or criminal intent, it is essential to criminal liability on
his part that he actually and personally do the acts which constitute the
offense or that they be done by his direction or permission. He is liable where
his scienter or authority is established, or where he is the actual present and
efficient actor. When the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the
prohibition extends to the board of directors and to each director, separately
and individually.”* |
| Under the circumstances as to the set up of the Krupp enterprise
after it became a private firm in December 1943, the same principle applies.
Moreover, the essential facts may be shown by circumstantial as well as direct
evidence, if sufficiently strong in probative value to convince the tribunal
beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable
hypothesis. |
__________
* Corpus Juris Secundum
(American Law Book Co., Brooklyn. N. Y., 1940), volume 19, pages 368 and 364.
1448 |
. 
