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XII. DISSENTING OPINION OF PRESIDING
JUDGE
ANDERSON ON THE SENTENCES
IMPOSED BY THE
TRIBUNAL¹ |
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The following is submitted pursuant to reservations made by me at
the time I signed the judgment.
Upon the question of the guilt or
innocence of the defendants under counts two and three of the indictment, I
concur in the result reached by the Tribunal. As to the punishment, I concur in
that fixed for the defendant Kupke. As to the defendant Alfried Krupp, I concur
in the length of the prison sentence, but dissent from the order confiscating
his property.
As to all other defendants, I feel
bound to disagree with respect to the length of the respective sentences
imposed.² In general, the basis of my disagreement is this: Having in mind
that the defendants were heretofore acquitted of crimes against the peace, I
think there are many circumstances in mitigation not mentioned in the judgment
which should be given more weight.
In my view, the evidence as to the
defendant Loeser presents a special case. Apart from the fact that during the
war he resigned his position with the Krupp firm due to a disagreement with
respect to certain policies and apart from other circumstances winch seem to me
proper to be considered in mitigation, I am convinced that before he joined the
Krupp firm in 1937, and continuously thereafter, Dr. Loeser was identified with
the underground movement to overthrow Hitler and the Nazi Regime, and that
having been arrested by the Gestapo in connection with the plot of 20 July
1944, he escaped the death penalty meted out to others similarly involved only
through a delay in his trial as a result of which he was liberated by the
Allied troops.
Were I not convinced as a matter of principle that a
finding of guilt or innocence by a court or tribunal enforcing criminal laws is
not a discretionary matter, I would vote to acquit Dr. Loeser. |
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¹ Dissenting opinion
of Presiding Judge Anderson is recorded in the mimeographed transcript. 31 July
1948, pp. 13451-13452.
² After judgment had been rendered on 31
July 1948. Presiding Judge Anderson made and filed with the Secretary General
of the Tribunals a memorandum concerning his dissent, as follows:
“Since the judgment was rendered, some question appears to have
arisen as to the nature and extent of my dissent from that portion of the
judgment dealing with the guilt or innocence of the respective defendants under
counts two and three of the indictment, as distinguished from that portion
dealing with the punishment.
“Although it seems to me that there
should he no question about the matter, in order to remove any doubt about it.
this statement is made by way of clarification: I fully concur in the acquittal
of the defendant Pfirsch. and also in the reasons assigned therefor in the
judgment. As to the remaining defendants, I fully concur in the result only.
“In my judicial and professional experience, the qualification
indicated by a concurrence limited to the result is a well understood and
established practice.”
1453 |
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