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in view of the decision of the Tribunal in United States vs.
Friedrich Flick, et al. With this contention I cannot agree. The factual
situation of the Flick Case and of that before us is at great variance.
The Flick judgment found that, as far as Flick’s management of a
certain French plant was concerned, “it was, no doubt, Goering’s
intention to exploit it to the fullest extent for the German war effort. I do
not believe that this intent was shared by Flick. Certainly, what was done by
his company in the course of its management falls far short of such
exploitation.” And, again, “We find no exploitation * * * to fulfill
the aims of Goering. Adopting the method used by the IMT — namely,
specifically the limitation that the exploitation of the occupied country
should not be greater than the economy of the country can reasonably be
expected to bear” — the Flick Tribunal, on the basis of the evidence
of its own case, found that “the source of the raw materials (used by
Flick in the Russian railway car plant) is not shown except that iron and steel
were bought from German firms,” and also considered it relevant to
establish that the manufacture of armament by Flick in Russia was not proved.
The Flick Tribunal decided that “when the German civilians departed, all
plants were undamaged.” Furthermore, according to the evidence received by
the Flick Tribunal, there were other basic differences; they were paid from
government funds and responsible only to Reich officials. At one of the two
Russian enterprises operated by Flick, “the plants barely got into
production.” In short, the facts in the Flick Case were substantially
different.
Prior to the evacuation of the plants at Kramatorsk and
Manupol as stated above, the Krupp firm aided in stripping these plants of
machinery and raw materials. The property removed did not fall into any
category of movable public property which the occupant is authorized to seize
under the Hague Regulations and the participation of the Krupp firm in the
removal of such materials and machinery was a direct violation of the laws of
land warfare. The participation of the Krupp firm in the demolition of these
plants was also a violation of the requirements of the Hague Regulations that
the capital of such properties be safeguarded and administered in accordance
with the laws of usufruct.
I am of the opinion that the Krupp firm
abetted the Reich government and its various agencies in the utter and complete
spoliation of the Russian occupied territories, took a consenting part in, and
was connected with plans and enterprises involving the commission of those
crimes. |
1483 |
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