Source: Law-Reports of Trials of War Criminals, The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Volume XII, London, HMSO, 1949

[Some sections have been highlighted provisionally until hyperlinks can be added to appropriate files. Page numbers precede text]

Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V Part VI Part VII Part VIII 

Evidence with Particular Reference to the Commissar Order
Evidence with Particular Reference to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order

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(b) Evidence with Particular Reference to the Commissar Order

On 30^th March, 1941, Hitler held a conference at Berlin with leaders of the Wehrmacht. Von Leeb was present. At that time, according to the summary contained in General Halder’s diary, Hitler said :

" Clash of two ideologies. Crushing denunciation of Bolshevism, identified with a social criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for our future. We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A Communist is no comrade before nor after the battle. This is a war of extermination. If we fail to grasp this, and though we are sure to beat the enemy, we shall again have to fight the Communist foe 30 years from now. We do not wage war to preserve the enemy. . . .

" War against Russia. Extermination of the Bolshevist Commissars and of the Communist intelligentsia. The new States must be Socialist, but without intellectual classes of their own. Growth of a new intellectual class must be prevented. A primitive Socialist intelligentsia is all that is needed. We must fight against the poison of disintegration. This is no job for military courts. The individual troop commander must know the issues at stake. They must be leaders in the fight. The troops must fight back with the methods with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU men are criminals and must be dealt with as such. This need not mean that the troops get out of hand. Rather the commander must give orders which express the common feelings of his troops.

" This war will be very different from the war in the West. In the East, harshness today means leniency in the future. Commanders must make the sacrifice of overcoming their personal scruples."

This seemed to have caused some excitement among those present, who, of course, recognized it as being brutal, murderous and uncivilized. After Hitler had made his speech and had departed to his inner sanctum, protests were uttered by the commanders to the effect that the extermination planned by Hitler would violate their soldierly principles, and, further, would destroy discipline. Brauchitsch agreed with them and promised to express their opinion to the OKW and Hitler respectively. He tried through Keitel to obtain a change in the plans, but was unable to do so. Subsequently, he lent his approval to the objections made by the field commanders, who, in some instances at least, expressed a negative opinion of the order to their subordinates and tried to avoid its execution as far as they could do so without peril to themselves. One of the means to ameliorate the brutality

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of the Commissar Order was the issuance by von Brauchitsch of what is known as the " Maintenance of Discipline " order hereafter referred to.

On 6^th June, 1941, the Commissar Order was issued from the Fuehrer Headquarters as " TOP SECRET, Transmission only by officer ! " and was captioned, " Directives for the Treatment of Political Commissars." It was as follows :

" In the fight against Bolshevism it is not to be expected that the enemy will act in accordance with the principles of Humanity or of the International Law. In particular, a vindictive, cruel and inhuman treatment of our prisoners must be expected on the part of the political Commissars of all types, as they are the actual leaders of the resistance.

" The troops must realize :

" (1) In this fight, leniency and considerations of International Law are out of place in dealing with these elements. They constitute a danger for their own safety and the swift pacification of the conquered territories.

" (2) The originators of barbarous Asiatic methods of warfare are the political commissars. They must therefore be dealt with most severely, at once and summarily.

" Therefore, they are to be liquidated at once when taken in combat or offering resistance.

" For the rest the following directives will apply :

" I. Combat Zone

(1) Political commissars who oppose our troops will be treated in accordance with the ‘ decree concerning the application of martial law in the Barbarossa area.’ This applies to commissars of any type and grade, even if they are only suspected of resistance, sabotage or of instigation thereto. 

Reference is made to the ‘ directive concerning the conduct of the troops in Russia.’

(2) Political commissars as organs of the enemy troops are recognizable  by special insignia-red star with interwoven gold hammer and sickle on the sleeves-(for particulars see ‘ The Armed Forces of the USSR,’ High Command of the Armed Forces/General Staff of the Army, Qu IV, Section Foreign Armies East (II) No. 100/41 secret, of 15^th January, 1941, appendix 9 d). They are to be segregated at once, e.g. still on the battlefield, from the prisoners of war. This is necessary to prevent them from influencing the prisoners of war in any way. These commissars will not be recognized as soldiers, the protection of prisoners of war by International Law does not apply to them. They will be liquidated after segregation.

(3) Political commissars who have not committed or are not suspected of hostile acts will not be harmed for the time being. Only after deeper penetration of the country will it be possible to decide whether officials who were left behind may stay where they are or will be handed over to the Sonderkommandos. Preferably the latter should decide on this point..

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As a matter of principle, in deciding the question whether ‘guilty or not guilty,’ the personal impression which the commissar makes of his mentality and attitude will have precedence over facts which may be unprovable.

(4) In cases 1 and 2, a short message (message form) about the incident will be sent :

(a) by divisional units to divisional headquarters (Intelligence Officer).

(b) by troops directly under the command of a corps, an army or an army group or a Panzer group, to the respective head-quarters (Intelligence Officer).

(5) None of the above-mentioned measures must obstruct the operations. Methodical searches and mopping-up actions, therefore, will not be carried out by the troops.

" II. In the Communications Zone

" Commissars who are arrested in the communications zone on account of a doubtful attitude will be handed over to the Einsatzgruppen and/or Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police (Security Service).

"III. Limitations of Courts-Martial and Summary Courts

" The courts-martial and summary courts of the regimental and other commanders must not be entrusted with the execution of the measures as per I and II."

On 8^th June, 1941, von Brauchitsch sent out a supplement of two additional clauses to be added to the original, viz., to I, Number 1, 

" Action taken against a political commissar must be based on the fact that the person in question has shown by a special, recognisable act or attitude that he opposes or will in future oppose the Wehrmacht."

to I, Number 2,

" Political commissars attached to the troops should be segregated and dealt with by order of an oficer, inconspicuously and outside the proper battle zone."

On 24^th May, 1941, however, von Brauchitsch formulated the Maintenance of Discipline order, in which as a supplement to the Fuehrer Order it is said : 

" Subject : Treatment of Enemy Civilians and Criminal Acts of t r: Members of the Wehrmacht against Enemy Civilians. 

Attached Fuehrer decree is (hereby) announced. It is to be distributed in writing down to the commanders with jurisdiction of their own ; beyond that, the principles contained in it are to be made known orally.

" I expect that all counter intelligence measures of the troops will be carried out energetically, for their own security and the speedy pacification of the territory won. It will be necessary to take into account the

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variety of ethnic strains within the population, its overall attitude, and the degree to which they have been stirred up.

" Movement and combat against the enemy’s armed forces are the real tasks of the troops. It demands the fullest concentration and the highest effort of all forces. This task must not be jeopardized in any place. Therefore, in general, special search and mopping-up operations will be out of question for the combat troops.

" The directives of the Fuehrer concern serious cases of rebellion, in which the most severe measures are required.

" Criminal acts of a minor nature are, always in accordance with the combat situation, to be punished according to detailed orders from an officer (if possible, a post commander) by resorting to provisional measures (for instance), temporary detention at reduced rations, roping-up on a tree, assignment to labour).

" The C.-in-C.‘s of the Army Groups are requested to obtain my approval prior to the re-instatement of Wehrmacht jurisdiction in the pacified territories. The C.-in-C.‘s of the Armies are expected to make suggestions in this respect in time.

" Special instructions will be issued about the treatment to be given to political dignitaries.

" Supplements to II :

" Under all circumstances it will remain the duty of all superiors to prevent arbitrary excesses of individual members of the Army and to prevent in time the troops becoming unmanageable. It must not come to it that the individual soldier commits or omits any act he thinks proper toward the indigenous population ; he must rather feel that in every case he is bound by the orders of his officers. I consider it very important that this be clearly understood down to the lowest unit. Timely action by every officer, especially every company commander, etc., must help to maintain discipline, the basis of our successes.

" Occurrences with regard to ‘ I ’ and ‘ II,’ and which are of special importance, are to be reported by the troops to the OKH as special 9 events.

(Signed) VON BRAUCHITSCH

There were 340 copies of this order, which, as noted, had attached a copy of the Fuehrer Order. This apparently was given wide distribution, although the original Fuehrer Order had a very limited distribution. 

It was claimed by the Defence that the Maintenance of Discipline order was conceived by von Brauchitsch as a means of sabotaging the Hitler order, but it will be noted that in the quoted part of Halder’s diary he had Hitler saying, " This need not mean that the troops get out of hand." 

The record contains a large number of reports showing the execution of commissars by units subordinate to various of the accused.

The evidence showed that the accused von Leeb was present at the meeting held by Hitler in March, 1941, when the proposed extermination of the

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commissars was announced. Von Leeb had considered this to be in violation of International Law and also to be unwise in that it tended to defeat its own purpose. He had lodged a protest with von Brauchitsch who had assured him that he would do all he could to prevent the issuance of the order. Nevertheless the order was later issued by the OKW. Not only the accused von Leeb as Commander of Army Group North, but also von Bock of Army Group Centre and von Rundstedt of Army Group South were opposed to the order. When the order was issued, it was directed by the OKW to the armies in these three groups. In other words, the Army Group had nothing to do with the passing on of this order to subordinate units beyond the administrative functions of forwarding it to them. It was also established that the accused von Leeb had discussed this order with his subordinate commanders and let them know of his opposition to it. He had also drawn attention to the Maintenance of Discipline Order issued by von Brauchitsch in an effort to thwart as far as he could the enforcement of the Commissar Order. It was clear from the evidence that the accused von Leeb had protested against the order in every way short of open and defiant refusal to obey it. In spite of his attitude reports of units in the subordinate commands indicated that these commanders had permitted the enforcement of this order and that many of these commissars had been murdered.

As to the accused von Kuechler the evidence showed that he, as commander of the 18^th Army, had received this order directly from the OKW together with the von Brauchitsch Maintenance of Discipline Order. He had passed on the Commissar Order to subordinate commanders. Von Kuechler had also attended the above-mentioned meeting with Hitler in March, 1941, and knew of the impending war of ideology or extermination. He testified that he had been opposed to the order, but the evidence in this respect was rather contradictory. The fact remained that he had distributed the order and that it had been enforced by units subordinate to him in the 18^th Army. Many reports were made by these units showing that commissars were being executed by them.

The accused Hoth was assigned to Army Group Centre for the war against Russia. He remained as commander of Panzer Group 3 until the 10^th October, 1941, when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 17^th Army attached to Army Group South. On 15^th May, 1942, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 4^th Panzer Army in which position he remained until he was transferred to the Fuehrer Reserve in October, 1943. The accused Hoth had also attended the meeting with Hitler in March, 1941. He had received the order from his superior von Brauchitsch and testified that he had simply passed it down without emphasizing it or attempting to mitigate its effect. He did not think that Hitler would ask his commanders to do anything wrong and in any case a directive from Hitler superseded in his opinion Section 48 of the German Military Penal Code which provides that an officer need not carry out an order that is clearly criminal on its face and commits a criminal act if he so does. Numerous reports submitted by his subordinate units indicated that hundreds of commissars had been executed. It was established that several of these reports were seen and signed by the accused Hoth. The evidence left no

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doubt that the Commissar Order had been passed down by Hoth and that it had, with his knowledge and approval, been ruthlessly carried out by units subordinate to him.

The accused Reinhardt entered the Russian campaign as Commanding-General of the 41^st Panzer Corps subordinated to Army Group North. The evidence showed that he had received the Commissar Order and had communicated it orally to his Divisional Commanders. He testified that when he transmitted it to his divisions, he had directed orally that it was not to be carried out, but the evidence on this point was unclear and conflicting. It was established that he had passed down the order and many reports showed that hundreds of commissars had been executed by his subordinate units in circumstances which clearly imputed knowledge on his part. 

The evidence showed that the Commissar Order was received by the accused von Salmuth while he was Commanding General of the XXXth Army Corps. It was shown that it was distributed to subordinate units by him. Von Salmuth testified that he rejected the order and that he had acquainted his divisional commanders with his objections. The evidence did not establish that the order was ever carried out within the XXXth Army Group while it was under the command of the accused.

The accused Hollidt had, as commander of the 50^th Infantry Division, received the Commando Order or a similar order in writing. He testified that he had instructed his regimental commanders not to comply with this order.

The only two reports relied upon in evidence as to such executions were ambiguous and unclear and did not suffice to establish any criminal responsibility on his part.

The accused von Roques admitted that he learned of the Commando Order in June or July, 1941. At that time he was Commander of the Rear Area of Army Group South. Later he became Commander of the Rear Area of Army Group A (Caucasus). He denied that he had passed down the order but the evidence on this point was conflicting. There was, however, overwhelming evidence to show that the order had been given a very extensive. implementation in his territory. Commissars were regularly shot with his knowledge and he took no action as a result. Numerous orders and reports established that thousands of so-called guerrillas, functionaries and Jews had been executed within his area according to the Commissar Order in circumstances which could leave no doubt that they were carried out with the knowledge, connivance or approval of the accused.

The accused Reinecke was, at the outbreak of the war, Chief of the Genera1 Wehrmacht Office (AWA) and remained so until the end of the war. One of the most important sub-sections of this office was that of prisoner-of-war affairs. The evidence established that the accused had general control and responsibility over these matters within the Reich, the General Government, the Reich Commissariat and other areas under the OKW. In June, 1942, the accused signed a decree termed " Policy regarding Commissars and Politruks " which provided for the " elimination " of Commissars and Politruks while within the General Government. It was clear from 

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evidence that the accused knew, participated in, and approved of the enforcement of the Commissar Order within his area of authority, in so far as it was applicable to prisoners of war.

The evidence showed that the accused Warlimont, as Chief of the Section of National Defence under the OKW, had taken a substantial part in the preliminary and final phases of the drafting of the Commissar Order.  Although it was clear that the idea for the murder of prisoners of war, etc., in the name of ideological warfare did not originate with the accused, the evidence established that he contributed his part to moulding it into its final form. It was distributed " by order " under his signature. There was nothing to indicate that those contributions which he made in any way softened its harshness.

The accused Woehler, as Chief of Staff of the 11^th Army, knew of the receipt of the Commissar Order. The evidence did not, however, establish any participation on his part in its transmittal to the subordinate units. He also knew of its enforcement, but as Chief of Staff he had no command authority over subordinate units. Neither did he have any executive power. The evidence failed to show any personal connection on his part with the passing down or execution of the order.

The accused Lehmann was a doctor of law. In July, 1938, he became Chief of the Legal Department of the OKW, which position he held until the capitulation of Germany. The only connection which he was shown by the evidence to have had with the issuance of the Commissar Order, was an immaterial change in the wording of Section 3 as to courts-martial. He had made no material contribution to the preparatory or final drafting of that order.

The accused Sperrle and Schniewind were not involved in, and not charged in connection with, the issuance or implementation of the Commissar Order.

(c) Evidence with Particular Reference to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order

The so-called Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order was issued by Keitel on 13^th May, 1941, as " Decree on Exercising Military Jurisdiction in the Area of Barbarossa and Special Measures by the Troops," and reads as follows :

" The Wehrmacht’s application of its laws (Wehrmachtsgerichtsbarkeit) place at maintaining discipline.

" The vast extent of the operational areas in the East, the fighting methods necessitated thereby and the peculiarity of the enemy give the Wehrmacht courts jobs which-in view of their limited personnel-they can only solve during war operations and until some degree of pacification has been obtained in the conquered area if they limit themselves at first to their main task.

" This is possible only if the troops themselves oppose ruthlessly any threat from the enemy population.

" For these reasons herewith the following is ordered for the area ‘ Barbarossa ’ (area of operations, army group rear area, and area of political administration)

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I

" Treatment of Crimes committed by Enemy Civilians

" (1) Until further order the military courts and the courts-martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians. 

" (2) Franc-tireurs will be liquidated ruthlessly by the troops in combat or while fleeing.

" (3) Also all other attacks by enemy civilians against the Armed Forces, its members and auxiliaries will be suppressed on the spot by the troops with the most rigorous methods until the assailants are finished. (Niederkaempfen.)

" (4) Where such measures were not taken or at least were not possible, persons suspected of the act will be brought before an officer at once. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.

" Against localities from which troops have been attacked in a deceitful or treacherous manner, collective coercive measures will be applied immediately upon the order of an officer of the rank of at least battalion, etc., commander, if the circumstances do not permit a quick identification of individual perpetrators.

" (5) It is strictly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to put them at the disposal of the courts after the reinstatement of jurisdiction over indigenous inhabitants.

" (6) The C.-in-C.s of the Army Groups can-by agreement with the competent commanders of the Luftwaffe and the Navy-reinstate jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht courts for civilians, in areas sufficiently pacified.

" For the area of’ the Political Administration this order will be given by the Chief of the OKW.

II

" (1) With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht or by its auxiliaries, prosecution is not obligatory, even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or misdemeanour.

" (2) When judging such offences, it will be taken into consideration in any type of procedure that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable followers of the movement were caused primarily by bolshevist influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

" (3) Therefore the judiciary will decide in such case whether disciplinary punishment will be appropriate, or whether prosecution in court is necessary. In the case of offences against indigenous inhabitants the judiciary will order a prosecution before the military courts

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only if the maintenance of discipline or the security of the Forces call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious deeds due to lack of self-control in sexual matters, which originate from a criminal disposition and which indicate that the discipline of the troops is threatening to deteriorate seriously. Crimes which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or any other kind of captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces will be judged, as a rule, not less severely.

" The order to start investigation procedure requires in every single case the signature of the judicial authority.

" (4) Extreme caution is required in judging the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.

III

" In so far as they are competent, it is the personal responsibility of the troop commanders to see to it :

" (I) that all officers of the units under their command are instructed in time and in the most emphatic manner about the principles set out under ‘ I ’ above ;

" (2) that their legal advisers are informed in time of these rules and of the verbal communications in which the political intentions of the Supreme Command (Fuehrung) were explained to the C.-in-C.s.

" (3) that only those sentences will be confirmed which correspond to the political intentions of the Supreme Command (Fuehrung).

IV

" Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will merely have the classification of a Top Secret."

The order was thus divided into two main parts : first, it dispensed with court-martial jurisdiction over the civilian population and provided that civilians in the occupied areas would. be subjected to arbitrary punishment upon the decision of an officer. The second part provided that there was no obligation to prosecute members of the Wehrmacht or its auxiliaries who committed crimes against enemy civilians except in cases involving discipline which were restricted to certain types of offences.

The evidence showed that apart from a mass liquidation which occurred at Kowno, no liquidations within the accused von Leeb’s area of command had been brought to the attention of the accused. This action, apparently inspired by the Einsatzgtuppen, was carried out as a pogrom and was blamed upon a local self-defence organization of Latvians. Hearing of this action, the accused took action to prevent any recurrence of a similar nature within the area of the 18^th Army where Kowno was located. The evidence failed to prove that the accused von Leeb knew that the German Government was carrying out an extermination programme or that the activities of the Einsatzgruppen were brought to his knowledge. The reports by

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various officers of the Einsatzgruppen on these activities were not sent to von Leeb or through his headquarters but to their superiors in Berlin. Reports containing incidents of illegal executions by the SIPO in connection with security operations were made from subordinate units in von Leeb’s command to the Army Group Rear Areas, Armies, and Corps Headquarters. It was not established that these reports were transmitted to the headquarters of the Army Group North or reported to von Leeb by his staff. He did not receive or pass down the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order. 

The evidence showed that the accused von Kuechler received the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, that it was disseminated by him without any action on his part to prevent its criminal application and that it was carried out by units under his command. Units subordinate to him summarily executed civilians because they were Communists, gipsies, had an anti-German attitude, on suspicion of aiding partisans, for anti-German propaganda, for listening to Radio Moscow and for spreading rumours of atrocities, for refusing to work, and so on. Summary executions were held after an on-the-spot investigation by an officer, even down to a second lieutenant. Brutality was substituted for judicial process and suspicion took the place of proof. The evidence also showed that with his knowledge and approval some 230 insane and diseased women in an asylum were executed because they were considered " no longer objects with lives worth living according to German conception." On the other hand the evidence did not show any responsibility on the part of von Kuechler in connection with the extermination activities of Einsatzgruppe A within the area of his command. 

The evidence established that the accused Hoth received and passed down this order without attaching any safeguards to it. The evidence also showed that the order with his knowledge and approval had been ruthlessly carried out by his subordinate units.

The accused Reinhardt was also shown to have passed down the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order to his subordinate commanders. On 25^th February, 1942, he gave the following directions to his troops: " 6. If weapons are found in the possession of partisans or their partisan activity seems quite obvious, the partisans are to be shot or hung by order of an officer . . . Similar treatment should be given to inhabitants who supported partisans." On 31^st. July, 1942, he signed an order which, among other things, stated : " the death sentence may be imposed on every tenth man if the ringleader or the especially guilty person cannot be apprehended." These and a number of other orders showed that the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order had been carried out in the most ruthless way by units under the accused’s command, on his orders or with his knowledge or approval. Thousands of persons had been executed within his area of command according to this order.

There was not sufficient evidence to show that the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order had been transmitted by the accused von Salmuth. The evidence did show, however, that many illegal executions had been carried out by his subordinate units. Numerous reports showed that thousands of "partisans," " suspects " and " agents " had been liquidated. It was not quite clear from the evidence whether or not these executions were carried out according to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order in particular but the evidence left no

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doubt that they had been carried out with the knowledge, connivance or approval of the accused in close co-operation with all participating German agencies.

As to the accused von Roques, the evidence showed that he had passed this order down to his subordinate units. It also showed that he personally issued other harsh orders in implementation of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order or pursuant to it, that numerous " suspects," being " partisans," had been executed without trial and that mass executions had taken place on his orders.

The evidence showed that the accused Warlimont in his capacity as Chief of the Section of National Defence of the OKW was connected with the formulation of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order together with the accused Lehmann who was Chief of the Legal Department of the OKW. It was established that Lehmann on the 28^th April, 1941, had prepared a draft of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order on instructions from Keitel. His original proposal was not accepted but as a result of his discussions with the authorities concerned a final and fourth draft was submitted to Keitel which, with a few minor modifications, was issued over the signature of Keitel and became what was later known as the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order. It was apparent that the accused Lehmann’s idea, for good or evil, became a part of this order. His final draft contained, among other things, the provisions as to collective punishments, which left the door open to the decision of an officer of at least the rank of a battalion commander to impose such collective punishments as he saw fit. The evidence also showed that due to the influence of Lehmann a provision was finally inserted in the order to the effect that troops would dispose of all cases and that courts were to have no jurisdiction whatsoever, whereas General Mueller had urged that troops were to dispose of only those clear cases and that doubtful cases were to be left to the jurisdiction of the courts. In this decision the accused Lehmann was supported by the accused Warlimont. This provision, which did not derive from Hitler or Keitel, was one of the most serious parts of the order. It was clear from the evidence that the accused Lehmann became the main factor in determining the final form of the order.

As to the accused Otto Woehler it was shown by the evidence that the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order had been received by the 11^th Army, but it failed to prove any criminal connection with its distribution on the part of the accused. On 5^th September, 1941, however, an order was issued by the 11^th Army signed, in pursuance of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, by Woehler as Chief of Staff. This order provided that civilians who are " sufficiently suspected " of certain offences are to be shot including boys and girls. Reports showed that these orders had been carried out. 

The evidence did not establish that the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order was ever transmitted by the accused Hollidt. The order upon which the prosecution based its charge against the accused Hollidt in this respect was a drastic military order for the suppression of partisans and to secure the area of the 5^th Infantry Division against guerrilla activities by the population. It may be inferred that this order was derived from the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order. By implementing this order the accused had, however, placed a limitation upon its enforcement to the effect that only those persons

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who were proved by their own confession or by credible evidence to have been guerrillas were to be shot. The evidence did not establish any criminal responsibility on the part of the accused in connection with this order or the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.

The evidence showed that the accused Schniewind did not see the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order before 20^th May, 1941. At that time he was Chief of the Naval Command Office and Chief of Staff of the Navy War Staff, a department in the Naval Command Office. He relinquished this command on 12^th June, 1941, and the evidence showed that the order was not passed down to subordinate units until 17^th June, nearly a week after he had left his command.

The accused Sperrle was not charged with any criminal responsibility in connection with the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order. The evidence did not show that the accused Reinecke was particularly connected with the preparation, issuing or implementation of this order.

Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V Part VI Part VII Part VIII