Source: Law-Reports of Trials of War Ciminals, The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Volume XII, London, HMSO, 1949



30TH DECEMBER. 1947 - 28TH OCTOBER, 1948

Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V Part VI Part VII Part VIII 

Part V

Evidence with Particular Reference to the Compulsory Recruitment and Deportation of Slave Labour

Evidence with Particular Reference to the Forced use of Civilians for Prohibited Work

Evidence with Particular Reference to the Alleged Murder, Ill-treatment, Persecution, and Execution of Jews and Co-operation with the Einsatzgruppen and Sonderkommandos of the SIPO and SD

Evidence with Particular Reference to Alleged Crimes against the Civilian Population in Connection with Evacuation and in Connection with the Retreat of the German Army in the Eastern Territories

Evidence with Particular Reference to the Alleged Criminal Conduct by the German Army Under the Accused von Leeb's Command in Connection with the Siege of Leningrad


in Belgium. On the 30th October, 1940, he addressed a communication to the Armed Forces Commander in the Netherlands, supplementing this order of Keitel’s, a copy of which he sent to Reichsleiter Rosenberg for his information.

The evidence showed that the accused Hollidt had issued a directive that " everything which could be usable to the enemy in the area must be destroyed if no evacuation is possible." In the Tribunal’s opinion, it failed to show, however, that these measures were not warranted by military necessity.

On the 11th November, 1941, an order was issued from the 12th Panzer Division, which was under the accused von Leeb’s command, directing an operation against certain villages " used by the partisans as a base of operations " with instructions to seize the cattle, horses, and chickens and most of the food. At the same time, however, the order directed a small amount of food to be left for the population at the discretion of the Commander of the operations. Another order of the 39th Corps issued on 7th December, 1941, in connection with a forced retreat, called for the destruction of food and fodder that could not be taken along in the retreat. It seemed, however, that the destruction of these foodstuffs was intended to hamper the advancing enemy and was in the Tribunal’s view warranted by military necessity.

The evidence also failed to show any criminal responsibility on the part of the accused von Kuechler, Reinhardt, von Salmuth and Woehler in connection with similar charges of plunder and spoliation brought against them. The accused, Sperrle, Hoth, Schniewind, von Roques and Lehmann were not charged with crimes of this kind.

(j) Evidence with Particular Reference to the Compulsory Recruitment and Deportation of Slave Labour

It was conceded that the policy of recruitment of slave labour for the Reich (Footnote: See Vol. VII, pp. 29 et seq.)  did not originate with the Wehrmacht. It appeared, however, that the Wehrmacht desired this source of labour for its own purposes, and furthermore, it seemed obvious from the evidence that this large-scale programme could not have been effectively carried out without the co-operation of the military authorities in the occupied territories.

The evidence showed beyond question the ruthless manner in which the accused von Kuechler contributed to this criminal programme. On 8th June, 1942, the 285th Security Division reported to the Commander of the Rear Area of the Army Group North as follows :-

" The moral of the population has been lowered a good deal by the labour allocation to Germany since the recruiting had to be carried on in most cases by imposing a forced quota on the various communities."

A situation report dated 15th March, 1942, to the Commander of the " Rear Army of the Army Group North, stated as follows :

" Of peculiar interest is the seizure of refugees to cover the needs of labour for the Reich and for the fighting troops as well as for the war


plants in the rear army area and Estonia. During the period 28th January-19th February, all in all, sixteen transport trains containing 9,786 persons went to the transit camp in East Prussia. From the. area around Sebesch and Idriza on 15th February, 1942, altogether three transport trains with 1,357 persons were sent off. At the present time an additional 1,500 persons, who are gathered in Krasnegwardeisk, are ready for transport."

Even children over ten were considered as labourers. These and other reports, several of which bore the accused’s signature, showed clearly the extent to which he had contributed to the enforcement of the forced labour programme of the Reich.

Deportation and enslavement of civilians was also shown to have been carried out on a large scale within the area of the accused Reinhardt’s army commands. A report to the 3rd Panzer Army, dated 6th March, 1944, showed the manner of conscription and the attitude of the Army long after the beginning of the war. It read in part as follows :

" Partly the workers are being seized in the streets and under the pretext that they are to work for two-three days. They are being brought to work without any winter clothing, shoes, mess kit and blankets . . . The indigenous auxiliary police fetched the Russians out of their houses at night, but partially these people could buy themselves out of it by giving some alcohol to the indigenous auxiliary policemen. This manner of conscription did not increase the Russians’ willingness to work."

The knowledge and attitude of the accused Reinhardt towards the forced labour programme is shown in a letter he signed and sent to the Commanding General of the 43rd Corps on the 28th March, 1943. In this letter he complained of the inefficiency and laziness of the forced workers which he had noticed when touring the area. He then went on :

" . . . The population-which is being subjected to a much greater strain on the Russian side-must be compelled to fulfil my requirements, if necessary through retention of wages, deprivation of food and restraint of personal liberty ; just as I shall call to account any supervisory personnel of any description and rank, if my demands are not enforced. Supervision of workers is a military duty like any other and requires the full efforts of the personnel assigned.

" It is requested that all military superiors and all organs in charge of traffic control and of the maintenance of discipline co-operate with me in the full exploitation of labour of any kind."

The accused Reinhardt’s policy with respect to the programme of deportation and enslavement of civilians for labour in the Reich was shown by an order signed by him as Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Panzer Army, in which he stated :

" The Fuehrer has charged Gauleiter Sauckel with the direction of the entire labour allocation programme reaching into the zone of operations. An intelligent co-operation of the military agencies with the departments of labour allocation administration must make


it possible to mobilize the work capacity of the entire able-bodied population. If success cannot be achieved in any other way, coercive measures must now be applied to recruit the required labour for allocation in the Reich."

This order was given wide distribution throughout his command.

The evidence also showed the personal responsibility of the accused von Salmuth for the forced use of the civilian population in the army area and the illegal recruitment and deportation of civilian slave labour to the Reich to a very great extent, both in the West and in the East. He had personally urged the programme to be carried out and admitted himself that this labour recruitment and deportation was compulsory.

As to the accused Hollidt, the evidence showed that he participated in the recruitment of slave labour for the Reich under the compulsion of orders to do so. He maintained that he was himself opposed to this programme. Nevertheless he carried it out. The evidence showed that his disapproval was based upon the fact that he needed such labour for his own purposes.

Various communications, reports and minutes from conferences showed that the accused Warlimont was not only well aware of, but also actively participated in, the programme of recruitment of forced labour and deportation of civilians for slave labour in the Reich. It was shown that he had attended a conference in the Chancellery, called for the purpose of taking intensive measures for the recruitment of foreign labourers. The minutes of this conference, in pertinent parts, read as follows :

" The deputy of the head of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Fuehrer Order, according to which all German forces had to place themselves in the service of the work of acquiring manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was and was not employed exclusively in pressing military duties (as for example, in the construction of the coastal defences), it would be available, but it could not actually be assigned for the purposes of the GBA. General Warlimont made the following practical suggestions :

" (a) The troops employed in fighting partisans are to take over in addition the task of acquiring manpower in the partisan areas. Everyone, who cannot fully prove the purpose of his stay in these areas, is to be seized forcibly.

" (b) When large cities, due to the difficulty of providing food, are wholly or partly evacuated, the population suitable for labour commitment is to be put to work with the assistance of the Wehrmacht. 

" (c) The seizing of labour recruits among the refugees from the areas near the front should be handled especially intensively with the assistance of the Wehrmacht."

Other evidence submitted showed that these suggestions by the accused Warlimont had been put into operation.

The evidence showed that the accused Woehler as Chief of Staff of the 1lth Army, issued and signed orders pertaining to the recruitment of forced


labour. The evidence also showed the compulsory and illegal use of civilians under Woehler as Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Army by units subordinate to him. An order signed by his quartermaster on the 25th June, 1944, provided for the compulsory recruitment of civilians and others to the Reich for slave labour in the mines.

The evidence failed to show any criminal responsibility on the part of the accused von Leeb and Sperrle in this connection. The accused Hoth, Schniewind, von Roques, Reinecke and Lehmann were not particularly involved in or charged with crimes of this kind.

(I) Evidence with Particular Reference to the Alleged Murder, Ill-treatment, and Persecution of the Civilian Population, Discrimination, Persecution, and Execution of Jews and Co-operation with the Einsatzgruppen and Sonderkommandos of the SIPO and SD

The evidence showed that the accused von Kuechler had directed the enforcement of a decision to execute 230 insane and diseased women inmates of an asylum within his area of command to the SD. It failed to show any other criminal connection on the part of von Kuechler in connection with the extermination activities of Einsatzgruppe A within his area of command. Numerous civilians were, however, summarily executed by units under his command in implementation of the Commissar Order and the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order with his knowledge and approval. His attitude towards the Jewish question is shown by an order which he issued as early as July, 1940. In this order he stated among other things :

" 2. I am also stressing the necessity of ensuring that every soldier of the Army, particularly every officer, refrains from criticizing the ethnical struggle being carried out in the GENERAL GOUVERNEMENT, for instance the treatment of the Polish minorities, of the Jews and of church matters. The final ethnical solution of the ethnical struggle which has been raging on the Eastern border for centuries calls for one-time harsh measures.

" Certain units and departments of the Party and the State have been charged with the carrying out of this ethnical struggle in the East.

" The soldiers must, therefore, keep aloof from these concerns of other units and departments. This implies that they must not interfere with those concerns by criticism either.

" It is particularly urgent to initiate immediately the instruction concerning these problems of those soldiers who have been recently transferred from the West to the East ; otherwise, they might become " acquainted with rumours and false information concerning the meaning and the purpose of that struggle."

On the 10th October, 1941, the accused von Kuechler, as Commander-in-Chief of the 18th Army, distributed the Reichenau Order concerning the conduct of the German troops in the Eastern areas. This order is quoted in full because it also gives an indication of the attitude adopted towards the civilian population in the Eastern territories :.


" Subject : Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

" Regarding the conduct of troops towards the Bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-Bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the Eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war, but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon Germany and racially related nations.

" Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on sub-human Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland, which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews. 

" The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war, and guerrilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner-of-war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the pressing struggle.

" The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply. 

" When retreating, the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former Bolshevistic rule, even in the form of buildings, is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the Eastern territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civilian population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long and vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation of the battle, the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the Army, drastic measures are to. be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or


report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a ‘wait-and-see ’ attitude must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judged and treated as a member of the Soviet System.

" The fear of the German counter-measures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering Bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future, the soldier has to fulfil two tasks :

(1) Complete annihilation of the false Bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.

(2) The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia.

" This is the only way to fulfil our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger."

Other orders were issued by the 18th Army requiring Jews to wear distinguishing brassards and placing them in ghettoes, with the knowledge and approval of the accused.

On the 17th November, 1941, the accused Hoth, as Commander-in-Chief of the 17th Army, issued an order in implementation of the same Reichenau Order, which clearly showed his ruthless attitude towards the civilian population. Numerous murders and atrocities were also committed against the civilian population by units under his command pursuant to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order and the directives concerning Partisan Warfare with the knowledge, approval or express orders of the accused. The evidence also showed that the SD perpetrated a mass killing of 1,224 Jews, 63 political agitators and 30 saboteurs and partisans on the 14th December, 1941, at Artemousk which was located within the accused’s area of command. The accused stated that he had criticised his chief of staff for not advising him that the SD operated within his area. 

The evidence showed, however, that even after he had acquired knowledge of the activities of the SD within his area of command, his own army police, over whom he had command authority, turned over civilian prisoners and Jews to the SD as a regular practice right up to the time when he relinquished his command. The evidence showed that the accused Reinhardt knew as early as September, 1941, that the SD was operating within his area of command. It also showed that not only did his army know about the activities of the SD, but also actively co-operated with it in sending suspects of all kinds, including civilian men, women and children. Thousands were in this way sent to Lublin and Auschwitz concentration camps:

On the 1st August, 1941, a Ukrainian woman reported a secret meeting of some 50 local Jews and Bolshevists who, she said, planned to collect and destroy leaflets dropped by German planes requiring the Ukrainian population to resume work in the fields, and to attack the German military officers after the Jews had become strong enough by calling in other persons. As a result the SS Einsatzkommando Xa, stationed in Olschenka, was informed by the XXX Corps of the 11th Army under the accused von Salmuth’s command, and assigned the task of preventing the execution of these plans. On the 2nd August, the XXX Corps reported that 400 male persons had been arrested,


mostly Jews ; 98 of them were shot to death outside the village. One hundred and seventy-five were taken hostages and the rest released. The accused denied any participation in or knowledge of this incident, but the evidence seemed to indicate that this was not true. On the 2nd August, he signed an order to his troops concerning the " participation of soldiers in actions against Jews and Communists," which clearly showed that he was fully aware of the ‘activities of the Sonderkommandos within his area of command and provided regulations for the co-operation of the troops in actions of the Sonderkommandos. He also issued express orders for the handing over of " suspected elements who, although they cannot be proved guilty of a serious crime, seem dangerous because of their attitude and behaviour," and therefore should be handed over to the Einsatzgruppen or the Kommandos of the SD. Numerous other documents and reports established his knowledge and the close co-operation of units under his command with the Einsatzgruppen and the Sonderkommandos and the Secret Field Police. As a result of this co-operation, numerous civilians were either murdered, ill-treated or sent to concentration camps for " elimination."

Many documents showed that ill-treatment and persecution of the civilian population took place within the accused von Roques’ area of command. Other documents showed the establishment of ghettoes for the Jews ; requirements that they should wear the Star of David ; the prohibition of Jewish rites ; confiscation of Jewish ritual articles, terror killings of suspects and partisan sympathisers ; so-called mopping-up operations and turning over of Jews and Communists to the SD ; orders by the accused Roques himself that troops should not participate in " arbitrary shooting " of Jews and the executive measures of the SD ; orders that all headquarters should help the SD detachments in carrying out its orders from the Reichsfuehrer SS, other than taking part in executions and that " the right to object does not exist for the subordinate headquarters with regard to measures carried out by the SD detachments." These documents and orders left no doubt that the accused von Roques actively supported and participated in the activities of the SD within his area of command. He also handed prisoners of war over to the SD.

The evidence showed that the approximate number of murders committed within the area of the 11th Army, while the accused Woehler was its Chief of Staff was in the neighbourhood of 90,000, including men, women and children, The evidence showed that this murder programme was known in part at least to staff officers under Woehler. Woehler himself denied knowledge of this programme, but Ohlendorf, who was in command of the Einsatzgruppen within this area, testified that he had had various conferences with Woehler. Ohlendorf testified that he had not specifically discussed this matter because he assumed that the accused Woehler was aware of the  programme. From this and other evidence it seemed to be beyond doubt that the accused was fully aware of the extermination activities of the Einsatzgruppen within that area. Ohlendorf also testified that he had received co-operation from various units of the Army. Several documents initialed by Woehler and referring to these executions positively proved his knowledge of what was going on. The evidence also showed that the accused had assigned Einsatzgruppen to various localities wherein they


operated and carried out their activities. It was quite clear from the evidence that these orders as to the location of the Einsatzgruppen units were not such basic orders which were issued on the sole authority of the Commander-in-Chief, but were within the sphere of authority of a chief of staff.

As to the accused von Leeb, Hollidt, Reinecke and Warlimont, the evidence failed to show any criminal connection with or participation in the general programme of discrimination, persecution and execution of Jews and the activities of the Einsatzgruppen and Sonderkommandos of the SD, SIPO or the Secret Field Police. The accused Sperrle, Schniewind and Lehmann were not charged with responsibility in connection with this criminal programme.

(m) Evidence with Particular Reference to Alleged Crimes against the Civilian Population in Connection with Evacuation and in  Connection with the Retreat of the German Army in the Eastern Territories

On the 14th February, 1943, the accused von Kuechler distributed over his signature a Fuehrer Order relative to evacuations which provided in part as follows :

" (3) In case of evacuation all men between the ages of 16 and 65 are to be taken along by the troops. Thus the troops will always have manpower for building of entrenchments and prisoners of war will be released for new employment (handing over to Luftwaffe in exchange for men they have released). Then the enemy will be unable, as he is doing now on a large scale, to draft the entire male population as combatants.

" (4) In case of planned evacuations of considerable extent the mass of the civilian population is to be taken along, whenever possible, to be used later as manpower. The villages are then to be destroyed."

On the 21st September, 1943, the Commanding-General of the Security Troops and Commander of the Rear Area of the Army Group North, issued an order which showed the ruthless attitude towards and the hardships accorded to the civilian population during the German retreat in the area of the accused von Kuechler’s command. The pertinent parts of the order read as follows :

" Subject : Evacuation of the civilian population from the area between the present advanced front line and the Panther Position. 

" Reference : Commander-in-Chief Army Group North, Ia NO. 101/43, top secret military, dated 17th September, 1943 (not distributed). 

I. Task

" The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North has ordered, by reference order, the evacuation of the civilian population from the area between the present advanced front line and the Panther Position. This evacuation is to be carried out extensively and without delay by all means and possibilities available.


II. Supervision

" Pursuant to Special Order the responsibility and supervision of the evacuation of the population rests with the Commander in the Army Area North. For this purpose he is entitled to issue instructions to the armies.

III. Principles to be Applied in the Evacuation

" (1) No usable manpower must be left to the enemy.

" (2) The evacuation will take place mainly in marching convoys of about 1,000 persons each, covering an average of 12-15 km. per day. . . .

" (4) The families will set out in village communities under the direction of the Starost and be escorted by indigenous police.

" (5) During the march, the families are to feed themselves. Only bread is to be distributed on the way. . . .

" (12) Before the setting out of the convoys, the inhabitants will be screened in the starting places, and/or transfer camps, for later labour assignment. See No. IV, A3. For this purpose Gauleiter Sauckel will send a number of representatives to Economy Intendantur North. In order to avoid undesirable effects upon the readiness of the population to be evacuated the able-bodied are to be turned over to the representatives of Gauleiter Sauckel together with their families. As far as they cannot take charge of complete families, the separation of the able-bodied is to take place at the earliest in the receiving camps, but if possible only in the final areas.

" The labour assignment of those evacuated will be partly for operation ‘ Panther,’ partly in the occupied territory, partly in the Reich. It is estimated that 50 per cent. of each convoy are able-bodied. Children over ten are considered as labourers." 

On 7th October, 1943, the AOK 18 N O Qu IC Counter Intelligence Officer transmitted to the High Command of the Army Group North Ic Counter Intelligence Officer, a communication concerning evacuation by foot march which refers to this contemplated evacuation, pertinent parts of which read as follows : 

" Numerous remarks from the population have been heard in the sense of ‘ We prefer to be clubbed to death right here than to being evacuated.’ Even the population which is basically pro-German suspects rightly that the evacuation by foot march will mean inconceivable misery and will cost innumerable people their health or their lives. . . .

" (3) One must keep clearly in mind that these treks will be trains of misery of the worst kind in spite of the fact that within the army area, on account of the comparatively dense deployment of German troops, it was possible to prepare to some extent the taking care and sheltering of the treks. The horses and vehicles of the population on hand will by far not be sufficient to take care of the people who are unable to march or become unable to march, and to take along the most necessary.


amounts of foodstuffs, clothing and household implements. Already up to the collecting camps Luga and Jamburg, the treks will have to cover up to 150 km., therefore, they will be on their way up to two weeks. Considering the state of the clothing, especially the shoes, of the population and the expected weather, the participants of these marches will soon be in an indescribable state, especially the women and children. As far as the availability of any horses and vehicles of their own is concerned, reference is made to the enclosed report of the Orts Kommandant of Lampowo, and it is expressly pointed out that the community of Lampowo is one of the richest and so far best maintained communities in the whole army area."

Notwithstanding this communication to his headquarters, on 30th November, 1943, the defendant signed the following order to the 16th Army :

" (1) The population of the occupied Russian zone East of the Panther has to be speedily evacuated, unless they are labour forces required by the Wehrmacht. The able-bodied population in particular has to be seized, eventually even without consideration as to preserving the unity of families, and with horses and cattle to be deported to the territories West of the Panther. As to undesirable elements, suspected of assisting the bands, the organization of special camps in the East is to be waited for...

" (7) The execution of above measures and their continuous supervision is the duty of all Commanders and Offices. They have to be aware of the fact that an omission represents a grave offence, injures the conduct of the war and costs the blood of German men."

Many documents apart from those mentioned above and several of which were signed by the accused von Kuechler showed the ruthless manner in which he evacuated hundreds of thousands of helpless peoples and the inhuman treatment accorded to them.

An order of 12th August, 1943, issued by the 3rd Panzer Army under the accused Reinhardt’s command, relating to the evacuation of the Witebsk area contained the following :

" According to Pz AOK. 3, Ia No. 6262/43 secret, it is ordered to evacuate the area designated in the above reference since it was established beyond doubt that the population helped the bands during the operations of the 2nd and 7th Jaeger Battalions. DS Witebsk has declared itself ready to arrange that the population which is to be evacuated will be sent to an SD camp (Lublin)."

Another order issued on the 19th August, 1943, relating to the same evacuation showed that it concerned some 3,000 civilians. The order then goes on : .

" The request to SD Witebsk to separate unmistakable band elements in Transit Camp 230 and to take them over for the purpose of accommodating them in Lublin, continues to be upheld.

" Besides properly looking after them and feeding them which has already been ordered, Transit Camp 230 will also see to indoctrinating them with the necessary propaganda, especially also informing them


of the reason for the evacuation-large sections of population aiding the bands ; the innocent ones must suffer with the guilty."

The remainder of the accused were not particularly involved in or charged with such crimes against civilians in connection with evacuation of areas or during the retreat of the armies.

(n) Evidence with Particular Reference to the Alleged Criminal Conduct by the German Army Under the Accused von Leeb’s Command in Connection with the Siege of Leningrad

The evidence showed that during the siege of Leningrad its defenders and the civilians therein were in great straits and it was feared by commanders of the German Army that the population would undertake to flee through the German lines. Orders were then issued to the effect that the German artillery should be used in order to prevent such an attempt, at the greatest possible distance from the German lines so that the German infantry, if possible, could be spared shooting on civilians. This order was known to and approved by the accused von Leeb.

Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V Part VI Part VII Part VIII
Last Updated 10/09/01 21:06:11
S D Stein
Faculty of Economics and Social Science