*1 Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June 1991, followed by Croatia on 25 July 1991, and BiH on 6 March 1992. All three were admitted as members of the United Nations on 22 May 1992.
*2 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, at 30, § 116 (27 May 1994).
*3 Id. at 30, § 117.
*4 James Gow, «One Year of War in Bosnia Herzegovina», 2 Jane's Intelligence Review 1 (4 June 1993).
*5 See Annex IV for the «Policy of Ethnic Cleansing», Annex IV, Part 3 of «Ethnic Cleansing in Zvornik», and Annex V for «Prijedor».
*6 See James Gow, «Slovenia Territorial Defence A Year on», Jane's Intelligence Review 305 et. seq. (July 1992).
*7 See Milan Vego, «The Croatian Army», Jane's Intelligence Review 203 et. seq. (May 1993); Milan Vego, «The Croatian Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina», Jane's Intelligence Review 99 et. seq. (March 1993).
*8 See Milan Vego, «The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina», Jane's Intelligence Review 63 et. seq. (February 1993).
*9 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, at 31 (27 May 1994).
*10 Milan Vego, «Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina», Jane's Intelligence Review 445-46 (October 1992).
*11 Protocol I Geneva Conventions Protocol II Yugoslavia (Ratification) 21 April 1950 11 June 1979 Slovenia (Succession) 26 March 1992 26 March 1992 Croatia (Succession) 11 May 1992 11 May 1992 BiH (Succession) 31 December 1992 31 December 1992 return to text
*12 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1992).
*13 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History (1975). See also Annex IV, Part 1, which discusses the history of the region.
*14 Id.
*15 In contrast, 14 German divisions had an authorized strength of roughly 10,000 troops per division.
*16 The Partisan military accomplishments are even more noteworthy because, unlike most guerilla armies in history, the countryside in which they operated was not necessarily friendly. Ustase and Cetnik forces, using tactics similar to those of the Partisans, occupied the same woods. This reduced the «safe haven» factor historically crucial to guerilla forces.
*17 A frequently used tactic was to hide in the hills, allow the German combat formations to bypass the hidden Partisans, and then to attack the support troops that followed behind the infantry. This caused major disruption to the German lines of support and communication, and had an extremely demoralizing effect on the German troops.
*18 The Germans launched at least seven major offensives to destroy the Partisans, using German, Cetnik, Ustase, and other Axis troops. While the Partisans suffered serious casualties, they were never completely defeated.
*19 The depth of the rift between Yugoslavia and the Soviets is underscored by the existence of a formal United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group in Belgrade from 1951 to 1961, at the height of the Cold War. Over the course of the Cold War, the United States extended some $600 million in military grants and an equal amount in economic assistance to Yugoslavia.
*20 Mark Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 593 (1992).
*21 Michael S. Evancevich, «Danger in the Balkans», in Military Intelligence 10, 12 (April-June 1993).
*22 Id.
*23 Id.
*24 David C. Isby, «Yugoslavia 1991 - Forces In Conflict», 3 Jane's Intelligence Review 394 (1991).
*25 Id.
*26 Id.
*27 TND was codified in Article 240 of Yugoslavia's 1974 Constitution, which states that the armed forces consist of the YPA and territorial defence units.
*28 David C. Isby, «Yugoslavia 1991 - Forces In Conflict», 3 Jane's Intelligence Review 394 (1991).
*29 Id. The assessment that command, control, and communications facilities were vulnerable was based on the assumption, probably accurate, that an invading Soviet force would achieve air superiority early in the campaign and would thus be able to destroy the military infrastructure from the air. Id.
*30 David C. Isby, «Yugoslavia 1991 - Forces In Conflict», 3 Jane's Intelligence Review 394 (1991).
*31 Id. at 395.
*32 Id.
*33 Id.
*34 Id. In addition to military weapons, an estimated 1.6 million citizens legally owned private firearms in 1989. Id.
*35 Id. See also James Gow, «The Yugoslav Army, An Update», Jane's Intelligence Review 501 et seq. (November 1993); Milan Vego, «Yugoslav Ground Forces», Jane's Intelligence Review 247 et seq. (June 1993).
*36 David C. Isby, «Yugoslavia 1991 - Forces In Conflict», 3 Jane's Intelligence Review 395 (1991). After 1991, the reorganized JNA effectively came under the direct command of President Milosevic, who was reportedly personally involved in the appointment of succeeding chiefs of staff and also of other senior officers. He is also reported to have become increasingly involved since 1991 in strategic and major tactical decisions, such as the type and level of military supplies and assistance given to the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia.
*37 David C. Isby, «Yugoslavia 1991 - Forces In Conflict», 3 Jane's Intelligence Review 397 (1991).
*38 Id.
*39 Id.
*40 Id. at 396-97. The Air and Naval forces did not exhibit this striking ethnic imbalance. Id. at 397.
*41 Id. at 395.
*42 Id.
*43 Id.
*44 Id.
*45 Id. at 397.
*46 Id.
*47 Id. at 395.
*48 Id. at 397-98.
*49 Id. at 398.
*50 Id.
*51 Id.
*52 Id.
*53 Id.
*54 Id.
*55 The structural information presented here is drawn directly from Michael Brown, «Yugoslavia's Armed Forces - Order of Battle», 3 Jane's Intelligence Review 366 (1991).
*56 There were 230 M-84 model tanks, the Yugoslav version of the Soviet T-72 and 758 were the older, slower, and less heavily armoured T-55 model. Id.
*57 «Guards» is an honourific meant to recognize a unit's performance in combat.
*58 The active Mountain Brigade was the 6th, headquartered at Delnice, and subordinate to 13th Corps, 5th MD. Id.
*59 These were the 81st Partisan Brigade at Mostanika, and the 63rd Partisan Brigade at Zvezdara. The other 19 brigades were subordinate to various Corps headquarters, and through the Corps to the MD. Id.
*60 Mark Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 569-570 (1992).
*61 These Republics did eventually secede. Slovenia and Croatia seceded on 25 June 1991, and BiH on 6 April 1992.
*62 Mark Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 569-570 (1992).
*63 Id.
*64 Id.
*65 Id.
*66 Id. The YPA's performance against the Slovenes is discussed infra. See also supra note 6.
*68 After its reorganization, the composition of the Yugoslav Army enlisted force was 50 per cent Serb, 20 per cent Montenegrin, and 30 per cent «other» -- primarily ethnic Albanians and Hungarians. The officer corps, however, was 92.6 per cent Serbian, 7 per cent Montenegrin, and .4 per cent «other».
*69 Milan Vego, «Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina», 4 Jane's Intelligence Review 445 (1992).
*70 Id.
*71 Id.
*72 Id.
*73 Id. The abbreviation «SRBiH» is used by the United Nations Protective Forces (UNPROFOR).
*74 Milan Vego, «Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina», 4 Jane's Intelligence Review 446 (1992).
*75 See Annex VI, Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo, for a daily chronology of the battle and siege and a detailed analysis and comprehensive breakdown of the forces in and around the city.
*76 Id. See also «Transcript of Radio Communications by Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Others», (conversations reportedly between Mladic and his artillery commanders in which Mladic orders civilian targets hit repeatedly).
*77 Id.
*78 Milan Vego, «Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina», 4 Jane's Intelligence Review 446 (1992).
*79 Id.
*80 Id.
*81 Id.
*82 Id.
*83 Id. at 447.
*84 UNPROFOR Order of Battle Document (25 May 93), IHRLI Doc. No. 2549-25123, at 25077.
*85 Milan Vego, «Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina», 4 Jane's Intelligence Review 447 (1992).
*86 This analysis was made by comparing UNPROFOR Order of Battle Documents, with UNPROFOR Pictorial Information Summaries (PICINFSUM), 27 May 93.
*87 A more detailed and updated analysis is available in the Sarajevo report, Annex VI.
*88 Milan Vego, «Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina», 4 Jane's Intelligence Review 447 (1992).
*89 Id.
*90 Id.
*91 Id.
*92 David C. Isby, «Yugoslavia 1991 - Forces In Conflict», 3 Jane's Intelligence Review 403 (1991).
*93 Id.
*94 Id.
*95 Id.
*96 Id.
*97 Id. See also Annex III.A, Special Forces.
*98 Milan Vego, «The Army of Bosnia Herzegovina», 5 Jane's Intelligence Review 63 (1993).
*99 Id.
*100 See Annex III.A, Special Forces.
*101 Milan Vego, «The Army of Bosnia Herzegovina», 5 Jane's Intelligence Review 63 (1993).
*102 Id.
*103 Id.
*104 Id. at 63-4.
*105 Id. at 64.
*106 Id.
*107 Id.
*108 Id. at 65.
*109 Id. at 64.
*110 Id. at 65.
*111 Milan Vego, «The Muslim Defense Industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina», Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1994, at 213.
*112 Id.
*113 Id. at 64. Typical weapons include AK-74 assault rifles, 90 millimetre. M79 Osa [Wasp] and 120 millimetre. Zolja [Hornet] anti-tank rockets, and German Panzerfaust bazookas, as well as 60 millimetre and 80 millimetre mortars. Id. Older weapons include AK-47 assault rifles, and M48 rifles (early postwar vintage).
*114 Id.
*115 Id.
*116 Miodrag Ivanovic, «The Fate of the Yugoslav Military Industry», Jane's Intelligence Review, 164 et. seq. (March 1993).