Notes of annex IV


      

*1       Fifth Periodic Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993, E/CN.4/1994/47, at para. 13.

*2       The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect 151 (1993) (originally published in 1914 as Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars).

*3       See Stan Markovitich, «Serbia», 33 RFE/RL Research Report 96 (April 1994) for a description of political events within Serbia during this period.

*4       The First Balkan War was largely an effort by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia to expel the Ottomans from the Balkans. The Second Balkan War broke out when Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece. Montenegrin, Ottoman and Rumanian troops joined the conflict to oppose Bulgaria. The two Balkan Wars ended Ottoman rule in the Balkans, except for a part of Thrace and Constantinople. Id. at 99.

*5       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 31 (Comm. Print 1992).

*6       The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect 151 (1993) (originally published in 1914 as Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars).

*7       Stan Markovitich, «Serbia», 33 RFE/RL Research Report 96 (April 1994).

*8       Id.

*9       James Gow, «One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina», RFE/RL Research Report 11 (4 June 1994). Gow states that as early as mid-August 1991 «. . . the activities of the Yugoslav Army units stationed there [in BiH] were, in fact, aimed at linking most of the Republic with Serbia. According to Gow, the JNA expected a major influence on events in BiH from 1990 onward, including providing arms to the Serb population and encouraging local unrest.

*10       David C. Isby, «Yugoslavia 1991 - Armed Forces in Conflict,» Jane's Intelligence Review, 402 (September 1991).

*11       As quoted by Roger Cohen in «Serbian General Who Calls the Shots: Determined and Calling the West's Bluff», New York Times, at 4 (17 April 1994).

*12       See Glenn E. Curtis, Yugoslavia, A Country Study 293, Table 5 (1992).

*13       The attack on Zvornik is one of two case studies on «ethnic cleansing». For the other study related to the Prijedor region, see Annex V.

*14       «Monster Town» in Vreme, No. 112, 15 November 1993, at 18.

*15       The dividing line ran north-south from the Sava River near Sirmium (Stremska Mitrovica) to Lake Scutari (Skadar), on the current Montenegrin-Albanian border. For a general history of the Balkan peninsula, see Edgar Hosch, The Balkans: A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Day (Tania Alexander trans. 1972). See also Rene Ristelhueber, A History of the Balkan Peoples (Sherman David Spector ed. and trans. 1971).

*16       A majority of scholars have adopted the view that the Bogomils were adherents of a Christian medieval sect that emerged in Bulgaria in the early middle ages. They were considered heretics by church officials. Because of their persecution, and the fact that the Bogomil sect contained a strain of mysticism that was receptive to the Islam practiced by some Islamic mystic orders, many Bogomils converted to Islam following the Ottoman conquest. See Smail Balic, «Culture Under Fire», in Why Bosnia? 81 (Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993). Another view suggests that the medieval Bosnian Church was not Bogomil. Rather, unlike the Bogomils, the Bosnian Church accepted the Trinity, an omnipotent God and at least part of the Old Testament. See John A. Fine, «The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society» in The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina 5-20 (Mark Pinson ed. 1994).

*17       Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 1 (1983).

*18       These resettled regions closely correspond to the areas that rebelled against the Croatian government in 1991. See Steven Woehrel & Julie Kim, Croatia: Background and Current Issues, Congressional Research Service Report (3 December 1992).

*19       Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 2 (1983).

*20       Id. at 3.

*21       Id. at 6.

*22       Russia had declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1877. In March 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano created a large Bulgarian state and greatly expanded Russian influence in the region. This upset the region's balance of power, leading Britain and Austria-- Hungary to call for a new accord. As a result, the Congress of Berlin was held in June and July 1878. Id. at 7. For an interesting account of the Congress of Berlin, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 155-58 (1994).

*23       Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 109 (1983). Jelavich also states that «[t]he greater Serbian goal . . . was thus a state based not on strictly ethnic principles, but on the acquisition of lands that had historic associations or that had at some time been under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church».

*24       Id. at 111.

*25       Id.

*26       The First Balkan War was largely an effort by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia to expel the Ottomans from the Balkans. The Second Balkan War broke out when Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece. Montenegrin, Ottoman and Rumanian troops joined the conflict to oppose Bulgaria. The two Balkan Wars ended Ottoman rule in the Balkans, except for a part of Thrace and Constantinople. Id. at 99.

*27       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 31 (Comm. Print 1992).

*28       The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect 151 (1993) (originally published in 1914 as Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars).

*29       Id. See also Jelavich, supra note 3, at 112. When one of the co-conspirators was arrested, he stated, «I am a Serbian hero». The Archduke was murdered because they feared that he would join Bosnia with the other South Slav lands in a separate autonomous state controlled by the Hapsburgs. The timing of the Archduke's visit, on Serbia's most celebrated anniversary, may have been a deliberate provocation.

*30       Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 201 (1983).

*31       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 32 (Comm. Print 1992).

*32       Id.

*33       Yugoslavia was partitioned by its German and Italian victors into spheres of influence. Macedonia fell under Bulgarian domination. Hungary took areas in Backa and Baranja. Italian- ruled Albania was given Kosovo and some Macedonian and Montenegrin lands. Germany and Italy each annexed a part of Slovenia. Italy assumed control over the Adriatic coast and the Adriatic Islands. Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 262 (1983).

*34       Id. at 264. Croatia was recognized by the Axis powers and became a signatory of the Tripartite and Anti-Comintern Pacts. Id. at 263.

*35       Id. at 264.

*36       Serbs constituted about one-third of Croatia's population at the time. As a Fascist state, Croatia's 6.5 million inhabitants included: 3.4 million Croats; 1.9 million Orthodox Serbs; 700,000 Muslims; 150,000 Germans and 18,000 Jews. Id. at 263.

*37       The Bosnian Muslim community had three major divisions: some aligned with the Ustasa regime; some wanted a separate state allied with Germany; others joined the Communist partisans fighting the Ustase. Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia- Hercegovina 3 (Comm. Print 1992).

*38       Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 265 (1983). The estimates as to how many Serbs were killed during this period is still fiercely contested. See Steven Woehrel & Julie Kim, Croatia: Background and Current Issues, Congressional Research Service Report 3 (3 December 1992); see also Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 65 (1994); Jasenovac: The System of Ustasha Death Camps (Museum of the Victims of Genocide 1994); Andrew Borowiec, «Croatian-Run Death Site Remains Dark Secret», The Washington Times, 5 July 1994, at A10.

*39       The Cetniks were organized by Colonel Draza Mihajlovic, who also served as a minister in Yugoslavia's Government-in-exile, which was based in London. Initially, Mihajlovic's resistance movement consisted of a small group of Serbian officers who went to the hills where they organized local inhabitants into fighting units. These forces were called the Cetnik detachments of the Yugoslav Army. Eventually, the Cetniks largely became loosely knit bands of fighters organized under local leaders. The term «Cetnik» recalled similar groups that had struggled against Ottoman rule. Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 266-67 (1983).

*40       Jelavich, for instance, writes: «Although instances of cooperation between members of all resistance forces and the occupying powers can be found, the most widespread collaboration, and the most easily documented, was established between the Chetniks and the Axis command». Id. at 270.

*41       Id.

*42       Tito's ties to the Soviet Union were soon broken. Although the first meeting of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) was held in Belgrade (in fact, its first headquarters were in Belgrade), Yugoslavia was expelled on 28 June 1948. The Cominform motion stated: «the Information Bureau [Cominform] declares that the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union». The resolution went on to express the fear that Yugoslavia would turn into «an ordinary bourgeois republic» and «a colony of the imperialist countries». Patrick Brogan, The Captive Nations: Eastern Europe, 1945-1990 161 (1990).

*43       See Stevan K. Pavlowitch, «Who is »Balkanizing« Whom? The misunderstandings Between the Debris of Yugoslavia and the Unprepared West», 123 Daedalus 203, 206 (Spring 1994).

*44       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 32 (Comm. Print 1992). Tito was a Croatian by birth. He was born in Kumrovec, Croatia to a Croatian father and a Slovene mother. As a young man, he apprenticed to a locksmith and later worked as a mechanic. Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 385 (1983).

*45       Id. at 396.

*46       Id. In the 1980's, the Serbs would argue with vehemence that it was Serbia which had suffered economically during the Tito years.

*47       Id. at 396-97. Steven Woehrel & Julie Kim, Croatia: Background and Current Issues, Congressional Research Service Report 3 (3 December 1992).

*48       Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 397 (1983).

*49       Id. at 398.

*50       Id. at 394.

*51       Id. at 393. For a critique of the communist regime during the 1950s, see Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (1957) and his Conversations with Stalin (1962).

*52       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 32 (Comm. Print 1992). Allegations of corruption also did much to diminish the stature of the Yugoslav federal army. For example, in the mid- 1980s, investigative reports alleged that military labour was used to build expensive villas for communist party and military officials. See Karl Wheller Soper, National Security in Yugoslavia: A Country Study 225, 253 (Glenn E. Curtis ed. 1992).

*53       Such allegations can be found in Alex N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats: The Struggle for Yugoslavia 163-64 (1992).

*54       Id.

*55       In January 1986, Milosevic succeeded Ivan Stambolic as Chief of the Serbian Community Party. Slobodan Milosevic's background and rise to power is described in Aleksa Djilas, «A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic», Foreign Affairs 81, 81-95 (Summer 1993). According to Djilas, when Milosevic was still the head of the Belgrade Party Committee, «[h]e frequently attacked dissident intellectuals, firmly opposed all demands for liberalization, and punished any manifestation of Serbian nationalism». Id. at 86.

*56       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 23 (Comm. Print 1992). Patrick Brogan, The Captive Nations: Eastern Europe, 1945-1990 165-69 (1990).

*57       Patrick Brogan, The Captive Nations: Eastern Europe, 1945-1990 168-69 (1990).

*58       The document was prepared by members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences who are not identified in the document. However, the editor of the document is widely reported to be Dobrica Cosic, a well-known Serbian historian and novelist who served as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for approximately one year until June 1993. See Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 33 (1992). A copy of the Memorandum (translated into English by teachers of English at the Centre of Foreign Languages in Zagreb, Croatia) is on file with the Commission of Experts.

*59       Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 23 (1992). Since the late 1960s, Serbs had been emigrating from Kosovo--between 200,000 and 300,000 had left by the mid-1980s. Many Serbs believed that the exodus was due to mistreatment by ethnic Albanians. Another complaint often voiced by Serbs concerned the fact that Serbia was the only Republic with autonomous provinces within its territory. Under Yugoslavia's 1974 Constitution, Kosovo and Vojvodina had their own representatives in federal, state and party bodies, where they had cast their votes in opposition to Serbia. The two provinces (like the six Republics) also could veto changes in the Constitution. Aleksa Djilas, «A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic», Foreign Affairs 81, 82 (Summer 1993)

*60       Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 33 (1992). See also Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracing the Break-Up, 1980-1992 199-202 (1993).

*61       Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 34 (1992).

*62       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 33 (Comm. Print 1992).

*63       Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 569-70 (1992).

*64       These Republics eventually seceded; Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 1991, BiH on 6 April 1992, and Macedonia voted to separate from Yugoslavia on 8 September 1991. Macedonia alone has not been recognized by the European Community (EC). Greece has objected to Macedonia's recognition because its name is the same as that of a region in northern Greece. The Greek government argues that adoption of the name «Macedonia» implies claims on Greek territory. Bulgaria and Turkey have recognized Macedonia's independence. For a discussion of the situation in Macedonia, see Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 1992-1993 340-42 (1993).

*65       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 33 (Comm. Print 1992).

*66       Id.

*67       Id.

*68       See Chronology of Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia (prepared by Research Analyst Shannon M. McLeod on file with the IHRLI Database). The Serbian National Council was formed on 25 July. On 18 August, the Serbs of Knin began a two week referendum on whether to establish a «Serbian Autonomous Region» (SAO) of Krajina. On 1 October 1990, it was announced that 99 per cent of the voters favoured autonomy. Id. at 6.

*69       Olga Ramljak, «Chronology of Serb Rebellion in Croatia», Foreign Broadcast Information Service 16-17 (26 February 1993). See also Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 1-2 (1992).

*70       See Chronology of Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia (prepared by Research Analyst Shannon M. McLeod on file with the IHRLI Database).

*71       Id. On 21 December 1990 the Serbs of the opstinas of Knin, Benkovac, Vojnic, Obrovac, Gracac, Dvor and Kostajnica adopted the «Statute of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina». The Statute provides that «[t]he SAO executes laws, other ordinances, and general acts of the Republic of Croatia and the federation». A legislative Assembly was created, consisting of 60 deputies who would serve four year terms. The Chairman of the Executive Council of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina was Milan Babic. He appointed Milan Martic, a former policeman with Croatia's Ministry of Internal Affairs to the post of Secretary for Internal Affairs for the region of Krajina. Id. at 9.

*72       See Id.; see also David C. Isby, «Yugoslavia 1991: Armed Forces in Conflict», Jane's Intelligence Review 394, 402 (September 1991).

*73       Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 12 (1992).

*74       Id. at 12-14.

*75       Robert M. Hayden, «Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics», 51 Slavic Review 654, 657-58 (Winter 1992).

*76       Id. at 657. Croatia's Constitution, which was adopted on 21 December 1990, provides in its preamble that: the Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the national State of the Croatian nation and the State of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and the realization of their ethnic rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the United Nations and of the free world countries. United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties: Croatia, HRI/Core/1/Add. 32, at 8 (5 May 1994). The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia of 1974 defined the Republic as «the State of Croatian nation, Serbian nation in Croatia and the State of other nationalities who live in it». Id. at 17, n.4.

*77       Id. See also Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 12-14 (1992).

*78       Robert M. Hayden, «Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics», 51 Slavic Review 654, 657, n.10 (Winter 1992). See also Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 151 (1994). The new Croatian regime renamed a school after an Ustasa minister who had cooperated with the Nazis in sending Croatian Jews to Auschwitz. The school had been named after a school principal killed by the Ustase.

*79       Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 157 (1994).

*80       Yugoslavia: A Country Study XXXIX (Glenn E. Curtis ed. 1992).

*81       Id.

*82       Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/25274, at 5 (10 February 1993). See also Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 570 (1992).

*83       Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 570 (1992).

*84       Id. at 573.

*85       Id. at 574.

*86       Id. at 575.

*87       Id. at 576, 577.

*88       Security Council Resolution 713, S/RES/713 (25 Septmeber 1991). The Resolution also recognized that aggression within the former Yugoslavia threatened the peace and security of the region. It again called upon the parties to resolve their disputes through arbitration.

*89       Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 581 (1992). Lord Carrington was subsequently replaced by Lord Owen.

*90       See United States Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia- Herzegovia: February 29-March 1, 1992, at 8 (12 March 1992).

*91       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 33 (Comm. Print 1992).

*92       Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 41-43 (1992). On 3 July 1992, Mate Boban proclaimed an independent state, to be called the Community of Herceg-Bosna. Id. at 43. Fighting erupted among Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Muslims within this area of Bosnia, leading to «ethnic cleansing» allegations against the Croats, especially in the City of Mostar and the surrounding area. Fourth Periodic Report of the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1994/8 (6 September 1993).

*93       Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 583 (1992).

*94       Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 70-71 (1994).

*95       The five-member Arbitration Commission was composed of two members appointed by the former Yugoslav federal presidency, and three members appointed by the European Community and its member states. Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 589 (1992).

*96       Id. at 589.

*97       The signatories agreed that all wounded and sick combatants would be treated in accordance with the First and Second Geneva Conventions; that all captured combatants would be treated in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention; and that all civilians would be treated in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I. Further, the signatories agreed to conduct hostilities in accordance with Additional Protocol I and the Protocol On Prohibition or Restrictions On the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devises, annexed to the 1980 Weapons Convention.

*98       Id. at 587.

*99       Id. at 594.

*100       Id. at 586.

*101       Id. at 591. A declaration from the Serbian minority dated 10 November 1991, expressed a desire to either remain with the Yugoslav Federal Republic, or, if BiH formed its own state, to proclaim an independent Serbian republic within the territory of BiH. Id.

*102       Security Council Resolution 743, S/RES/743 (21 February 1992).

*103       «Pink zones» were established adjacent to these areas. These are zones that do not fall within UNPROFOR's jurisdiction, but that contain a majority Serb population or where Serbs constituted a large minority. In July 1992, the «parties agreed to permit the establishment of a Joint Commission that would oversee the establishment of Croatian authority in these regions. Steven Woehrel & Julie Kim, Croatia: Background and Current Issues, Congressional Research Service Report 4-5 (3 December 1992).

*104       Id. at 4.

*105       Felice D. Gaer, «The Former Yugoslavia», in A Global Agenda: Issues before the 48th General Assembly of the United Nations 9 (John Tessitore & Susan Woolfson eds., 1993).

*106       Id. at 12-13.

*107       See Judy Dempsy, «Bosnian Carve-Up in the Making», Financial Times, 8 July 1992; see also Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia- Herzegovina 39-40 (1992).

*108       In August 1994, the Bosnian Serbs announced that they would formally seek to link their territory with Yugoslavia and Serb- held portions of Croatia. Associated Press, «Bosnian Serbs Press for `Greater Serbia,'» Chicago Tribune, 19 August 1994, at § 1, p. 4.

*109       Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 597 (1992).

*110       Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 164- 65 (1992).

*111       Id. at 165. This was the beginning of the «ethnic cleansing» campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, «ethnic cleansing» had previously occurred in the conflict between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 274-359 (1992). Ethnic cleansing in BiH is discussed in the following section of this report.

*112       On 15 May 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 752, demanding that the cease-fire be recognized and that Yugoslav and Croatian armies refrain from interfering in the internal conflict in BiH. See «Documents on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia», 31 International Legal Materials 1421-1594 (1993); see also Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 394-95 (1992); Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 593 (1992). Resolution 752 also required that all parties respect the territorial integrity of BiH. The resolution also insisted that future humanitarian assistance programmes and convoys be given unimpeded access to all parts of BiH.

*113       Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 600 (1992).

*114       Id. at 595.

*115       These included the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and their Protocols additional of 1977, the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954, the Genocide Convention of 1948, and «crimes against humanity» as developed by conventional and customary international law. The following are the dates of ratification/succession, by the newly formed states, to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols additional of 1977:

  

*11       Protocol I Geneva Conventions Protocol II Yugoslavia (Ratification) 21 April 1950 11 June 1979 Slovenia (Succession) 26 March 1992 26 March 1992 Croatia (Succession) 11 May 1992 11 May 1992 BiH (Succession) 31 December 1992 31 December 1992

See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1992); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law (3 Vols., M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986); Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Laws of War (1991); The Laws of Armed Conflict (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1981); Howard S. Levie, The Code of International Armed Conflict (2 Vols. 1986); The Law of Armed Conflict: A Documentary History (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).

*116       Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/25274, at 5 (10 February 1993).

*117       Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 35 (1992). Estimates vary concerning the actual number of JNA troops left to fight in BiH. One report estimated «at least 30,000 men with tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launches and large stocks of ammunition». Id. at 36 (quoting a New York Times article). However, according to one independent analyst, approximately 80,000 JNA troops were transferred to the Territorial Defence Forces of the «Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina». Milan Vego, «Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia-Herzegovina», Jane's Intelligence Review 445 (October 1992). See also Annex III, Military Structure.

*118       In June 1993, for example, it was reported that Bosnian Croat forces in Mostar evicted Muslim residents from their homes and burned their personal belongings in the streets. The Muslims were told that «they were being evicted to make room for Croats who were coming from Travnik». Bosnian Croat forces have also been accused of the summary execution of Muslim civilians, mass deportations, and the rape of Muslim women. Within the Republic of Croatia, Croatian military forces have been accused of conducting «ethnic cleansing» operations against Serbs residing in the Croatian villages of Divoselo, Citluk, and Pocitelj, located in the «Medak Pocket». The United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Human Rights has reported that forces under the control of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina have also committed human rights violations. These violations include the summary execution and arbitrary arrest of civilians. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, at 8-9 (17 November 1993).

*119       See, e.g., Roger Cohen, «In Bosnia an Island of Tolerance is Sinking», New York Times, 12 May 1994, at 46 (although Bosnian Muslims have destroyed some Serbian villages in retaliatory attacks «there appear to have been few instances in Government- held Bosnia of the brutal `ethnic cleansing' perpetuated by the Serbs . . . .»).

*120       For example, Felice D. Gaer has stated: «. . . Although there were some actions by Muslims and Croats to cleanse their own areas of Serbs, United Nations and private observers agreed that these were mostly reactions to Serb policies and not the result of well-planned, coordinated and funded policies». Felice D. Gaer, «The Former Yugoslavia», in A Global Agenda: Issues before the 48th General Assembly of the United Nations 7 (John Tessitore & Susan Woolfson eds., 1993). Serb planning of the «ethnic cleansing» campaign is discussed infra.

*121       See Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, «A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing», Foreign Affairs 110-14 (Summer 1993). Examples from antiquity include the policies of Assyrian ruler Tiglath-Pileser III (745- 727 B.C.) who is said to have displaced one-half of the population of conquered territories. In medieval times, the Jews were expelled from England (1290), France (1306), Hungary (1349- 1360), Austria (1421), Lithuania (1445), Spain (1402), and from other countries as well. The Holocaust is the principal modern example. The German term «Judenrein» (clean of Jews) was used to designate areas from which Jews had been eliminated. Id. at 114. For further examples of ethnic conflict, see Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Joseph V. Montville ed. 1990); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985). See also David Binder, «As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy», New York Times, 7 February 1993, at 1, 12 (identifying 48 current ethnic conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America).

*122       The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 were largely wars waged against civilian populations. The Greeks attacked Bulgarian villages, the Bulgarians massacred Turks, and the Serbs committed atrocities against Albanian civilians. According to the report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which was published in 1913: «the object of those armed conflicts, overt or covert, clearly conceived or vaguely felt, but always and everywhere the same, was the complete extermination of an alien populations. In some cases this object expressed itself in the form of an implacable and categorical `order' to kill the whole male population of the occupied region». The Other Balkan Wars 148-49 (The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1993).

*123       The political philosopher, Michael Walzer, said of German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel: «. . . he was, we are told by one biographer after another, an honorable man . . . when he fought he maintained the rules of war. He fought a bad war well, not only militarily but also morally». Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 38 (1992).

*124       Kosovo's population is approximately 90 per cent ethnic Albanian. See Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569 (1992).

*125       It was officially reported that 12 persons were killed and 150 wounded but unofficial estimates are higher. In addition, Branka Magas has reported that 140 persons were tried and sentenced to prison. See Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-92 6-7 (1993).

*126       See Annex IV, Part 1, supra.

*127       Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break- Up 1980-92 249 (1993).

*128       Aleksa Djilas, «A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic», Foreign Affairs 81, 93 (Summer 1993).

*129       The use of the term «Serbs» does not, of course, mean «all Serbs». The term is used to refer to Serbia's political and intellectual leadership. In this instance, however, it appears that a very large number of Serbs, in fact, shared the concern over Kosovo's Serbian population. See generally Aleksa Djilas, «A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic», Foreign Affairs 81 (Summer 1993); Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-92 6-7 (1993).

*130       Aleksa Djilas, «A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic», Foreign Affairs 81, 93 (Summer 1993).

*131       See John Kifner, «Through the Serbian Mind's Eye», New York Times, 10 April 1994, § 4, at 1, 5; see also Smail Balic, «Culture Under Fire», in Why Bosnia? 80 (Rabia Ali & Laurence Lifschultz eds., 1993).

*132       Aleksa Djilas, «A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic», Foreign Affairs 81, 93 (Summer 1993) («. . . it is clear that an ideology with such a dark vision of history and the contemporary world could only lead to ruthless and cynical policies»).

*133       See infra.

*134       See, e.g., John Kifner, «Through the Serbian Mind's Eye», New York Times, 10 April 1994, § 4, at 1 («The Muslims--whom the Serbs call 'Turks'--are alone among Bosnia's three combatants in being identified by religion, even though they are, overwhelmingly, secular Slavs»).

*135       As quoted in P. Forestier, Ex-Yougoslavie: Law Conspiration Psychiatrique, Ethiques et Libertes 5 (on file with the United Nations Commission of Experts). See also Jovan Raskovic, Luda Zemlja (1990).

*136       Jovan Raskovic, Luda Zemlja 129 (1990).

*137       Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 17 (1992).

*138       See, e.g., P. Forestier, «Psychiatric Genocide! How the Barbarities of »Ethnic Cleansing« were Spawned by Psychiatry», Freedom 6-8 (May 1993).

*139       For a discussion of Raskovic's influence on Karadzic's career, see Vjesnik, 9 February 1992.

*140       Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 99 (1985).

*141       Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 170 (1994).

*142       V.P. Gagnon, «Serbia's Road to War», 5 Journal of Democracy 123 (April 1994). See generally Aleksa Djilas, «A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic», Foreign Affairs 81 (Summer 1993). See also Glenn E. Curtis, «Government and Politics», in Yugoslavia: A Country Study 197 (Glenn E. Curtis ed. 1992).

*143       See Aleksa Djilas, «A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic», Foreign Affairs 81 (Summer 1993). For a description of Milosevic's rise to power, see Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 100-06 (1994).

*144       Branka Magas, «The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina», in Why Bosnia 249 (Rabia Ali & Laurence Lifschultz eds., 1993). For an account of the «anti-bureaucratic» campaign, Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 44 (1992). See also Stan Markotich, «Serbia», 3 RFE/RL Research Report 96 (22 April 1994). Describing the anti-bureaucratic campaign, Markotich states: «Essentially, this strategy involved paying unemployed youths from Serbia proper to travel to the provinces and participate in violent nationalist demonstrations. A typical `anti-bureaucratic' demonstration would call for ending provincial autonomy and invariably included intimidation of minority residents». Id. For a discussion of the Federal Republic's governmental structure, see Glenn E. Curtis, «Government and Politics», in Yugoslavia: A Country Study 197 (Glenn E. Curtis ed. 1992). By 1989, the State Presidency had evolved from a 23 member group to an eight member group. One member was elected from each Republic and Province.

*145       For example, in early March 1991, demonstrations were held in Belgrade protesting the ruling party's tight control of the news media, as well as Milosevic's economic policy and his policy of provoking conflicts with the other republics. Police were called in to crush the demonstrations. V.P. Gagnon, Jr., «Serbia's Road to War», Journal of Democracy 125 (April 1994).

*146       Id. at 126.

*147       As quoted in Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 47 (1992).

*148       See Stan Markotich, «Serbia», 3 RFE/RL Research Report 95-104 (22 April 1994).

*149       The SRS holds 39 seats in Serbia's 250 seat parliament. It received 13 per cent of the votes cast in the December 1993 parliamentary elections. Id. at 95. For a discussion of Seselj as a paramilitary leader, see Annex III.A, Special Forces.

*150       According to Markotich, «Seselj campaigned on a platform emphasizing that Milosevic and the SPS had grown soft on promoting Serbian nationalism and were weak in pressing for a Greater Serbia». Stan Markotich, «Serbia», 3 RFE/RL Research Report 95 (22 April 1994).

*151       Id. at 96.

*152       Id. See also Annex III.A, Special Forces. For additional examples of human rights abuses against non-Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro, see Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Human Rights Abuses of Non-Serbs in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina (May 1994).

*153       Stan Markotich, «Serbia», 3 RFE/RL Research Report 99 (22 April 1994). Milosevic has also been criticized by members of his own party. For example, Andjelko Miskov, a prominent SRS supporter who broke with the party, alleged that Milosevic «stood by, arms folded» as Croats attacked Serbs in Krajina. Id. at 98.

*154       There were reports that Draskovic was severely beaten after his arrest. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, at 25 (17 November 1993).

*155       Id.

*156       Id.

*157       The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia directly controls nationwide television programming (Radio-TV Serbia); however, there is independent news coverage in the print media, such as Vreme. The United Nations' Special Rapporteur has also noted that Croatia's government-controlled electronic media has exacerbated the climate of political hostility. Sixth Periodic Report of the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/110, at 18 (21 February 1994).

*158       Id. at 21.

*159       Id. According to Mihajlo Crnobrnja, Yugoslavia's former Ambassador to the European Community, «the media stopped at nothing to spread false accusations and even barefaced lies, which had the effect of gradually but surely increasing distrust and even hatred between members of different nationalities». Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 148 (1994).

*160       Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, at 25 (17 November 1993).

*161       Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 44 (1992). See also Yugoslavia: Collapse, War, Crimes 73-119 (Sonja Biserko ed. 1993).

*162       For a report on theft as a motive for «ethnic cleansing», see John F. Berns, «A Serbian Fighter's Tape Trail of Brutality», New York Times, 27 November 1992, at 1.

*163       See, e.g., Mark Thompson, A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia 258 (1992).

*164       12 August 1991, trans. in Daily Report (Eastern Europe), FBIS, 12 August 1991, at 39.

*165       Seselj also controls paramilitary units that have engaged in paramilitary operations. See Annex III.A, Special Forces.

*166       As quoted in Der Spiegel 5 August 1991, at 124-26, trans. in Daily Report, FBIS, 5 August 1991, at 51. See also S. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia - 1962-1991 260-63 (1992). Seselj is also a leader of a paramilitary unit that has been accused of committing some of the worst atrocities of the conflict. See infra; see also Annex III.A, Special Forces.

*167       See Belgrade Domestic Service, 6 January 1990, trans. in Daily Report (Eastern Europe), FBIS, 12 January 1990, at 65; see also Borba, 16 January 1990, at 6, trans. in Daily Report (Eastern Europe), FBIS, 22 January 1990, at 102.

*168       As reported by Belgrade Radio, 1 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 2 July 1991, at 69.

*169       Id.

*170       See David B. Oldaway, «Serbs Spurn Bid to Save Peace Pact», Washington Post, 25 April 1993, at A26. However, Serb officials denied that the unification of Bosnia Krajina and the Autonomous Republic of Krajina created a new state. See Tanjug, 28 June 1991, trans. in FBIS, 1 July 1991, at 50.

*171       See, e.g., Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 47 (1992) (citing Karadzic's letter to United States President George Bush, dated 3 July 1992, as transcribed by Reuters Information Services, 3 July 1992). But see John F. Burns, «Understanding and Letting Loose, Historic Hatreds in the Balkans», New York Times, 17 May 1992, § 4, at 7 (quoting Karadzic as saying «[h]istory has proven it. It is impossible for Serbs to live together with other peoples in a unitary state»).

*172       According to the 1991 census, ethnic Serbs constituted 31.4 per cent. See Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 569 (1992). In 1991, it was estimated that the former Yugoslavia's population was 23.4 million. Of BiH's population of 4,364,574, 31.4 per cent were classified as Serbs. See Stjepko Golubic, Susan Campbell & Thomas Golubic, «How Not to Divide the Indivisible», in Why Bosnia 209, 211-12 (Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993). Within BiH, Muslims are the most numerous group (43.6 per cent) and Bosnia Croats are the third most populous group (17.3 per cent). Id. at 215.

*173       This is true of all three of the principal ethnic groups (i.e., their areas of predominance are neither homogeneous nor contiguous). Id. at 217.

*174       For a somewhat different formulation of these problems, see Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 100 (1992) («[T]he essential problem of the Yugoslav state lies in the numerical and political dominance of Serbs over Croats; the essential problem of the Croatian state lies in the numerical and political dominance of Croats over Serbs»).

*175       Roger Cohen, «Serbian General Who Calls the Shots: Determined, and Calling the West's Bluff», New York Times, 17 April 1994, at 4 (quoting Paul Beaver, a defence expert at Jane's Information Group). The Sandzak is a region within the Republic of Serbia, located on the border of BiH, which is heavily populated by Muslims. See Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 100 and 129 (1992).

*176       The conflict in Slovenia began on 27 June 1991 and ended with a cease-fire on 7 July. The cease-fire was brought about by European Community (EC) mediators. On 5 July, the EC had banned arms exports to the region and suspended approximately $1 billion in aid. Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 570-73 (1992).

*177       Steven Woehrel & Julie Kim, Croatia: Background and Current Issues, Congressional Research Service Report (3 December 1992). For further discussion of Dubrovnik, see Annex XI.A, The Battle of Dubrovnik and the Law of Armed Conflict. For a description of the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign in Croatia, see Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 75-81 (1992).

*178       Sporadic violence, however, had occurred as early as September 1991 when two Bosnian Muslims were killed by Serbs near Bratunac, Bosnia. On 12 September 1991, the town of Kostajnica fell to the Serbs. This marked the first time that a section of Bosnia came under such control. Olga Ramljak, «Chronology of Serb Rebellion in Croatia», FBIS, at 23, 26 February 1993.

*179       See Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 27-30 (1992).

*180       See James Gow, «One Year of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina», 2 RFE/RL Research Report 1 (4 June 1993).

*181       Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 149 (1992).

*182       Id. at 150.

*183       Kresimir Meier & Mirjana Glusac, «Rape as a Means of Battle», Delo, 23 February 1993, at 6, trans. in Daily Report (Eastern Europe), FBIS, 23 March 1993, at 25.

*184       Id.

*185       James Gow, «One Year of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina», 2 RFE/RL Research Report 7 (4 June 1993).

*186       Id.

*187       Milan Vego, «The Yugoslav Ground Forces», Jane's Intelligence Review 247-53 (June 1993).

*188       Id. at 248. According to Vego, the JNA's «reorganization was primarily aimed at consolidating the Serbian-dominated position in BiH and part of Macedonia». Id. In the summer of 1992, further reorganization occurred, and the 4th Military District reportedly was abolished. Id. at 252.

*189       Id. at 250.

*190       Id.

*191       Id.

*192       Id.

*193       James Gow, «One Year of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina», 2 RFE/RL Research Report 8 (4 June 1993).

*194       The Bosnian government's cooperation with the JNA ceased a few days before the EC recognized the independence of BiH. Id. According to Gow, «[i]n retrospect . . . this campaign had left the Bosnian Territorial Defence Force (already largely disarmed a year previously) and the forces of the Bosnian Internal Affairs Ministry . . . stripped of the means to defend the country . . . .» Id. at 8. Gow also notes that reports of the trial of Colonel General Andrija Vasiljevic in Belgrade indicate that Bosnia's Minister of Internal Affairs, Alija Delimustafic, may have been working for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's military counter-intelligence. Id. at 18 (citing Vreme, 19 April 1992).

*195       Id.

*196       On 27 April 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) changed its name to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). See Marc Weller, «The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia», 86 American Journal International Law 569, 595 (1992).

*197       See Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 35-36 (1992).

*198       Rodovan Karadzic, the President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, announced on 17 May 1992 that 55,000 Bosnian Serbs would be transferred from Yugoslav Army units in Bosnia to the Serb Republic. He also said that Yugoslav General Ratko Mladic would command the troops. Nevertheless, Karadzic maintained that this new army was completely independent of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He stated «Serbians or Yugoslavs have nothing to do with our rights down there [in Bosnia]. I can see that nobody believes this, but it is the truth». John F. Burns, «Understanding and Letting Loose, Historic Hatreds in the Balkans», New York Times, 17 May 1992, § 4, at 7.

*199       See generally Annex III, Military Structure; Annex III.A, Special Forces; Annex V, Prijedor.

*200       See Helsinki Watch, II War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 42-49 (April 1993). See also Annex V, The Prijedor Report.

*201       See Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Herzegovina) (7 December 1992).

*202       See infra part 3 on «ethnic cleansing» operations in the north- east city of Zvornik from April through June 1992 (Vienna, 6 April 1994).

*203       See infra.

*204       Many of the homes of Bosnian Muslims are not only destroyed by artillery fire; they appear to be deliberately destroyed by Bosnian forces to prevent the Muslim population from returning. For example, T.D. Allman, a foreign correspondent for Vanity Fair magazine reports, after travelling through Serb-held Bosnia, that «. . . every house has been destroyed in exactly the same way-- from within, by demolition squads . . . [t]here is no resentful population in the towns Serbs have seized, because there is no one left». T.D. Allman, «Serbia's Blood War», in Why Bosnia 47 (Rabia Ali & Laurence Lifschultz eds., 1993).

*205       See, e.g., Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 62 (1992) (paramilitary snipers in Bijeljina kill Muslim men).

*206       See discussion of Prijedor and Kozarac, infra.

*207       Id. Mass killings have also been reported in Bijeljina, Foca, Visegrad and Bratunac. See Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia- Herzegovina 63 (1992).

*208       For instance, Helsinki Watch states: «Prior to their expulsion from Serbian-controlled areas of Bosnia, some non-Serbs are forced to sign statements that they are voluntarily leaving the area. In other cases, civilian authorities draft and issue statements in which the signatory relinquishes all claims to his or her property to the local Serbian-controlled agencies, usually to the municipal [opstina] authorities or to the town council [mesna zajednica]». Helsinki Watch II, supra note 184, at 12.

*209       Id. at 42. The pre-war population of Prijedor was 44 per cent Muslim 42.5 per cent Serb and 5.6 per cent Croat (the remainder «other») according to the 1991 census. Stjepko Golubic, Susan Campbell & Thomas Golubic, «How Not to Divide the Indivisible», in Why Bosnia 209, 231 (Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993). See also Annex V (The Prijedor Report).

*210       Helsinki Watch, II War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 42-43 (April 1993).

*211       SDS is the «Sister Party» of Serbia's Socialist Party (SPS), headed by Slobodan Milosevic. Prior to the dissolution of FRY, SPS had been the ruling Communist Party.

*212       Helsinki Watch, II War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 44 (April 1993).

*213       Id.

*214       Id. at 45.

*215       Id. at 48-49.

*216       See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, at 11 (17 November 1993). In addition, only 1,000 Muslims remain in Doboj, out of 43,000 who were there for the 1991 census. In Bosanski Novi, only 800 of 15,000 Muslims remain. Id.

*217       See Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Herzegovina) (7 December 1992).

*218       Id. at 6.

*219       See Boltzman Report, infra. See also Helsinki Watch, II War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 222 (April 1993).

*220       Boltzman Report, §§ 217-27 infra.

*221       Id. at § 222 infra.

*222       Id. at §§ 223-29 infra.

*223       Id. at § 226 infra.

*224       Id. at § 227 infra. «Arkan» is the nom de guerre of Zeljko Raznjatovic. His role in the conflict is discussed further, infra. See also Annex III.A, Special Forces.

*225       It was also reported that Arkan attacked the Muslim negotiators. Boltzman Report, § 227 infra.

*226       Arkan's troops are also known as «Tigers». See infra.

*227       Boltzman Report, § 231 infra.

*228       The Seseljovci are loyal to Vojislav Seselj, a member of the Republic of Serbia's parliament. His role in the conflict is discussed further, infra, this section. Seselj's troops are more commonly called «Cetniks».

*229       The White Eagles are a paramilitary unit led by Mirko Jovic, the leader of the Serbian National Renewal Party. See infra this section. See also Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 39 (1992).

*230       Boltzman Report, § 231 infra.

*231       Id. at § 234 infra.

*232       Id. at § 243 infra.

*233       Id. at § 247 infra.

*234       Id. at § 251 infra.

*235       Id. at § 255 infra.

*236       Monster Town, Vreme, No. 112, 15 November 1993, at 18.

*237       See, e.g., Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 50- 63 (1992).

*238       See First Periodic Report of the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/3 (5 May 1993).

*239       John F. Burns, «A Serbian Fighter's Trail of Brutality», New York Times, 27 November 1992, at 1.

*240       Id. Herak also stated that he killed five Muslim men who had been taken from a prison camp to dig trenches for Serb troops. Herak killed them after his companion told him the Muslims were performing their work poorly. Id.

*241       Id.

*242       Id.

*243       Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide 44 (1993) (quoting a former prisoner at Omarska identified only as «Meho»). See also Annex VIII, Prison Camps.

*244       Roger Cohen, «Bosnian Camp Survivors Describe Random Death», New York Times, 2 August 1994, at 1. According to the newspaper article, prison camp survivors confirmed Popovic's report of executions and rapes.

*245       Id.

*246       New York Times News Service, «Serbs Carry Out New Ethnic Purge, U.N. Says», Chicago Tribune, 3 September 1994, § 1, at 18. See also New York Times News Service, «Serbs Renew `Ethnic Cleansing': Despite Promises, Bosnian Muslims Herded form Homes», Chicago Tribune, 20 September 1994, § 1, at 9.

*247       See Medecins Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders), Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Herzegovina) 15 (7 December 1992) («[t]he camps are administered by armed and uniformed Serbs. The majority of the guards are known to the detainees as they come from neighbouring villages»; one former camp detainee is quoted as saying of the guards «[w]e used to party together; our children went to school together»). Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 8-9 (Comm. Print 1992).

*248       This issue is relevant with respect to establishing individual guilt under applicable international law. A finding of «state action», for example, would be necessary before the provisions of international humanitarian law could be invoked. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity 248-59 (1992).

*249       Helsinki Watch, II War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 32-42 (April 1993).

*250       See Mary Battiata, «Bosnian Serb Police Unit is Accused of Massacre of Muslim Prisoners», Washington Post, 22 September 1992, at A17.

*251       Roy Gutman, «There is no Food, There is no Air», Newsday, 19 July 1992, at 7.

*252       See generally Annex III.A, Special Forces.

*253       Stan Markotich, «Serbia», 3 RFE/RL Research Report 95-100 (22 April 1994).

*254       Id. at 96.

*255       Id.

*256       Vojislav Seselj is the leader of the Serbian Radical Party; Arkan, the Party of Serb Unity; and Mirko Jovic is the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement. For a review of Seselj's and Arkan's role in Serbian domestic politics, see generally Stan Markotich, «Serbia», 3 RFE/RL Research Report (22 April 1994).

*257       Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 16 (Comm. Print 1992).

*258       See Der Spiegel, 5 August 1991, at 124-126, trans. in Daily Report (Eastern Europe), FBIS, 5 August 1991, at 51-52 (interview with Vojislav Seselj).

*259       Id.

*260       Id.

*261       Blaine Harden, «The Men Behind the Terror in Yugoslavia», Washington Post, 15 February 1993, at 24.

*262       Arkan's troops also were involved in the attack on Zvornik. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.

*263       According to a report in Vreme, Belgrade's only English language daily newspaper, «[i]t is public knowledge who sacked Zvornik: the Serbia Volunteer guards led by Zeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan), local territorial fighters, the »Panthers« from Bijeljina under the command of Major Ljubisa Savic (»Mauzer«) and assorted volunteers from Serbia. Milos Vasic & Filip Svarm, »Political Games: The Chetnik's Watergate«, Vreme, No. 112, 15 November 1993.

*264       Blaine Harden, «The Men Behind the Terror in Yugoslavia», Washington Post, 15 February 1993, at 24.

*265       Id.

*266       Id.

*267       Id. See also Annex III.A, Special Forces.

*268       Chuck Sudetic, A Shady Militia Chief Arouses Serbs, New York Times, 20 December 1992, at 1, 12.

*269       Id.

*270       Id.

*271       Id. (The press in Slovenia, Croatia and Belgrade also have reported that Arkan once worked abroad as a government «hit man»).

*272       Stan Markotich, «Serbia», 3 RFE/RL Research Report 96 (22 April 1994).

*273       Id. at 96.

*274       Id. at 97 (citing Borba, 11 November 1993).

*275       Id. at 97. A vote was not taken on the motion; Milosevic dissolved parliament and called for elections instead. Id.

*276       Aleksandar Ciric, «The Balkan Archeology», Vreme, No. 112, 15 November 1993, at 7. In November 1993, several prominent SRS party members were arrested. Milenko Retric, vice president of the Sid SRS, for example, was arrested for committing four murders in Vojvodina. According to Radio Serbia, none of the persons arrested have been charged with crimes committed outside of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Id. at 97. But see Id. at 9 («Radicals in Belgrade are being charged with crimes against the civilian population in the vicinity of Zvornik; a radical who was there said they had 'fooled around a bit, cleansed the place and had a bit of fun.'» Id. In June 1994, a Serb was indicted in the district court in Sabac, Serbia for killing 16 Muslim civilians in Zvornik. Dusan Vuckovic, described as a 31 year-old volunteer, was charged with killing a group of Muslims as they huddled in a cultural centre that had been converted into a prison. Roger Cohen, «Serbs Put a Serb on Trial for War Crimes», New York Times, 12 June 1994, at Y4.

*277       During the Second World War, the «White Eagles» was closely aligned with another organization, Zbor, which was a pro-fascist military movement during the Second World War. See Dejan Anastasijevic, «Eagles with Clipped Wings», Vreme, No. 113, 22 November 1993, at 15.

*278       Id.

*279       Id. at 16.

*280       Id. at 17.

*281       Id. at 17.

*282       Vuk Draskovic later became the leader of SPO. In November 1993, Draskovic and Civic Alliance leader Vesna Pesic formed an alliance known as the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEMOS). Milan Milosevic, «The Left and the Right Shake Hands», Vreme, No. 113, 22 November 1993, at 1.

*283       Dejan Anastasijevic, «Eagles with Clipped Wings», Vreme, No. 113, 22 November 1993, at 17.

*284       Id. at 18.

*285       Chuck Sudetic, «A Shady Militia Chief Arouses Serbs», New York Times, 20 December 1992, § 1, at 12. Arkan also testified in his 1986 trial for assaulting a man in an elevator that he worked «for the Federal Interior Ministry in the Division of Foreign Emigres». Id.

*286       Der Spiegel 5 August 1991, at 124-26, trans. in Daily Report, FBIS, 5 August 1991, at 51.

*287       Id.

*288       See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, «U.S. Names Figures to be Prosecuted over War Crimes», New York Times, 12 December 1992, at A1 (then Secretary of State Laurence S. Eagleburger identified Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic as suspected war criminals; also identified were Borislav Herak; «Adil» and «Arif», two members of a Croatian paramilitary unit; Zeljko Raznjatovic; Vojislav Seselj; Drago Prcac, the commander of Omarska prison camp; Adem Delic, commander of the Celebici prison camp; and Slobodan Milosevic).

*289       M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity 240-44 (1992) (discussing the public law connection between individual conduct and state action or policy). For the prerequisite legal elements of «Crimes Against Humanity», see id. at 248; see also Genocide Convention, art. IV («Persons committing genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals»). Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 United Nations Treaty Series 277, reprinted in 45 American Journal International Law 7 (1951) (Supp.).

*290       See «Profile: Happy to Butcher Bosnia», The Independent, 9 January 1993 at 14; Tanjug (10 July 1991), trans. in Daily Report (Eastern Europe), FBIS, 11 July 1991, at 42.

*291       See Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 149-50 (1992) (Presidents Milosevic and Karadzic discuss the shipment of arms in connection with Operation RAM).

*292       See «A Serbian Voice: Karadzic: We Want Peace, Not Land, In Bosnia», The Gazette, 29 August 1992, at B5.

*293       David Binder, «Bosnian Serb Leader Says His People Fight Out of Fear and in Self-Defense», New York Times, 5 March 1993, at A8.

*294       Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide 158 (1993).

*295       Id. at 159 (quoting the Bosnian State Commission on War Crimes).

*296       See discussion infra.

*297       Roger Cohen, «Serbian General Who Calls the Shots: Determined and Calling West's Bluff», New York Times, 17 April 1994, at A4.

*298       Id. See also John F. Burns, «A Serb, Fighting Serbs, Defends Sarajevo», New York Times, 26 July 1992, at 12 (General Mladic quoted as telling his officers «burn it [Sarajevo] all»).

*299       Slobodan Lekic, «Yugoslavia - Top Gun», Associated Press Wire Service, 8 April 1993.

*300       Id.

*301       «French Groups Want Mladic Tried for War Crimes», Reuter Wire Service, 21 April 1994.

*302       TWRA Press Release (Zagreb, Croatia), 9 April 1994 (captured Serb states that he was released from prison where he was serving a sentence for rape; he stated that the warden told him that the warden had been authorized by General Mladic to recruit the most violent criminals).

*303       See Annex III, Military Structure.

*304       For examples of repression in Serbia's Sandzak region, see Dino Ramovic, «Misery in a Land of Plenty», Bosnia Winter Watch, No. 2, 29 November 1993, at 7. See also Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 95-100 (March 1993).

*305       Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo (March 1993).

*306       David C. Isby, «Yugoslavia 1991 - Armed Forces in Conflict», Jane's Intelligence Review, 402 (September 1991).

*307       See James Gow, «One Year of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina», 2 RFE/RL Research Report 10 (4 June 1993).

*308       Milan Vego, «The Yugoslav Ground Forces», Jane's Intelligence Review 250 (June 1993).

*309       Id.

*310       Blaine Harden, «Sarajevo Greets U.N. Peace Keepers; Continued Shooting Blocks Plan to Reopen Airport for Food», Washington Post, 12 June 1992, at A1. For additional examples of alleged FRY involvement in the conflict in Bosnia, see Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 ICJ (13 September) (Separate Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Lauterpacht).

*311       Report by the Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs, to the Committee on Foreign Relations, to Stand Against Aggression: Milosevic, the Bosnian Republic, and the Conscience of the West, United States Senate (19 April 1993).

*312       See Milan Vego, «Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina», Jane's Intelligence Review 448 (October 1992). Other supply routes reportedly run across the Drina River at Loznica, Bratunac, and Visegrad. Id. Croatian forces in Bosnia have also received assistance from Croatia. See Milan Vego, «The Croatian Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina», Jane's Intelligence Review, 99-102 (March 1993).

*313       Chuck Sudetic, «Serbia Isolating Allies in Bosnia», New York Times, 5 August 1994, at 1.

*314       Stephen Kinzer, «Belgrade Appears to be Cutting Off the Bosnian Serbs», New York Times, 7 August 1994, at 1.

*315       The Bijeljina garrison belonged to the 17 Corps Tuzla.

*316       Until the re-organization of the former JNA, the headquarters of the 12th Corps Novi Sad commanded «operative groups» as part of its «sector command North», which were under direct control of the general staff, including at least 3 brigades and additional forces. Further «operative groups» were under the authority of the «sector command South», consisting of the headquarters of the Belgrade-based «mechanized division» with at least 6 brigades, one partisan brigade and one artillery brigade.

*317       All along, the units from Sabac and Sremska Mitrovica were under the authority of the 12th Corps Novi Sad.

*318       The unit in Valjevo was always under the command of the 1st Corps Belgrade. Until the fall of 1991 the units from Sabac, Sremska Mitrovica and Valjevo were readily-deployable units. All these units belonged to the First Military District of Belgrade.

*319       Up to the re-organization of the former JNA, the 21st Corps stationed in Nis was under the authority of the Third Military District of Skopje. Later a separate Third Military District of Nis was established.

*320       According to one respondent, on 25 March, Seselj personally brought hand-carried weapons into the church of Scemlije, where he was received by Bosko Ceranic, a SDS activist in Scemlije.

*321       The Serbian Police of Zvornik repeatedly transferred its headquarters: from April (i.e., immediately after the separation into a Muslim and Serbian militia) until mid-April, it was located on the premises of the «Alhos» factory in the Karakaj industrial zone. After that, the Serbian militia moved into the factory of «Novi Standard», then after the fall of Kulagrad into the Hotel Drina in the town of Zvornik, and finally back again into the building of the former militia (SUP).

*322       A number of detailed testimonies from survivors of the camps at Karakaj are available to BIM. All of them are suitable for submission to the International War Crime Tribunal.

*323       For a list of the camps see Appendix I.

*324       According to some witnesses, fatalities occurred in the Zvornik hospital, mostly as a result of blood withdrawals being conducted until the advent of death.

*325       In Subotica, some of the deportees encountered persons who had already taken part in the aggressions in Zvornik. In Subotica, these people were responsible, inter alia, for the issuance of Yugoslav passports to deportees from Zvornik.