S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I)
28 December 1994
Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
established pursuant to
security council resolution 780 (1992)
Annex Summaries and conclusions
Prepared by:
M. Cherif Bassiouni
Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)
Annexes I through I.C describe administrative and
organizational matters. They were prepared by the Commission's
Secretariat *1 and staff members of the International Human Rights
Law Institute (IHRLI), DePaul University, under the supervision
of Chairman Bassiouni. Annex I contains the Rules of Procedure
of the Commission which were also attached to the (first) Interim
Report as an appendix. *2 The Rules of Procedure governed the
activities of the Commission in the fulfillment of its mandate.
Annex I.A includes an explanation of the workings of the IHRLI
database and documentation centre and a description of the
documents received by the Commission and catalogued in the
documentarian's database. Annex I.B contains a list of the 34
missions undertaken by the Commission. *3 Annex I.C contains a
list of organizations which assisted or supported the work of the
Commission to acknowledge their efforts.
Commissioner Cleiren prepared Annex II, consisting of 18
pages of text, on the criteria for applying international
humanitarian law to the crime of rape and other sexual assaults.
The analysis addressed the legal issues of sexual assault against
women, men, and children. *4
This Annex was prepared by Chairman Bassiouni and consists of 37 pages. The analysis is based on a variety of sources describing the military structure, its evolution, and the strategies and tactics of the «warring factions» in the contextual evolution of this armed conflict. The historical, military, and political background of the military structure is described and analysed along with the particularities of the strategies and tactics of the parties. It is complemented by Annex III.A, which describes the role and activities of paramilitary organizations. The military characteristics described in Annexes III and III.A along with the historical background and policy of «ethnic cleansing» described in Annex IV are essential to an understanding of the facts that brought about the significant victimization and the violations of international humanitarian law that occurred in this conflict.
The following report describes the basic military characteristics and features of the «warring factions» in the former Yugoslavia. The focus of this report is on the structures, strategies, and tactics of the regular military forces engaged in the conflict. These regular forces are those of the Yugoslav Army (JA) and its predecessor, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA), also referred to as the Yugoslav National Army (JNA); the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA); the Krajina Serb Army (SKA); the Croatian Army (HV); the Croatian Defence Council (HVO); and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Paramilitary and Special Forces units have performed an important role in this conflict, often coordinating their operations with those of conventional forces. These forces are discussed in detail in Annex III.A. Armed police and local volunteers have also been also active participants in military activities.
With the exception of the JNA, the military forces involved in the conflict have been organized only recently. In large measure, they emerged from the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and local Territorial Defence Forces (TDF).
The strategies of the «warring factions» in the current conflict, with their decentralized structures and reliance on partisan tactics, have much in common with the tactics employed by Yugoslav forces during the Second World War. Thus, the following discussion begins with a review of military operations that emerged to resist the Axis powers.
The facts discussed above are linked to the periods to which they relate. Obviously, command structure, «order of battle», forces, equipment, and troop disposition change. Thus, this report is not intended to be a specific chronology of such events. Rather, it is intended to reflect a general situation that needs to be understood in order to assess the military context of the events that led to large scale violations. It is not therefore a complete survey of all aspects of the military situation. The description which follows is based on information obtained up to March 1993.
Unlike other conflicts, this one has peculiar characteristics which partake of conventional and unconventional war.
Political factors, both international and local, significantly affected the course of military operations.
Because the overall conflict evolved into three separate ones, the armies of some of the warring factions were newly constituted while the JNA was three times reconstituted. This situation produced complications and peculiarities with a direct bearing on the course of military activities, and the status of command and control.
The geographic spread of military industries, location of maintenance facilities, army depots and government supplies, also affected the course of military operations and the use of weapons because of the availability of munitions, spare parts and repair facilities.
Military operations in BiH and Croatia by the JNA, BSA, and SKA have essentially been a function of the political-military goal of securing territories that link Serbia proper with Serb- inhabited areas in BiH (along the Drina and Sava rivers) and Serb- inhabited areas in Croatia. The Serb goal was to achieve a territorial and defensible link between what is called «Greater Serbia». Thus, there has never been a unified or coherent battle line, but multiple theatres of operation between which forces shifted, depending on the status of each theatre. Strategic positions were related to each one of these theatres, but since these theatres were part of a political geographical arc linking Serbia with Serb-inhabited areas in BiH and Croatia, the theatres of military confrontation were readily identifiable. As the conflict progressed, the Serb side sought to solidify and enlarge its territorial gains in the areas of the projected «Greater Serbia», while BiH and Croatian forces sought to dislodge them. These theatres saw a constant ebb and flow of military activities.
Because these areas were of mixed ethnic and religious population and Serbs were usually a minority, particularly in BiH, Serbs felt that they had to dislodge the other groups. In 1992, Bosnian Serb forces were insufficient in number and disorganized. However, they were tasked by their political leaders with massive population removal in a relatively short period of time without the open and direct participation of the JNA. The JNA, however, militarily supported the Bosnian Serb forces in many ways, including bombardment and shelling. They were also directly involved in several operations. This was in execution of the policy of «ethnic cleansing» which is described in Annex IV and more specifically in Annex V. The overriding political goal of depopulating these areas of non-Serbs determined the nature of the military activities. These areas were not military targets, but civilian areas with strategic importance derived from the fact that they linked Serbia with Serbs in BiH and Croatia. Personnel, arms and supplies crossed the Drina River from Serbia to Serbs in BiH and through Bosnian Serb areas to certain parts of the Krajinas, which are surrounded by Croats. Military operations in these areas must therefore be seen in this light in order to be understood.
Confrontation lines are therefore in and around cities and villages, and access roads to them. But they are not part of a continuous line. Consequently, there are seven areas in BiH controlled by the Bosnian government which are geographically unconnected. This also means that areas under Serb control are not contiguous. The same is true with respect to Bosnian and Croatian forces in Herzegovina and also in the Krajinas where the Serbs are in four unconnected sectors. This checkered military map meant the forces from different warring factions were interspersed. In many areas, the party in control is surrounded entirely by another party, or only partly by that party and partly by yet another party.
The result of this checkered and totally uneven field situation is that each one of these theatres of military confrontation had different characteristics. More particularly, they also had different dynamics and the relations between opposing groups varied significantly.
One way by which this is evident is in the level of the black market and trade that goes on in these areas between the warring factions or through their lines. Thus, for example, the Tuzla area, which has over one million inhabitants, including some 20,000 Serbs and 30,000 Croats, has suffered little bombardment from the Serb forces which surround it entirely. That city has a flourishing black market to which goods arrive from Serbia through Serbian lines. Another example is the Bihac pocket which, until summer 1994, was ruled by Fikret Abdic who broke with the Sarajevo government. He operated a private company that brought goods from Croatia (which borders Bihac on one side) into the pocket, and also traded with the Serb forces which encircled the pocket from three directions. This cozy relationship resulted in Abdic's signing in Belgrade in April 1993 a separate peace with the Bosnian Serb Republic. This situation that changed when the Fifth Army Corps of BiH recaptured the area in August 1994. Since then, the area has been the scene of intense fighting between BiH forces and the BSA, which also has support from the SKA in nearby Croatia. These are only illustrations of the peculiarities of this conflict.
The military structure, strategies and tactics of the «warring factions» are a consequence of the following factors:
The TND was part of Yugoslav political-military doctrine. Thus, TND and the type of Army and Party structures that existed in Communist Yugoslavia constitute a political-military context which has had significant impact on the goals, strategies and tactics employed by the JNA and the forces that emerged out of the JNA in Serb Bosnia and Krajina. This context and, in particular, the political factors that led to the conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH, are crucial to an understanding of what occurred.
When the three Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH declared their independence, *5 they did not have separate armies. Before 1991, the JNA was a single army for all members of the former Yugoslavia, though its military centrality changed since 1974. Upon the successive declarations of independence of these three republics, some of the military personnel, who had been located in each of these Republics, left the JNA and reconstituted themselves as part of the newly created national armies of Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH. *6 In addition, each of the «warring factions» used paramilitary and special forces as described in Annex III.A. The armies of the «warring factions» consisted mainly of military personnel and equipment of the former JNA. But each of these Republics had local TDF *7 which were part of the TND of Yugoslavia, and local police forces consisting of personnel from their respective Republics. These forces and armed civilians supplemented the armies of the «warring factions».
The role performed by the military in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia was critical to the evolution of this conflict, as stated by James Gow, a Research Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London:
«[t]he role played by the military in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia was central: it made the difference between widespread unrest and war. By September 1991 the military had decided to create a new Yugoslav state from parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be »cleansed« of »unreliable« and potentially hostile inhabitants. At that stage, as the Belgrade military intensified its activity in Croatia, it also appears to have begun preparations for a war to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. That war was launched in the period preceding international recognition of the Bosnian state, with a series of attacks at crucial points in the country. In the face of international pressure, the Yugoslav military divided, with half of its capability remaining in Bosnia as the Bosnian Serb army. This force proceeded to occupy and »cleanse« large parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.» *8
Since the conflict began, however, there has been considerable continuity in the structure, strategy, and tactics of the military forces in the former Yugoslavia. The distinctive changes since 1993 are that the «warring factions» increased centralized command of their respective army structures; established control over paramilitary and special forces by integrating them into the army or disbanding them; and enhanced military professionalism. The result, as of middle-to-late 1993, is that more combatants are in uniform, who operate as part of regular army units, and under the command of superior officers. It is therefore important to distinguish between the situation that existed between approximately June 1991 and late 1993, and the ensuing period, bearing in mind that the process of transformation has been gradual.
The earlier part of the conflict was characterized by a multiplicity of combatant forces (for example, regular armies, militias, special forces, police and armed civilians) operating within different structures or outside any structure, sometimes operating under no established command and control. Some of these forces operated without uniforms, emblems or insignias. Frequently, these forces merged or combined in connection with certain operations. Probably the only factor common to all of these forces is their receipt of military equipment, ammunition and supplies from their respective armies and governments, and in the case of Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, their reliance on the JNA and the FRY.
The military structure and the strategies and tactics employed blur the chain of command and conceal responsibility. This concealment may well be intended by some of the parties to provide a shield of plausible deniability to the military and political leaders. But it could also have been the result of a chaotic situation which regular armies in the process of constituting or reconstituting themselves could not control until they had reached a sufficient level of organization. This occurred later in the conflict, but after most of the violations had occurred.
These factors, however, contributed to the manner in which the policy of «ethnic cleansing» was implemented, particularly by Serb forces, who were unrestrained by the JNA, from which they received support. *9
The overall conflict in the former Yugoslavia evolved through three distinct phases. The military structure must be examined in the contexts of the three succeeding and sometimes overlapping conflicts which took place during these three phases, as described below.
The first phase involved the conflict in Slovenia. It began when that Republic declared its independence from the former Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991. That conflict involved the JNA, Slovenia's TDF, Slovenian troops who left the JNA to join the newly created Slovenian Army, and local Slovenian Police. This phase lasted for only 10 days in June and July 1991, and resulted in limited human and property harm. *10
The second phase of the conflict involved Croatia. It started before that Republic officially declared its independence on 25 July 1991. On one side, that conflict involved the JNA, Serb militia in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia, special forces from Serbia (with the participation of Serb expatriates and some mercenaries), local special forces, and Serb police and armed civilians from the same areas. On the other side, the newly-formed Croatian Army consisted of Croatian troops who left the JNA, the Croatian National Guard (ZNG), local militia, special forces (with the participation of expatriate Croats and some mercenaries), and local Croatian police and armed civilians. After November 1991, the JNA formally withdrew from Croatia, but continued to support the army of the newly-formed, self-proclaimed «Serb Republic of Krajina». Meanwhile, the newly- established Republic of Croatia had formed its army, the Croatian Army (HV), which, along with Croatian special forces and others, continued the armed conflict in what became the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia. *11
The third phase of the conflict began in BiH, following its declaration of independence on 6 March 1992. It involved simultaneous fighting between Croatians and Bosnian government forces, Bosnian government forces and Serbian forces, and Croatian and Serbian forces. The Croatian Defence Council forces in BiH (HVO) were supported by the Croatian Army, local Croatian police, volunteer civilians and special forces like the HOS, the military wing of the Croatian party of Rights (named after the former Ustase of the Second World War, who also fought against the Serbs in the Krajina area). The HOS was later partially incorporated in the HVO and disbanded. Other Croatian armed civilian forces operate essentially in local areas. At first, the Bosnian government and JNA opposed each other. This lasted from April to June 1992, during which time the JNA troops from Serbia and Montenegro «officially» withdrew from BiH, leaving behind Serbian JNA troops from BiH and their equipment. They were supplemented by special forces from Serbia which consisted of Serbs, expatriate volunteers and mercenaries, Bosnian Serb militia and police, and local Serb volunteers. *12
As described above, in addition to the regular armies of JNA, Croatia and BiH, there are three additional armies: the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), which operates in Bosnia; the Krajina Serb Army (SKA), which operates in Croatia; and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), which operates outside the border of the Republic of Croatia, in BiH. The first two are armed and supported by the JNA (the Yugoslav Army or JA) and the third is armed and supported by the Croatian Army (HV).
In addition to these armies, the TDF were militarily active. In Croatia, TDFs were known as the Croatian National Guard (ZNG). The TDFs had a separate command structure from the regular army. Nevertheless, they joined in the armed conflict, frequently operating with their respective regular army and under regular army officers' command. They also operate independently in certain geographic areas, usually the areas from which most of the personnel in these units came.
Two other types of paramilitary groups and formations are also engaged in military operations. They consist of the so- called special forces, and local police forces augmented by local armed civilians. All the warring factions make use of such forces among their combatants, but the lines of authority and the structure of command and control are confusing, even to the combatants. (See Annex III.A, Special Forces).
There are several reported paramilitary and special forces, (see Annex III.A), which usually operate under the command of a named individual and apparently with substantial autonomy, except when they are integrated into the regular army's plan of action. *13 These forces are supplied and often trained by the governments that they serve. Many special forces answer only to senior political officials in the respective governments. Such relationships are frequently based on personal political allegiance and are not always publicly known. However, in time, information about the political sponsorship and support of these groups became more readily available though still nebulous. As these units usually operate independently and outside the apparent military chain of command, their order of battle is not known. Notwithstanding the strong links between these units and the respective armies, the regular armies failed to restrain them from the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. Among the most notorious of the special forces are Arkan's «Tigers» and Seselj's «White Eagles» (also referred to as «Cetniks»). Many of these units operate throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Thus, the Serbian units operate in BiH and Croatia, and the Croatian units in BiH. These special forces have committed some of the worst violations of international humanitarian law. They are described in Annex III.A.
Some towns and villages formed paramilitary units, which are not to be confused with the special forces mentioned above. These local forces operate in the areas of their towns and villages. Occasionally, they also lend support to similar groups and other combatants in the same opstina (county) and neighbouring areas. Their command and control is local, and the chain of command difficult to establish, though these groups, like the special forces, typically have an identifiable leader. Frequently, the unit or group is called by the leader's name. Otherwise, the unit or group uses a politically significant name or the name of their town, village or area. The leadership of these groups is local, mostly consisting of political figures. These units, particularly among Serbs in BiH and Krajina and Croats in Krajina and BiH, have, like the special forces, committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.
The police, augmented by volunteer armed civilians, also participate in military activities. These forces operate within a given municipality. They are nominally under the control of the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the respective Ministries of Interior also have national and regional police units, which usually operate outside the boundaries of local municipalities. The relationship between national, regional and local police is not always clear and varies in each country, and sometimes within the regions of each country. During the early stages of the conflicts in Croatia and in BiH, the police, augmented by volunteer armed civilians, operated without apparent command and control from the army. Their leadership was local and included many political figures. These forces acted with apparent autonomy in their respective areas, except when engaged in operations with their respective regular army.
During the early stages of the conflict, most of the combatants, including in many cases those in the regular army, did not wear distinctive uniforms, emblems or insignias of rank. As a result, officers freely moved from army to militia and from one unit to another. To further complicate matters, in the early stages of the conflict between Croatia and the FRY and other Serb forces within Croatia, and between BiH and the FRY and other forces within BiH (in May 1992, JNA forces from the FRY officially withdrew from Bosnia), the order of battle of many army and militia units was not clearly established. The chain of command was significantly blurred, even to insiders. Consequently, the organizations' command and control structures were seriously eroded, which resulted in much confusion. The confusion was more pronounced in BiH among Serb combatants until late 1992. It seems to have been purposely kept that way for essentially political reasons. This makes it difficult to ascertain units in a specific area and to establish command responsibility. The situation changed as the three regular armies managed or decided to control these combatants as of 1993. But that process was slow.
The outcome of such a structure and the strategies and tactics employed blur the chain of command and help conceal responsibility. This concealment may well be intended by some of the parties to provide a shield of plausible deniability. But, it could also be due to other factors existing at the early stages of the conflict, as stated by one expert:
«[t]here is a great deal of genuine confusion in the West as who actually controls the Serbian forces in BiH. To make the situation even more complicated, the regime in Belgrade consistently tries to do its best to muddle the issue by denying its own responsibility for war in the neighbouring republic. For example, the President of the self-proclaimed FRY, Mr. Dobrica Cosic (who is also Supreme Commander of the Federal Army) falsely asserted on 15 July that the army does not provide any weapons and military equipment to the former 'territorial Defense Forces of the Serbian Republic of BiH, except for some limited humanitarian aid'. Moreover, it does not command and control these forces. But the reality is quite different. The operational chain of command in the federal army runs from the Supreme Defense Council (composed of the president of the FRY and presidents of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro through the General Staff in Belgrade to the commanders of 1st MD (Belgrade), 4th MD (Podgorica), the Army of the Serbian Republic of BiH, Naval District (Kumbor, Bay of Cattaro), Air Force and Air Defense units.» *14
Special forces are apparently accountable only to senior political officials of the governments which they serve. Little is known about their order of battle except that restraint of these units by the regular army is conspicuously absent. Command and control, in effect, have been established through a policy of omission. The JNA, in particular, has at least tacitly permitted paramilitary units and special forces to engage in conduct that has resulted in grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. In many instances, the JNA was on the scene and militarily supported these activities and these violations. A purposeful failure to act was therefore evident in many cases.
As stated earlier, paramilitary units and special forces have performed an important role in the conflict. In the early stages of the war in BiH, for example, paramilitary units coordinated their operations with the JNA. This was apparent in the attacks on Prijedor, Bijeljina, and Zvornik, as well as in other attacks in cities and villages along the Drina and Sava Rivers. The role that paramilitary and special forces have played in the conflict is explored in greater detail in Annex III.A.
A large number of Serbian and Croatian expatriates have joined in the fighting, mostly with paramilitary and special forces. There are also a smaller number of non-nationals, volunteers, and a few that could be called mercenaries also joining in the fighting. In contrast, a much smaller number of expatriates and non-nationals joined on the BiH side. (See Annex III.A, Special Forces)
All of the combatant forces, in significantly different degrees, have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law for which military and, in some cases, civilian commanders are responsible under the principle of command responsibility. The largest number of these violations were clearly perpetrated by Serb combatants, and the largest number of victims have been from BiH.
The absence of command and control and the conditions created, particularly on the Serb side, were conducive to large scale and repeated violations. Persons who engaged in this conduct were encouraged by propagandistic rhetoric and comforted by the belief that they would have impunity. The absence of preventive action by military commanders and other purposeful omissions, such as the failure to punish known perpetrators, constitutes a clear basis for command responsibility.
The history of war clearly reveals that professional armies that are under effective command and control commit fewer violations than fighting units that are not properly trained in the law of armed conflict and are not under the effective command and control of superior officers. But when military commanders order violations, permit them to happen, fail to take measures to prevent them, and fail to discipline, prosecute and punish violators, then the worst can be expected. Unfortunately, in this conflict, the worst did occur. This is a sad commentary on those who committed these crimes, but it is an even sadder one concerning the military and political leaders who ordered these acts or made them possible. War is sufficiently inhuman without having it carried out in the most inhuman ways. Tragically, in this case, these inhuman ways were designed to serve a political purpose. See the Policy of Ethnic Cleansing Annex IV.
The grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law occurring in this conflict are, in part, the product of the military structure that resulted in a lack of effective command and control. The violations are also the result of the strategies and tactics employed by the «warring factions», and the failure of military commanders to prevent and repress these violations.
The parties to this conflict are bound by the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II, both under State succession and by the parties' specific accession thereto. *15 The parties are also bound by the Genocide Convention under State succession, in so far as that convention has been ratified by the former FRY. The parties are also bound by that Convention under jus cogens and customary international law. The parties are also bound under jus cogens and customary international law by the obligations arising under «crimes against humanity», as developed in conventional and customary international law. *16
The Federal Criminal Code of the former Yugoslavia embodied the international rules of armed conflict. JNA military personnel were instructed accordingly. Thus, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law are also part of the applicable national laws of all warring factions.
Furthermore, the ordinary criminal laws which existed in the criminal codes of all the former Republics of Yugoslavia also prohibited those acts (which are grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and other violations of international humanitarian law) as common crimes.
Lastly, the defence of «obedience to superior orders», finds no application in the cases of violations which occurred in this conflict.
The doctrine of «Command Responsibility» and the defence of
«obedience of superior orders» are discussed in the Final Report,
§ 55-62.
Annex III.A was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni. It consists of 251 pages of text.
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has seen the widespread use of paramilitary organizations within the territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Republic of Croatia, and to a lesser extent, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The use of paramilitary organizations by all «warring factions» must be viewed in the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the structure of the military before the breakup. *17 In the period of 1989-1991, political ferment indicated that a breakup of Yugoslavia was likely, however, there were no indications on how the country would be divided. The rise of nationalism and ethnic tension caused Yugoslavs to become concerned for their own safety. This concern over their own self- defence, combined with the rhetoric of nationalist politicians, led many Yugoslavs to arm themselves. Furthermore, uncertainty of the Yugoslav National Army's (JNA) role in post-Communist Yugoslavia led many to conclude that paramilitary organizations were a necessity.
The creation of paramilitary groups was further fueled by the wide circulation of stories of atrocities committed by all sides. Serbs, for example, were shown pictures allegedly depicting the Mujahedin forces holding the severed heads of Serb soldiers. All sides viewed themselves as victims, not as perpetrators, thereby creating a desire for revenge and providing justification for their own deeds.
Paramilitary organizations exist in several forms. Some are highly-organized groups and operate in several theatres in conjunction with regular military formations. Others are loosely organized and act alone in a single village or on an ad hoc basis. Some of the groups preceded the conflict, others followed it. Still others were formed as the need arose during the conflict. These groups have been organized by the governments or militaries of the warring factions, by political parties, as well as by local police, political, military or community leaders. The members of these paramilitary organizations have been drawn from the regular army, Territorial Defence forces, local militia and police, local civilians, expatriots, and foreign nationals. According to some reports, the paramilitary organizations also include criminals released from prison solely for the purpose of forming these units.
For purposes of this report, the paramilitary forces operating in the territory of the former Yugoslavia can be classified into four categories: Special Forces, «Militias», «Paramilitary units», and «police augmented by armed civilians». *18 Special Forces usually operate with substantial autonomy under the command of an identified leader. They operate in several theatres, and sometimes engage in joint operations with the regular militaries. These groups are supplied, and often trained, by the governments they serve. Many of these Special Forces report solely to senior political officials. «Militias» consist of members of the former Territorial Defence Forces. They frequently operate jointly, in the geographic area from which they originate under the command of the regular army. «Paramilitary units» are forces under the command of a local leader. Their area of operation is often confined to the town or village from which the members were drawn, although they may occasionally operate alongside similar groups in other towns or villages. The «police augmented by armed civilians» are forces that operate within a given county *19 under local, sometimes political, leadership. These forces frequently act with autonomy, although they are reported to be under the control of the Ministry of Interior or other political organizations. For purposes of this report, groups from these categories will be referred to generically as paramilitary groups, unless otherwise indicated.
This report attempts to identify the paramilitary organizations working in support of all three warring factions in the former Yugoslavia. It also discusses how these groups operate in relation to the regular military command of the respective factions. Furthermore, this report discusses the reported activity of these groups.
This report begins with a discussion of the research methodology, and is followed by a brief discussion of the pre- conflict military defence doctrine of the former Yugoslavia. This doctrine, with its reliance on a decentralized command structure and locally-based weapons caches, provided fertile ground for the creation of paramilitary groups. This discussion is followed by a summary analysis of the data. Section II discusses the activity of six of the most prolific paramilitary organizations: the Green Berets and Mujahedin, working in support of the government of BiH; the HOS and troops under the command of Jusuf Prazina, working in support of the Croatian government; and those groups under the command of Vojislav Seselj and Zeljko Raznjatovic (nom de guerre Arkan), working in support of the government of Serbia and the self-declared Serb Republics. Section III is a listing of the other identified paramilitary organizations containing all reported vital statistics, and Section IV discusses paramilitary activity by geographic location.
This report is based on information contained in documents and audio and video tapes received by the Commission of Experts and the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), as well as on information gathered from searches of the NEXIS and FBIS media databases. All of the organizations referred to in paragraph 4 operated in substitution for, or supplementing, a regular military force. *20 All documents and media reports in the possession of IHRLI were reviewed, and those containing allegations of paramilitary activity were analysed. A large number of these reports referred to paramilitary groups generically (i.e., Serbian paramilitaries or irregular forces). Although these reports were consulted, only those reports referring to a paramilitary organization by name (i.e., Tigers, Yellow Ants), or by specific leaders or group members (i.e., paramilitary forces under Dragan Ikanovic), are included in the statistical data below.
Information sheets were created for each identified paramilitary organization containing the following information: name of unit, ethnicity, uniform, number of troops, place of origin, area(s) of operation, political affiliation, leader(s), alleged members, source of information, and the alleged activity. These information sheets were then used to compare information on the paramilitary groups in a standardized format.
This report is limited by the quality and quantity of the documents received by the Commission. In addition, the Commission was not able to verify much of the information that it received. Consequently, this report should not be considered all inclusive, though it is comprehensive. Subsequent investigation may identify additional paramilitary groups and facts that have not yet been discovered that may bear upon the information contained in this report.
Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform led to fears of a Soviet invasion. These fears resulted in the development of a new military defence doctrine in the former Yugoslavia called «Total National Defence». *22 This doctrine was designed to defeat a Soviet invasion by mobilizing all of the nation's cultural, societal, and military resources. The Communist party apparatus was tightly integrated into the military scheme, with the military structures accommodating a «shadow» chain of command responsible to the Communist party.
Yugoslav military strategists realized national command, control, and communications facilities were vulnerable. Therefore, they decentralized the system of command and control. The governments of the various republics would participate with the federal government for regional defence.
This strategy required universal military service and coordinated training in guerilla warfare. This ensured that cadres of soldiers, trained in guerrilla warfare, would be available nationwide and capable of operating in a decentralized command fashion. Training facilities, weapons caches, and supply stores were placed throughout the country. The military also organized reserve units (Territorial Defence Forces) around workplaces to ensure the wide distribution of weapons.
Thus, with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, trained soldiers were available for mobilization, and weapons and ammunition were also available for distribution to national and local political or military leaders and their followers. These leaders sometimes used these resources to further their own political, military, or personal goals. This, along with the other factors, led to the proliferation of paramilitaries throughout the republics of the former Yugoslavia.
The first report of paramilitary activity occurred in April of 1991. However, Arkan and Vojislav Seselj began forming paramilitary organizations as early as 1990. The first reported paramilitary operation involved Seselj's troops in Vukovar County, Croatia. The most active period for Serb paramilitary activity in Croatia was in October of 1991. Those areas reporting the greatest amount of paramilitary activity in Croatia were Knin, Podravska Slatina, and Vukovar.
There were no reports of paramilitary activity in BiH until early 1992. The first reports concerned paramilitary groups supported by Arkan and Seselj. The activity in BiH was strongest in May and June of 1992 in the areas of Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brcko, Doboj, Foca, Konjic, Modrica, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Visegrad, and Zvornik.
Paramilitary groups working in support of FRY, or the self- proclaimed Serbian Republics, have operated in the territories of BiH, Croatia, and FRY. Those groups working in support of Croatia were reported to have operated in both BiH and Croatia, while those supporting BiH have not been involved in operations outside BiH territory. *28
The vast majority of the paramilitaries acted locally, with their operations confined to a single county, or opstina. *29 They operated under the command of a local leader with local command and control. These groups would often coordinate their operations with regular forces or other paramilitaries. *30 The local groups would then take control of the area after it had been secured.
The most active paramilitary groups operating throughout the area of conflict were the Serb groups under the command of Arkan and Seselj. *31
Reliance on, or tolerance of, paramilitary and special forces served several purposes for the military and political leaders of the respective republics. It clouded the issue of command and control, reduced the chances of being identified, and therefore permitted the greater use of illegal violence. Many of these groups, for example, did not wear uniforms or other conventional military badges or symbols.
Involvement of paramilitary groups in the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law is alleged in the vast majority of the reports in which paramilitary groups are mentioned. The most frequently reported violations are the killing of civilians, torture, rape, destruction of property, and looting. *32 There is also a strong correlation between reports of paramilitary activity and reports of rape and sexual assault, detention facilities, and mass graves. These types of activities (i.e., paramilitary activity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) tended to occur in the same counties *33 and evidence the localized nature of the activity.
FRY, Croatia, and BiH used paramilitary forces. However, the disproportionate number of paramilitary and special forces of Serbian ethnicity indicates that the Serbs more heavily relied on the use of special forces to accomplish their military and strategic goals. Of 39 counties where Serb paramilitary activity was reported, Serb paramilitary units were operating in conjunction with the JNA in 24 of them. In comparison there were reports for five counties of joint operations between forces operating in support of Croatia, the Croatian Army (HV), and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), *34 and reports for only two counties of joint operations between the Army of BiH and forces operating in support of the Government of BiH.
The JNA was operating with the highest paramilitary activity in eight counties simultaneously: Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brcko, Doboj, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Visegrad, and Zvornik. Excluding Sarajevo, these counties are within the strategic arc the Serbs need to link all Serbian populations from BiH and Croatia within a contiguous Serbian state.
There is substantial evidence that Serbian government or military officials have coordinated, or at least have been aware of, the activities of the Serbian paramilitary or special forces:
While paramilitary groups have links to their respective governments, the nature of these links vary according to which agency furnishes funds, supplies, and military equipment to the group. Thus, Arkan is said to have strong links to Serbia's Ministry of Interior. The HOS in Croatia have links to political figures in that country, and the Green Berets have links to the Presidency of BiH. Control of the paramilitary groups is largely a function of the internal politics of the warring factions.
Members of ethnic and religious groups, such as Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims residing outside of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, have participated in the conflict as mercenaries. Some members of these groups, as well as persons of other nationalities, have been paid by the «warring faction» which they supported.*36
In most cases, paramilitary groups have coordinated their activities with the armies of the «warring factions». The groups that have operated with the most independence are the HOS in Croatia and the Mujahedin in BiH. The smaller the group, the greater the tendency to operate outside of the army's control.
In many counties, Serbian special forces supported the work of local «crisis committees» when local militia or local police were unavailable. This further evidences the localized nature of most paramilitary activity. In some respects, it also reflects the doctrines of guerilla warfare inspired by Tito's World War II experience.
In BiH, Serb paramilitary activity was at its greatest level in the second half of 1992. During this period, immediately after the JNA was officially withdrawn, there was disorganization and confusion within the regular armed forces of the Bosnian Serb Army. This led to a lack of command and control, and it was during this period that the greatest number of violations by Serb paramilitary groups occurred.
Serb paramilitary members have been recruited largely from the population of persons between the ages of 18 to 30. This population of young persons is more capable of violence and less susceptible to control than older age cohorts. Paramilitary members have also been recruited from prisons. It has been reported that persons convicted of violent offences were released to fight in BiH. The Army apparently had the first pick from among these offenders. The others served in paramilitary units.
Most of the paramilitary units sustained themselves through lootings, thefts, ransoms and trafficking in contraband. This is especially true of the groups associated with Arkan, as discussed below.
The largest number of violations were committed by Serb
paramilitary groups fighting in BiH in support of the breakaway
Serb Republic. This can be explained, in part, by the following:
There are more Serb paramilitary groups than those fighting on
behalf of the other warring factions; Serb paramilitary groups
have more members than the other groups; Serb paramilitary groups
have operated over a wider range of territory, thus they have
been in contact with a larger number of potential victims; and
the Serbs have pushed a policy of «ethnic cleansing» on a wider
scale than the other groups.
Annex IV was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni. It consists of 88 pages of text.
Part I of the following Annex briefly describes the historical antecedents to the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Part II describes the development of the policy of «ethnic cleansing» and the early stages of its implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Part III focuses upon one «ethnic cleansing» campaign in the Bosnian city of Zvornik and describes the military attack on and expulsion of the Muslim population of the city.
As used in this report, «ethnic cleansing» means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons from another ethnic or religious group.
All parties involved in the conflict have committed «grave breaches» of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. These violations include the killing of civilians, rape torture, and the deliberate destruction of civilian property, including cultural and religious property, such as churches and mosques. But, there are significant qualitative differences. Most of the violations were committed by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims. The second largest group of victims were Croats, whose perpetrators have been Serbs from Serbia, BiH, and the Krajinas. Both Bosnian Muslims and Catholic Croats have also victimized Serbs in BiH and Croatia, but in lesser number. The policy of «ethnic cleansing», however, has been systematically carried out by Serbs in BiH and Croatia against their opponents, though Croats have also carried out similar policies, but on a more restricted scale, against Serbs in Croatia and Muslims in Herzegovina. Forceful population removal by BiH of Serbs has also occurred in some limited areas, but not as a policy. In fact, BiH occupied areas contain both Croats and Serbs, while Bosnian Serb areas have been cleansed of all but Serbs. The Krajinas in Croatia also have been cleansed of Croats, while eastern and western Slavonia (Croatia) have been cleansed of Serbs.
Croatian forces in the Republic of Croatia and BiH have engaged in «ethnic cleansing» practices against Serbs and Muslims. Croats, for example, have conducted «ethnic cleansing» campaigns against Serbs in eastern and western Slavonia and in parts of the Krajina region, as well as against Muslims in the Mostar area. While Bosnian Muslim forces have engaged in practices that constitute «grave breaches» of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law, they have not engaged in «ethnic cleansing» operations. The vast majority of reports alleging «ethnic cleansing» operations involved Serbian forces who have used means, such as the mass killing of civilians, torture, sexual assault, the bombardment of cities, the destruction of mosques and churches, and other practices to eliminate Muslim and Croat populations that lie within Serb-claimed territory.
«Ethnic cleansing» by Serb forces has been systematic and apparently well-planned. As early as mid-1990, the Yugoslav Army (JNA) began to arm and supply local Serb forces in BiH. The «ethnic cleansing» campaigns in the early stages of the conflict involved coordinated attacks by JNA and paramilitary forces that sometimes operated from the Republic of Serbia. As the war and «ethnic cleansing» continued, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) persisted in supplying logistical support, arms, fuel, and other supplies to Serb forces in Croatia and BiH. «Ethnic cleansing» has involved means, such as the mass killing of civilians, sexual assault, the bombardment of cities, the destruction of mosques and churches, the confiscation of property and similar measures to eliminate, or dramatically reduce, Muslim and Croat populations that lie within Serb held territory.
According to the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, by late 1993, over 2.1 million people had been displaced from their homes since the conflict in the BiH region. *37
The Slavic people migrated from the caucuses to the Balkan peninsula between the Sixth and the Eighth Century. Between the Ninth and Twelfth Centuries, Croats, Bosnians, and Serbs developed distinct historical and cultural identities.
The division of the Christian Church in 1054 reinforced the fault line that earlier divided the Roman Empire. *38 On the eastern side of the line lie the cultural heritage of the Greek world, the Eastern Orthodox Church and users of the Cyrillic script. On the western side lie the Roman Catholic Church.
In the 17th Century the Ottoman Turks encroached on the Balkan peninsula and defeated Serb, Bosnian, and Albanian forces at the Battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of Blackbirds) in June 1389. The event was to become of particular historical significance to the Serbs and is commemorated as the symbolic end to the independent Serbian medieval kingdom. *39
Members of the Bosnian Church, which was distinct from the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches, converted to Islam during this period. These conversions were in part due to the promise of better conditions by Turkish rulers.
In the 17th Century, the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires clashed and the Treaty of Karlowitz transferred some Ottoman lands to Christian powers in 1699. The entry of the European powers into the region further accentuated the divisions that had occurred earlier. Croats and Slovenes were firmly part of the west, embracing Catholicism and looking towards the western powers for leadership. The Serbs and Bosnians remained within the Ottoman Empire. For the Serbs, Russia became a growing influence, and as Ottoman power in the region waned Russia assumed the rule of protector of all Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.
Independence movements appeared in Serbia in the early 19th Century and by 1830, Serbia had achieved autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire. Strong nationalist sentiments continued to grow throughout the 19th Century. Serbs increasingly viewed their mission as one of liberating and unifying the lands in which Serbs lived. It was during this period that the idea of a «Greater Serbia» first emerged.
Two Balkan wars were fought in 1912 and 1913, finally freeing the peninsula from Ottoman control. *40 Serbia made territorial gains by absorbing Kosovo and part of Macedonia. However, Serbia did not achieve its objective of uniting with Serbian regions of the Hapsburg Empire, including sections of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Vojvodina. *41 The two Balkan wars experienced ethnic conflict on a massive scale. The worst atrocities appear to have been related to efforts to unite the peninsula's Serbian population. In 1914, an International Commission found:
«[h]ouses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind--such were the means which were employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of [these] regions.» *42
Serb nationalists, incensed by the Hapsburg annexations of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. The event, on the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, sparked the first World War.
Following the First World War, unity was finally achieved when King Alexander of Serbia proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The new state, however, was plagued by ethnic conflict from its inception. Croats, fearing Serbian domination, sought greater self-government within a looser confederation. It was during this period that the Croatian Ustasa (Uprising) movement was born. Its goal was Croatian independence, through violence if necessary.
Yugoslavia surrendered to the Axis powers in 1941, leading to German and Italian occupation of the country. In Serbia, the Germans installed a regime headed by Serbian General Milan Nedic. During the war, the Croatian leadership launched a campaign of annihilation against its Serbian population. Some Muslims joined the Croats' efforts against the Serbs, though many have fought alongside the Ustase regime and against the Germans and the Italians. Pavelic sought to create an ethnically and religiously homogenous state. The Serbs of Croatia were faced with the alternatives of extermination, expulsion, or conversion to Catholicism. Serb officials maintain that a system of death camps, covering 210 square miles, ran along the Sava River. It has been estimated that between 350,000 and 750,000 Serbs were killed during this period.
In October 1944, Tito's partisans, with Soviet assistance, took Belgrade and a communist regime was established. A federal system was constructed, consisting of six Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia included two autonomous provinces, each containing a high concentration of an ethnic minority: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Ethnic tensions persisted in the post war years. Tito, however, effectively repressed ethnic and nationalist movements, such as the Croatian reformist movement of the early 1970s.
After Tito's death in 1980, a resurgent Serbian nationalism was led by Slobodan Milosevic. To achieve, and later to consolidate his power, Milosevic organized massive demonstrations in support of Serbs living in the province of Kosovo, which had a predominantly ethnic Albanian population. When disturbances broke out in Kosovo in 1989, Milosevic imposed martial law.
Within the Republic of Serbia, the tenor of political life became increasingly strident. Faced with a disintegrating nation- state, Milosevic denounced his domestic political opponents as «enemies of Serbia». *43 His opponents in the other Republics were compared to vampires and fascists. *44
In February 1989, the Serbian Republican Assembly amended its constitution and revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This display of Serbian nationalism, coupled with the use of force in Kosovo, generated apprehension within the other Republics. The resulting tension between the six Republics led to the breakup of the League of Communists in early 1990. In January of that year Slovenian delegates to the Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists demanded an end to the Communist party's «leading role» and the establishment of a multi- party state. Clashing with the Serbian delegates, the Slovenians walked out of the Congress.
The present conflict emerged in early 1990 when Serbia and three of the other five republics failed to reach an agreement concerning the structure of the federal government. The Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) sought a loose confederation in order to exercise greater autonomy. Serbia, on the other hand, wanted a more centralized federation in order to maintain its dominant role. This conflict resulted in efforts by Croatia, Slovenia, and later BiH and Macedonia, to secede from Yugoslavia.
Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991, Two days later, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) attacked the provisional militia. The war in Slovenia lasted only 10 days, but it soon spread to Croatia , where the conflict would be more protracted and bloodier.
In response to the Croatian vote for independence, Serbs living in Croatia's Krajina region established a Serbian National Council and scheduled an August referendum on their secession from Croatia. Breakaway republics were also established by the Serbs in BiH. These breakaway republics received small arms, artillery, missile launching systems and other support from their supporters in Serbia. In addition, Croats living in BiH established the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, and they received arms and other assistance from supporters in Croatia. *45
The JNA, according to numerous reports, was involved in the conflict in Croatia from its inception. When the Serbs of Croatia's Krajina region declared their independence, there was a massive transfer of heavy weapons from the JNA to Serb paramilitary forces. In addition, there was an influx of supplies from Serbia itself. Serb paramilitary units operating in Croatia have worn federal army uniforms and used JNA topographical maps. They also were able to obtain a large number of sophisticated weapons and vehicles. *46
Coordination between the JNA and local Serb forces was apparent in the destruction of Vukovar in 1991. A mass grave found at Ovcara is thought to contain the remains of at least 200 Croats who had been taken from a Vukovar hospital, summarily executed, and buried in a shallow grave.
In April 1992, when the conflict in BiH broke out, the JNA had approximately 80,000 troops deployed there. In early May, General Ratko Mladic was appointed JNA commander. Under pressure from the international community, on 19 May 1992, the FRY announced that it was withdrawing its forces. However, Yugoslav officials said that JNA personnel from BiH could remain there and fight on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs (see Annex III, Military Structure).
In the weeks following BiH's recognition by the European Community, JNA and Bosnian Serb forces attacked Bosnian towns such as Prijedor and other villages in the Kozarac region of north-east BiH, and Zvornik in north-west BiH. Similar attacks have occurred in many cities and villages along the Drina and Sava Rivers. These areas of BiH have high concentrations of Bosnian Serbs. The purpose of the attacks seems clear: Serb forces have sought to consolidate their control over these territories and link them with each other, as well as with Serb- controlled areas of Croatia.
Although «ethnic cleansing» occurred to some extent in the conflict in Croatia, it was in BiH that a distinct pattern of «ethnic cleansing» could be discerned. First, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, often with the assistance of the JNA, seize control of the area. In many cases, Serbian residents are told to leave the area before the violence begins. The homes of non- Serb residents are targeted for destruction and cultural and religious monuments, especially churches and mosques, are destroyed. Second, the area falls under the control of paramilitary forces who terrorize the non-Serb residents with random killings, rapes and looting. Third, the seized area is administered by local Serb authorities, often in conjunction with paramilitary groups. During this phase, non-Serb residents are detained, beaten and sometimes transferred to prison camps where further abuse, including mass killings, have occurred. Non-Serb residents are often fired from their jobs and their property is confiscated. Many have been forced to sign documents relinquishing their rights to their homes before being deported to other areas of the country.
According to one military expert of Jane's Information Group:
«[the Commander of the Bosnian Serb military forces] has a clear military aim: the consolidation of Serb-held territory of Bosnia; the eradication of Muslim enclaves within them, such as Gorazde, and the severance of any possible military link between Muslims in Bosnia and those in the Sanzak area of Serbia.» *47
The policy of «ethnic cleansing» has been implemented consistently throughout an area incorporating an arc that ranges from north-eastern BiH through the regions of eastern and western BiH, adjacent to the Serb Krajina area of Croatia.
The Serbs «ethnic cleansing» campaign was shaped by several factors. First, the demographics of the region ensured that any attempt to establish «ethnically pure» areas would entail tremendous dislocations. In BiH, the pre-war population was approximately 40 per cent Muslim, 32 per cent Serb, and 18 per cent Croat. *48 The areas of Serb preponderance are primarily located in the north-east, south-east and north-west portions of the country. However, these areas are neither homogenous nor contiguous. The areas in which Serbs are numerically dominant include substantial populations of Muslims and Croats.
Populations can be removed, even forcibly removed, without extreme bloodshed. Ethnic minorities could have been ejected from their homes, gathered at a central locations, and transported to another region. This, however, would have required a strong and well-organized regular army. The Bosnian Serb Army was neither numerically strong enough, nor sufficiently well-organized, especially in the first stages of the conflict in BiH, to accomplish this task. Thus, Serb officials relied on the use of terror, entailing mass killings, torture, rapes, and prison camps to eradicate the non-Serb population. The non-Serbs had to be sufficiently terrorized to ensure that they would flee the area and never return.
The character of «ethnic cleansing» was partly determined by its reliance on local officials and paramilitary leadership. Local officials relied on police and militia to help expel non- Serbs from Serb-controlled land, and these forces were often ill- equipped and untrained. The use of terror was their most efficient weapon. Police and local militia were frequently supplemented by paramilitaries. These groups often operated outside any discernable centralized command and control structure. Paramilitaries were often recruited from a population of rural, uneducated youth. Sometimes a deliberate effort was made to recruit those with criminal backgrounds. The apparent lack of control over paramilitaries conveyed the message that the most brutal acts would be permitted, or at least they would go unpunished.
The fragmentation of authority has provided FRY and Bosnian Serb officials with «plausible deniability». If ties between paramilitaries and officials are obscured, government officials might be able to evade responsibility for «ethnic cleansing». Thus, even after the JNA became better organized and able to assert greater control in 1993, it did not establish effective command and control over the paramilitaries.
While regular military units, militia, police and local citizens have all participated in «ethnic cleansing» campaigns. Paramilitary units are responsible for some of the most brutal aspects of «ethnic cleansing.» Two of the units that have played a major role in the «ethnic cleansing» campaign in BiH, the «Cetniks» associated with Vojislav Seselj and the «Tigers» associated with Zeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan), have been active in the Republic of Serbia as well. Seselj's followers have reportedly waged «ethnic cleansing» campaigns against ethnic minorities in Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Arkan's «Tigers» have staged military training exercises allegedly designed to intimidate Albanian residents in Kosovo.
These paramilitary units have launched operations from within the Republic of Serbia. In addition, paramilitary training camps are located within the Republic of Serbia.
The attack on Zvornik, in north-eastern BiH, reveals a similar pattern of events that was repeated throughout much of the area. In the weeks prior to the attack (which occurred on 8 April 1992), tensions between ethnic groups in the city had increased. Members of each ethnic group had obtained weapons for their personal use. Muslims were warned by their Serb friends that they should leave the area. Prior to 8 April, many Serbs left Zvornik, apparently having been forewarned of the impending attack. On the weekend before the attack, Serbs constructed a barricade, preventing many Muslims from reaching their work site or school. In retaliation, Muslims also erected a barricade at the same location. It was protected by Muslim police officers and armed volunteers.
On the day before the attack, JNA troops moved into the region. On television, a Belgrade commentator reported that the JNA was needed in the region because they expected an attack by Muslim extremists.
On 8 April, Serb representatives of SDS, as well as the paramilitary leader known as «Arkan,» called for the Muslims to peacefully surrender the city. Negotiations proceeded in which the division of the city into Muslim and Serb enclaves was discussed. The negotiations broke down, however, apparently because Arkan was dissatisfied with the result.
After the failure to reach an agreement, the attack on the town began. The JNA, using tanks, artillery and infantry units, was joined by Arkan's paramilitary troops, sometimes known as «Arkanovci.» There was heavy shelling of the Muslim sections of the city.
The next day Arkan's troops, along with paramilitary units known as «Seseljovci» and the Beli Orlovi (White Eagles), entered the city. Serb territorial defence units (TOs) also participated. It was reported that these troops committed random executions and rapes after entering Zvornik.
The next day, a provisional government was established that was headed by local Serbs, primarily members of SDS. A curfew was imposed, and residents had to obtain a police permit to travel within the city. Several Muslims who went to the police station to obtain a permit were taken into custody and deported to an outlying prison camp. Except for indispensable personnel such as hospital employees, Muslim men were prevented from working. During the following days, paramilitary units continued to patrol the streets, and there were many reports of looting, rape and other acts of brutality.
In late April, an appeal was made to Muslims to return to the area from which they had fled. Many returned because they feared losing their property. On arriving in Zvornik, Muslims were told that they must register their property. An «agency for the exchange of houses» was established. In exchange for relinquishing their homes, Muslims were promised the former homes of Serbs in Tuzla. Departure from the town was only possible on the condition that their property was turned over to Serb authorities. From late May to early June 1992, the entire Muslim populations of villages in the surrounding area were deported. The expelled Muslims were allowed to take few personal possessions with them. Even these items were often stolen at Serb check-points on the roads leaving the area.
According to an account in Vreme, the «cleansing» was
followed by organized looting. «Some stole gold, hard
currencies, household appliances or cars. Others robbed
department stores. Electricity plugs were torn out of the walls
and children's toys were sold and bought. Even entire bedroom
suites could be seen floating down the river». *50
Commissioner Greve prepared Annex V with the assistance of Morten Bergsmo, Assistant to the Commission of Experts. Annex V is an extensive report, consisting of 128 pages of text, on the genocide and «ethnic cleansing» which occurred in Opstina Prijedor.
Commissioner Greve and Mr. Bergsmo collected approximately 400 statements from victims and witnesses of the events in Opstina Prijedor which were the main resource for the report. In addition, Commissioner Greve relied on local Serbian media reports of the events and her own research.
For security reasons, the information gathered from victims and witnesses is kept confidential. These statements are contained in four separate volumes (a total of 911 pages) and are provided exclusively to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY).
Opstina Prijedor is a district located in north-western Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) in an area which is part of Bosnian Krajina. It is located in between the town of Sanski Most (to the south), the Bosnian-Croatian border towns of Bosanski Novi (to the west) and Bosanska Dubica (to the north), and the regional capital of Banja Luka (to the east). Except for the area of Sanski Most, the other neighbouring districts had Serbian majority populations before the armed conflicts started in BiH.
According to the 1991 census, Opstina Prijedor had a total population of 112,470 people, of whom 44 per cent were Muslims, 42.5 per cent Serbs, 5.6 per cent Croats, 5.7 per cent «Yugoslavs» and 2.2 per cent others (Ukrainians, Russians and Italians). In early April 1992, the total population may have been approximately 120,000 people, augmented, inter alia, by an influx of people who had fled the destruction of their villages in areas to the west of Opstina Prijedor.
Comparing the 1991 census figures with the results of a population count of June 1993, as published in Serbian-controlled media, gives the following overall picture:
1991 1993 Reduction New arrivals
Serbs 47,745 53,637 --- 5,892
Muslims 49,454 6,124 43,330 ---
Croats 6,300 3,169 3,131 ---
Others 8,971 2,621 6,350 ---
Thus, the total number of killed and deported persons as of June
1993 is 52,811 (including limited numbers of refugees and people
missing). Since then, the number of non-Serbs in the district
has continued to decrease. The extreme persecution to which non-
Serbs are subjected and their almost total lack of protection in
the district is illustrated by the fact that the ICRC and the
UNHCR asked permission from the Serbs, ultimo March 1994, to
evacuate all remaining non-Serbs from Opstina Prijedor.
According to Kozarski Vjesnik, a Serbian-controlled newspaper in Opstina Prijedor:
«The man [Simo Drljaca], who the Serbian Democratic Party of the Opstina Prijedor put in charge of forming the Serbian police after half a year of illegal work, had done his job so well that in 13 police stations 1,775 well armed persons were waiting to undertake any difficult duty in the time which was coming. In the night between 29 and 30 April 1992, he directed the takeover of power [by the Serbs], which was successfully achieved in only 30 minutes, without any shots fired. The assembly of the Srpske Opstine Prijedor, at the end of March last year [1992], appointed him Chief of the public security station [i.e. in charge of the secret police]. He was in charge of this job during the most demanding period and remained in the position until January 1993. These days he has been appointed Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic. He will commence his new function in Bijelina on Monday.» *51
More than six months prior to the power change in 1992, the Serbs started to build up their own administration parallel to the legitimate authorities in Opstina Prijedor, what they called the Serbian Opstina Prijedor. This included, inter alia, a pure Serbian police force with secret service functions. The legitimate authorities in Opstina Prijedor had been lawfully elected and the Prijedor Assembly reflected the ethnic composition of the district.
In early 1992, a very small Serbian paramilitary group took control of the television transmitter on the Kozara Mountain in Opstina Prijedor. As a consequence, the population in the district could not receive television programmes from Sarajevo or Zagreb any longer, only from Belgrade and later Banja Luka. The television programmes from Belgrade insinuated that non-Serbs wanted war and threatened the Serbs.
Prior to the power change on 30 April 1992, Serbs secretly armed other Serbs in the district. Many soldiers from the JNA withdrew from Croatia to north-western BiH in early 1992. Instead of demobilizing those who returned to Opstina Prijedor, the legitimate authorities were pressured to accept redeploying them to control all inroads to and exits from the district together with police and the TO. The pressure applied was an ultimatum. The legitimate authorities were invited for a guided sightseeing tour of two Croatian villages just north of Bosanska Gradiska which had been destroyed and left uninhabited. The message was that if the ultimatum was not met, the fate of Prijedor would be the same as that of these villages. The ultimatum was accepted.
An immediate consequence of the Serbian takeover was severed communications between Opstina Prijedor and the outside world. It became more difficult to travel and the telephone system was no longer fully operational. A curfew was introduced in Prijedor town - the main town in the district - and travel permits were required in many areas even to move among local villages. Bus services were closed down.
In the wake of the power change, most non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, be it as police, public officials or even manual workers. In all key functions such as police and local administration, the empty posts were taken over by Serbs.
Already before 30 April 1992, Serbs had started to visit the non-Serbs who were licensed to hold weapons and demand that they give their weapons up. This process was intensified after the takeover, and combined with a campaign where non-Serbian police and Territorial Defence Forces (Teritorijalna Odbrana or TOs) were instructed to hand over their weapons, and non-Serbian houses and villages were searched for arms.
Also, the local media, Radio Prijedor and Kozarski Vjesnik, joined in the anti non-Serb propaganda. The media slandered former non-Serbian leaders by criticizing everything from their alleged lack of efficiency to their private lives. In addition, the media claimed that many dangerous - in particular Muslim - extremists were in the area, preparing genocide against the Serbs.
Following an incident in which less than a handful Serbian soldiers were shot dead under unclear circumstances, the village of Hambarine was given an ultimatum to hand over a policeman who lived nearby where the shooting had occurred. As it was not met, Hambarine was subjected to several hours of artillery bombardment on 23 May 1992. The shells were fired from the aerodrome Urije just outside Prijedor town. When the bombardment stopped, the village was stormed by infantry, including paramilitary units, which sought out the inhabitants in every home. Hambarine had a population of 2,499 in 1991.
On 24 May 1992, a large-scale attack on the entire Kozarac area east of Prijedor town, under the Kozara Mountain, was carried out with intensive bombardment from all directions by artillery, tanks, and small firearms. The bombardment lasted for more than 24 hours, before infantry and paramilitary groups stormed Kozarac and nearby villages and searched for people in every building. The affected area had a total population of almost 27,000 non-Serbian people.
On 30 May 1992, a group of probably less than 150 armed non- Serbs had made their way to the Old Town in Prijedor to regain control over the town. They were defeated, and the Old Town was razed. In the central parts of Prijedor town, all non-Serbs were forced to leave their houses as Serbian military, paramilitary, police and civilians advanced street by street with tanks and lighter arms. The non-Serbs had been instructed over the radio to hang a white piece of cloth on their homes to signal surrender.
Starting on 20 July 1992, a large area of predominantly non- Serbian villages on the left bank of the Sana River (the larger Hambarine/Ljubija area) was attacked in a similar manner to the Kozarac area. However, it was predominantly infantry and paramilitary groups that carried out the destruction. At the time of the attack, the areas had a population of close to 20,000 people, including people who had come for shelter after their villages west of Opstina Prijedor had been destroyed.
Today, the former homes of almost 47,000 people in the Kozarac and Hambarine/Ljubija areas are empty and destroyed. Some were hit by artillery shells, while others were set ablaze in the initial attack. All the homes were pillaged and a large number blown up, one at a time from inside, destroying especially the inside and the roofs. Most of the artillery used during these attacks had been moved into position some time before the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992.
As non-Serbs were attacked in the villages and Prijedor town, hundreds, possibly thousands, were killed in their home areas, frequently after maltreatment. The survivors who temporarily managed to flee or hide were divided. Females, boys under the age of sixteen (sometimes the age limit may have been lower) and elderly men (older than 60 or 65) made up one group, while the other men comprised the second group.
The second group - the men - were taken to hastily opened concentration camps in a ceramic tile factory, Keraterm, next to Prijedor town and on the premises of the iron ore mine and processing plant at Omarska. Massacres, torture, and appalling living conditions quickly depleted the number of detainees.
In an interview of Simo Drljaca (Chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor), he stated that:
«In the collection centres 'Omarska', 'Keraterm', and 'Trnopolje' more than 6,000 informative talks were held. Of this number 1,503 Muslims and Croats were sent to the camp 'Manjaca', on the basis of solid documentation of active participation in the fighting against the Army of Republica Srpska, and also participation in genocide against the Serbian people. Instead of letting them get their deserved punishment, the powerful men of the world expressing disdain forced us to release them all from Manjaca.» *52
As the «informative talks» or interrogations basically took place in the Omarska and Keraterm camps, it can be concluded that more than 6,000 adult males were taken to these concentration camps in the short period they existed (from the end of May to the beginning of August 1992). Since only 1,503 were moved on to Manjaca camp according to Mr. Drljaca, a limited number transferred to the Trnopolje camp, and almost none released, it may be assumed that the death toll was extremely high, even by Serbian accounts. The concentration camp premises were sometimes so packed with people that no more inmates could be crammed in. On at least one occasion, this allegedly resulted in an entire bus-load of newly captured people being arbitrarily executed en masse. Some 37 women were detained in Omarska, whilst no women were kept over time in Keraterm.
The women's groups (almost all the females, the boys under the age of sixteen and the elderly men) were normally taken to the Trnopolje camp. Here the regime was far better than in Omarska and Keraterm; none the less harassment and malnutrition was a problem for all the inmates. Rapes, beatings and other kinds of torture and even killings were not rare. Some of these detained women were released after a few days as there was a lack of space in the Trnopolje camp as well.
On their way to the concentration camps, some captives were detained for shorter periods at improvised detention facilities such as sports halls in schools and stadiums (notably in the Prijedor suburb of Tukovi, and in Ljubija).
As soon as the Serbs had captured the first groups of non- Serbs, the large-scale deportations of the women's group started. Some were deported straight from the improvised detention facilities, the majority from the Trnopolje camp. The majority of deportees were cramped into buses or onto military trucks and sent towards Travnik. These deportees had to walk almost 30 kilometres from where the trucks and buses dumped them in a desolate area on the outskirts of the Vlasic Mountain, to reach non-Serbian-held areas in central BiH. A few were deported the safer way to Bosanska Gradiska. Sizable numbers were taken by rail - many in cattle wagons - to Travnik, some were let off the trains in Doboj from where they were ushered ahead on foot in the direction of Tuzla. Some individuals perished during the transport due to the mid-summer heat and next to suffocating conditions both in cattle wagons and on closed military trucks where the deportees were also deprived of food and water.
The Serbs took power in Opstina Prijedor on 30 April 1992, after more than six months of careful planning. After this, the non-Serbs had their homes and communities destroyed, their families split, and their employment denied. The majority of the non-Serbs were soon captured, thousands incarcerated in concentration camps, and even larger numbers deported. This all happened after the Serbs had sealed off most exits from the area. The non-Serbs presented no real threat to the Serbs under these circumstances, the district of Prijedor being surrounded at the time by areas controlled and dominated by the Serbs (the non-Serb majority population in the Sanski Most district was purged simultaneously as in Prijedor).
Despite the absence of a real non-Serbian threat, the main objective of the concentration camps, especially Omarska but also Keraterm, seems to have been to eliminate the non-Serbian leadership. Political leaders, officials from the courts and administration, academics and other intellectuals, religious leaders, key business people and artists - the backbone of the Muslim and Croatian communities - were removed, apparently with the intention that the removal be permanent. Similarly, law- enforcement and military personnel were targeted for destruction. These people also constituted a significant element of the non- Serbian group in that its depletion rendered the group at large defenceless against abuses of any kind. Other important traces of Muslim and Croatian culture and religion - mosques and Catholic churches included - were destroyed.
From the time when the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, non-Serbs in reality became outlaws. At times, non- Serbs were instructed to wear white arm bands to identify themselves. Non-Serbs were subjected to crimes without the new Serbian leaders attempting to redress the problem. For example, rape became a serious problem for many women who were left alone as their husbands had been detained. The impression was allowed to spread among Serbs that they would be exonerated if they made life difficult for non-Serbs so that the latter would ask permission to leave the district. According to new Serbian regulations, those leaving the district had to sign over their property rights to Serbs and accept never to return, being told that their names simultaneously would be deleted from the census.
When the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, they immediately declared the existence of a Crisis Committee of the Serbian district of Prijedor (Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor). Some of the members of this crisis committee were the military commanders Colonel Vladimir Arsic and Major Radmilo Zeljaja, and other district leaders, such as Major Slobodan Kuruzovic; the Chief of Police, Simo Drljaca; Mayor Milomir Stakic; the President of the Executive Board of the Assembly in Prijedor, Mico Kovacevic; the President of the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka or SDS) in Prijedor, Simo Miskovic; and the President of the Red Cross in Prijedor, Srdjo Srdic.
The military destruction of the non-Serbian habitations in Opstina Prijedor took place when the area was under the command of Colonel Vladimir Arsic and Major Radmilo Zeljaja in close cooperation with military superiors, at least in the regional capital Banja Luka. Units stationed outside of Opstina Prijedor assisted in the military destruction, as did paramilitary units whose attacks were timed to fit with the artillery attacks and the manoeuvres of the regular army units.
In the above-mentioned interview, Simo Drljaca stated that:
«[T]hey [the police force (including the secret services)] carried out my orders and the orders of the CSB [the Public Security Centre] Banja Luka and the Minister of Interior.
...
... the cooperation was excellent with the Army of Republika Srpska and with the officers of that army. The cooperation was manifested in the joint cleansing of the terrain of traitors, joint work at the checkpoints, a joint intervention group against disturbances of public order and in fighting terrorist groups.» *53
The secret police and the military police provided the concentration camps with interrogators and guards. For some of the most gruesome torture and killings of detainees, the assistance of paramilitary units and some locals was also called upon. The joint police and military intervention units were used to trace and capture the non-Serbian leadership. The latter units killed prisoners arbitrarily during transport to the Manjaca camp and arranged mass-killings of «deported» prisoners in the Vlasic Mountain area.
The other members of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor ran the community in which all these violations occurred. They participated in the administrative decision-making. The gains of the systematic looting of non-Serbian property were shared by many Serbs on different levels.
The Commission of Experts possesses the names of hundreds of alleged perpetrators at different levels and in a variety of capacities.
It is unquestionable that the events in Opstina Prijedor
since 30 April 1992 qualifies as crimes against humanity.
Furthermore, it is likely to be confirmed in court under due
process of law that these events constitute genocide.
Annex VI was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni. It consists of 1,300 pages of text. Section 1 is the summary, which follows. Section 2 is the chronology which details daily combat and shelling activity, targets hit and damage to those targets, sniping activity, and total casualties reported. The chronology also contains a narrative of daily military activities as well as narratives of local and international events relating to the battle and siege. Each section is followed by detailed appendices, illustrating the information contained in the report.
The Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo presents a daily chronology documenting events in the city from 5 April 1992 to 28 February 1994. The chronology is based on incidents reported in the database, source materials and media reports. It details, in so far as information is available: daily combat and shelling activity; specific identified targets hit; known damage to targets; sniping activity; and total casualties reported. The chronology also contains a narrative of daily military activities and narratives of local and international events relating to the battle and siege. The purpose of the chronology is to describe the events and consequences of the battle and siege of Sarajevo and to evaluate apparent patterns of violations of humanitarian law. Where facts, figures or accounts of events have differed in the reports reviewed, all the conflicting versions are recorded in the chronology.
To present the most complete picture of the events in Sarajevo during the siege, a number of sources were utilized to prepare the chronology. Daily, weekly and monthly UNPROFOR reports were incorporated where available, to record the number of shells fired into the city, as well as to develop a greater understanding of the events as witnessed by the military observers on the ground. UNPROFOR orders of battle were also reviewed and included to identify the command structure of the forces in and around the city. *54 In many instances, information was obtained through specialized UNPROFOR and other UN reports, containing details on the numbers of relief flights into the city, the status of utilities and attempted utility repairs, specific crater analyses after serious shelling incidents, and other significant events. In addition to UNPROFOR reports, valuable information was gathered from local sources and incorporated into the chronology. In particular, cumulative statistical reports and reports on daily, weekly and monthly casualties in the city were obtained from the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Institute of Public Health Bulletins. Other valuable information was submitted by the BiH government and was incorporated into the chronology. This information included reports on property destruction in the city and photographs of destroyed structures submitted by the BiH War Crimes Commission in Sarajevo. Photographs and videotapes obtained independently by the United Nations Commission of Experts were also utilized. These materials confirmed the widespread structural and property damage in the city.
To supplement the above information, an on-line international media search was conducted to locate relevant press accounts pertaining to the events in Sarajevo. This search resulted in nearly twelve thousand pages of information which was put into source files and incorporated into the chronology. These media sources were cross-checked and verified against one another. Where accounts differed, both sides were recorded. Local media sources such as the Belgrade based Tanjug news agency and Vreme, as well as Sarajevo Television and Radio were consulted. This media-based information played an especially important part in the chronology, particularly during the first few months of the siege when UNPROFOR and other sources of information had not yet begun their efforts to record relevant data in the city. Additional information was also gathered pertaining to relevant negotiations and political events. In particular, the staff of IHRLI prepared a separate chronology of the negotiations which was incorporated into the chronology on the battle and siege of Sarajevo. The chronology of the negotiations drew much of its information from reports of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, a Carnegie Endowment Special Publication prepared on the negotiations, *55 and press reports.
In conjunction with the preparation of the chronology, many hours of video footage were viewed. This film was gathered and archived by IHRLI, with the assistance of Linden Productions. *56 The footage viewed ranged from local home video to western media reports providing details on the many events and venues featured in the chronology. To accurately identify and locate targets in the city and to verify reports in the chronology, a number of informal interviews were also held with individuals who had been in Sarajevo during the siege. This provided an excellent opportunity to hear detailed first-hand accounts of the siege. Since the individuals interviewed were native Sarajevans, the meetings also served to identify specific targets in the city, as well as many of the sites pictured in photos received.
Once a draft of the chronology was completed, a team of analysts was assembled to examine the information contained therein. *57 One analyst, for example, was assigned the task of collecting all of the information in the chronology pertaining to specific targets shelled in the city. Working with this information he prepared a map identifying the specific locations of shelled targets reported in the chronology. *58 Other analysts also:
Statistical analysts then examined the numerical data contained in the chronology. *62 As part of their effort, statistical charts were prepared recording
After an initial review of the statistics and the other data in the chronology, it became apparent that a possible connection existed between the increase and decrease in shelling activity and related political events such as negotiations, meetings, preparations for negotiations, the hardening or softening of public positions by international and local leaders, and changes and potential changes of positions by certain governments. The relevance of this connection is that it establishes a possible link between military and political activities or objectives. With this fact in mind, a graph was created to track significant local and international events contained in the chronology with the level of shelling in Sarajevo. *67 The political events included in this graph are as follows:
Sarajevo, the capital of BiH, is located in central BiH in the Miljacka River valley. It is a long and narrow city (occupying 2,049 sq.km.) surrounded by hills and mountains. *68 The 1991 census indicates that before the siege the city and its surrounding areas had a population of 525,980. There are estimates that prior to the siege the population in the city proper was 435,000. The current estimates of the number of persons living in Sarajevo range between 300,000 and 380,000 residents.
The history of Sarajevo dates back to the Roman conquest of the area. Slavs later colonized the area and erected a castle in the south-east of the city. The city's name is derived from the Turkish word `Seraglio' (palace in the fields). This name was given to the region by the Turks in the early 15th Century after the capture of the castle that the Slavs had erected. The city has been a cultural, religious and commercial centre since the 15th Century. In 1878 Sarajevo was assigned to Austria by the Treaty of Berlin. On 28 June 1914, a student, Gavrilo Princip, assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife on what now is the site of the Princip Bridge. The assassination set into motion the events leading to World War I.
Sarajevo contains an architectural blend of three major influences: the old Oriental heart of the city, the turn of the century Viennese city around it, and the contemporary high-rise apartment buildings and industrial facilities through its outskirts. The Old Town was built by the Turks and contains ancient structures and objects of cultural importance. Its centre, the medieval square known as Bascarsija (Market Square) serves as its marketplace. The city also has a very comprehensive modern tram and mass transit system. In addition to its many orthodox churches, Sarajevo has numerous mosques.
Sarajevo became the focus of world attention as host of the 1984 Olympic Games. Prior to the siege, it was a cosmopolitan city where persons of different religions lived and worked together. *69 Inter-marriages between the ethnic groups were not uncommon. According to the 1991 census, the city's multi-ethnic population distribution prior to the siege was as follows: Muslims 49.3 per cent; Serbs 29.9 per cent; Croats 6.6 per cent; Yugoslav 10.7 per cent. Jews and other groups made up the remaining 3.5 per cent of the population. Observers have noted that in the beginning of the siege many of Sarajevo's Serbs fled the city. According to reports, some joined the Bosnian Serb army. Others relocated to Serb-held areas in the outlying districts. There are estimates that 40,000 Serbs remain in government-held parts of the city. According to reports, the city's 400-year-old Jewish community numbered 14,000 before World War II and 1,400 before the current conflict. It has been reported that as a result of evacuations and casualties, only a few hundred Jews remain.
The battle and siege of Sarajevo began on 5 April 1992, the eve of European Community recognition of BiH as an independent state. On that date, thousands of persons took to the streets in spontaneous peace marches. The largest body of demonstrators headed towards the Parliament building and other buildings reportedly seized by Serb forces. Unidentified gunmen were then reported to have fired into the crowd. One protestor was confirmed dead. Since that date, the siege and relentless bombardment from the hills surrounding Sarajevo has taken a tremendous physical toll on the city and its inhabitants.
Since the beginning of the siege it is estimated that nearly 10,000 persons have been killed or are missing in the city. This total includes over 1,500 children. An additional 56,000 persons have been wounded, including nearly 15,000 children. It has been estimated that over the course of the siege the city has hit been hit by an average of approximately 329 shell impacts per day, with a high of 3,777 shell impacts on 22 July 1993. This shellfire has caused extensive damage to the city's structures, including civilian and cultural property. The BiH Government has estimated that shelling has destroyed over 10,000 apartments and damaged over 100,000 others. Of the other buildings in the city, 23 per cent were reported seriously damaged, 64 per cent partially damaged and 10 per cent slightly damaged. The Council of Europe's Committee on Culture and Education concluded that most of the buildings in the city had been damaged to a greater or lesser degree and that 35,000 dwellings had been destroyed through September 1993.
The chronology contains cumulative casualty reports submitted by the BiH Institute for Public Health. *70 It also contains casualty reports from UNPROFOR and other sources. According to the BiH Institute reports, as of 15 November 1993, 9,539 persons had either been killed, died of malnutrition or from the cold, or were missing in the city. This total included 1,525 children. Additionally, 55,801 persons had been wounded, including 14,538 children. *71
Based on the chronology's sources of information, a large number of Sarajevans have been killed and wounded with regularity throughout the siege.
The siege has not spared any sector of Sarajevo's population. UNICEF reported that of the estimated 65,000 to 80,000 children in the city: at least 40 per cent had been directly shot at by snipers; 51 per cent had seen someone killed; 39 per cent had seen one or more family members killed; 19 per cent had witnessed a massacre; 48 per cent had their home occupied by someone else; 73 per cent have had their home attacked or shelled; and 89 per cent had lived in underground shelters. It is probable that the psychological trauma suffered during the siege will bear heavily on the lives of these children in the years to come. *74
As a result of the high number of casualties and the wartime conditions present, makeshift cemeteries appear throughout Sarajevo and its surrounding areas. Parks, athletic fields, and other open spaces have been utilized as graveyards. *75 One such site is the sports complex built for the 1984 Winter Olympics.
The siege has also had a profound effect on the psyche and future of the city's population. The BiH Government has reported a soaring suicide rate by Sarajevans, a near doubling of abortions and a 50 per cent drop in births since the siege began.
The structural and property damage in Sarajevo as a result of the siege includes specifically protected targets such as hospitals and medical complexes, medical facilities (including ambulances) and medical personnel, as well as cultural property. Furthermore, there have been attacks upon civilian property which are not justified by military necessity and are equally prohibited. The BiH government has estimated that shelling has destroyed over 10,000 apartments and damaged over 100,000 others. Of the other buildings in the city, 23 per cent have been reported as seriously damaged, 64 per cent as partially damaged and 10 per cent as slightly damaged. *77 In its report, the Council of Europe's Committee on Culture and Education commented on the structural damage in the city. The Committee stated:
«. . . [I]t is plain that Sarajevo has suffered badly at the hands of its attackers. Apart from the obvious human cost in the continued suffering and difficulties of day to day living, there has been serious damage to the urban fabric. The infrastructure (drainage, electricity, telephone services, etc.) is badly damaged. Most buildings are damaged significantly and probably all buildings are damaged to a greater or lesser degree (broken glass etc.). Some buildings have been completely destroyed including ancient monuments (such as the Library) and including a number of modern steel framed buildings (such as the Unis Building) which in some cases have simply collapsed. 35,000 dwellings are also assessed to have been destroyed during the past year.» *78
The chronology documents the widespread structural and property damage and destruction of the city. *79 The following list is only illustrative and does not distinguish on a legal basis between specifically protected targets and others. The targets shelled and documented in the chronology include:
Shelled quarters of the city and suburban areas documented in the chronology include: Otes; Azici; Stup; Ilidza; Butmir; Nedzarici; Dobrinja; Mojmilo; Novi Grad; Buca Potok; Hrasno; Grbavica; Novo Sarajevo; Bascarsija; Bistrik; Stari Grad; Igman, Trebevic and Zuc Mountains; Cengic Vila; Pofalici; Vasin Han; Rajlovac; Vraca; Marijin Dvor; Doglodi; Bjelave; Vratnik; Velesici; Dolac Malta; Stupsko Brdo; Katorac (upper); Katorac (lower); Kasindol Street; Pero Kosoric Square; Darovalaca Krvi Street; Vase Miskina Street; Vojnicko Polje; Alipasino Polje.
Since the beginning of the siege, the First Corps Sarajevo has served as the BiH defensive force in and around Sarajevo. Most assessments characterize the First Corps Sarajevo as superior to the besieging forces in infantry numbers, but clearly deficient in its firepower. It has been estimated that there are as many as 70,000 soldiers in the BiH forces committed to the defence of the city. More conservative estimates range in the area of 25,000 to 30,000. The First Corps Sarajevo headquarters is located in Sarajevo and was originally commanded by Mustafa Hajrulahovic. *81 The most recent commander was Vahid Karavelic. Observers have noted that a recent reorganization of the First Corps has lead to better command and control of the forces.
At the beginning of the siege, a score of men with criminal backgrounds formed groups to defend the city. Among these men were Musan Topalovic (a.k.a Caco) and Ramiz Delalic (a.k.a. Celo). Caco, a 29 year-old former musician ultimately commanded the BiH army's Tenth Mountain Brigade. Celo commanded the Ninth Brigade. Both men reportedly controlled gangs operating on the Bosnian Serb siege line, bringing truckloads of contraband over the bridges across the Miljacka river separating Grbavica from the city centre. On 26 October 1993, the BiH government initiated a crackdown against these commanders, surrounding their headquarters in separate stand-offs. Caco was killed during the course of his capture and Celo was reported to have given himself up.
The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the First Corps forces fought together in defence of the city throughout much of the siege despite opposing one another in Mostar and in other parts of BiH. The HVO had an estimated 2,000 soldiers deployed in Sarajevo, in an area on the Miljacka River facing the Serbian- held districts of Kovacici, Grbavica and Hrasno which had reportedly not seen as much heavy fighting as other fronts. In late September 1993 there were reports that Bosnian Serb forces held their fire along these sections of the front defended by the HVO and that the forces traded cigarettes and food across the Miljacka. On 10 November 1993, several groups of HVO troops were marched under BiH army guard and the HVO barracks were occupied by BiH army troops. The HVO commander, Slavko Zelic, was subsequently arrested. The BiH army thereafter announced that it was disbanding the HVO in Sarajevo and accused some of its members of «actively cooperating» with BSA forces around the city, jeopardizing its defences. The BiH army then invited HVO soldiers to join a new Croatian brigade of the First Corps.
The Sarajevo Romanija Corps is the Bosnian Serb force of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) which has surrounded the city since the beginning of the siege. It is the successor of the same unit of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) which occupied the same position until May 1992. There are indications that early in the siege the JNA was involved in the fighting in Sarajevo. Bosnian officials frequently charged that JNA tanks joined Bosnian Serb forces in barrages, and that the JNA provided the Bosnian Serb forces with logistical support and protection. In late April 1992, the BiH government ordered the withdrawal of all JNA forces from its soil. The Belgrade government announced that it would withdraw from BiH, troops who were not residents of the Republic. Since most of the JNA troops in BiH were Serbs of Bosnian nationality, this withdrawal policy reportedly had little effect. Some 80,000 Yugoslav soldiers were thereafter transferred with their equipment to the Territorial Defence Forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH).
The Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters are located in the hills overlooking the city at Lukavica. The Corps was originally commanded by Major General Tomislav Sipcic and was most recently commanded by Major General Stanislav Galic. The command structure has for the most part remained the same throughout the siege. While the defensive forces seem to have numerical superiority in their infantry troops, the besieging forces have firepower superiority. Reports estimate that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps numbers some 13,000 troops which are formed into eight brigades directly surrounding the city. A possible explanation for the shifting of firing sites from the mountainous areas surrounding Sarajevo may be that artillery personnel move from one emplacement to the other. Another explanation for this phenomenon could be the pattern of delivery of munitions. There are, however, no apparent munitions shortages.
Although the BSA forces surrounding the city have superior firepower, it has been observed that it is unlikely that they could effectively take control of the city. This observation is based, in part, on the fact that the BiH forces have more fighters. In addition, controlling the city and its numerous buildings and streets could prove an overwhelming task for the BSA forces. The BSA forces have therefore concentrated their efforts on weakening the city through constant bombardment from the surrounding hills.
Many reports in the chronology generally describe shelling as coming from gunners in the hills surrounding the city. Far fewer pinpoint specific areas from which the shelling has originated. Reports of the besieging artillery and other heavy-to- medium weapons employed in the attacks vary from 600 to 1,100 pieces, but no verified account is available. These estimates do not include a large number of tanks. Some of the weapons are in fixed emplacements such as bunkers in the wooded hills and mountains surrounding Sarajevo and its suburbs. Because of the dense foliage, the emplacements are hard to detect from the air, particularly in the summer. Although the bunkers are difficult to see from the roads above or below the emplacements, it is possible to detect some of them. It is, however, very difficult to determine whether the bunkers contain artillery pieces, mortars or machine-guns, or have only snipers with small arms. From their hillside vantage points the besieging forces have a commanding view of the city. It is thus likely that they know which targets they are hitting with their artillery fire.
The nature of the shelling observed in Sarajevo takes several forms: 1) specific targeting; 2) indiscriminate shelling; and 3) random shelling. With respect to specific targeting, a question arises as to whether or not a target is a protected target which makes the shelling a war crime. Indiscriminate shelling does not target a specific object, but by virtue of not discriminating or distinguishing between targets, it constitutes a war crime if within the area selected for shelling there are protected targets. Lastly, random shelling may include indiscriminate shelling as well as specific targeting, but the manner in which it is executed is not selective. Random shelling, can be methodical and systematic. If it includes protected targets it is a war crime.
Protected targets, whether objects or persons, are specifically identified in the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 *82 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. *83 They are also established in the customary law of armed conflict and in the 1907 Hague Convention on the Regulation of Armed Conflict. *84 In addition, the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in Times of War also applies. *85 Both the conventional and customary law of armed conflict provide for specific prohibitions but also for what may be termed as circumstances exonerating from war crimes responsibility (but only with respect to certain types of violations). These exonerating conditions are: proportionality in responding to enemy fire; military necessity; and reprisals. *86 Since this study does not go into the question of individual criminal responsibility with respect to specific incidents, the analysis shall not cover the legal questions raised above. However, from a macro-analysis perspective, it is clear that, irrespective of whether a given instance establishes or not the individual responsibility of those who performed the act, the totality of the circumstances described in this report evidence command responsibility.
UNPROFOR and city officials have indicated that shelling of the city ranges from about 200 to 300 impacts on what they refer to as a quiet day to 800 to 1,000 shell impacts on an active day. The chronology confirms that the city has been relentlessly shelled over the course of the siege. *87
Observers have noted that UNPROFOR shelling reports in many cases record only a fraction of actual shelling activity. *88 This is due in part to the logistical difficulties encountered by the UNPROFOR contingent during the siege. Therefore, it should be assumed that Sarajevo has been hit by a greater number of shells than that which has been recorded by observers.
The majority of shells counted on most days are usually directed towards BiH-controlled areas of the city suggesting a strategy to hit those areas. An examination of the range of destruction reveals a system of specific targeting as evidenced by the severe damage to almost all mosques, Catholic churches and major commercial buildings and facilities in the centre of the city.
The following targets have been documented in the chronology as being among the most frequently targeted sites in the city: *89 the Sarajevo radio and television stations; the Oslobodjenje Newspaper building which is still in operation; *90 the public transportation system; the Holiday Inn Hotel (which is the base of many foreign journalists); the Presidency and Parliament buildings; the main city brewery; the flour mill; the main bakery; the Olympic complex; the Post Telegraph and Telephone building; the industrial area of Alipasin Most near the railway station and main television tower; the Jewish cemetery; the Lion cemetery; the city airport; the tobacco factory; the Dobrinja apartment complex; the central district; Bascarsija (the old quarter of mosques); the Stari Grad section; New Sarajevo; the main thoroughfare on Marsal Tito Street; and the shopping district at Vase Miskina.
The chronology confirms that certain areas of the city have been systematically shelled throughout the course of the siege. *91 For example, the city centre has consistently been the most often targeted area, with shelling attacks reported in that particular area of the city on 240 days. Also heavily shelled were the airport area and south-western suburbs (shelling attacks reported on 158 days) and the Old Town area (shelling attacks reported on 113 days).
Systematic targeting can be inferred from the shelling of hospitals and in particular the Sarajevo University Clinical Centre Kosevo which has constantly been under shell and sniper fire. *92 The Kosevo complex has reportedly been shelled at least 264 times since the siege began, killing staff and patients alike. *93 An examination of the sheer number of shells and the high percentage of direct hits on the complex indicates an intent by the besieging forces to hit this civilian target. Moreover, much of the shelling from the surrounding hillsides has taken place at midday, the time when the hospital is busiest with visitors. It is therefore obvious that the besieging forces have knowledge of the patterns of operation of this facility. *94 Despite extensive damage, a shortage of electricity, water and necessary equipment, the Kosevo Hospital is by necessity still in operation.
A review of the incidents in the chronology also indicates a random process of shelling throughout the civilian areas of the city. The shelling which occurs at different times of the day without any particular pattern or target has a terror-inspiring effect on the civilian population. It is particularly telling that deaths, injuries and destruction have occurred in various parts of the city and in such presumably well-known civilian settings as schools, markets, streets, parks, football and athletic fields, cemeteries, hospitals, and even bread, water and relief lines in the city.
It is noteworthy that shell fire increases at night and often continues into the early morning hours. This may be attributable to the fact that many of those engaged in the shelling and sniping are working in the fields and at other jobs during the daytime hours. Observers have also noted that the shelling by the besiegers is generally lower during the week than on weekends. At times, night shellings are observed to follow a systematic directional pattern as if the same artillery pieces are simply changing their range. At other times, the shelling comes from different locations. A pattern of heavy shelling into the city has been observed to have occurred after reports of early morning small-arms fire. This suggests that the besieging forces have used heavy shelling of the city as a means to respond to efforts by the defending forces to break the siege. *95
Most of the besieging forces firing from the hills surrounding Sarajevo are drawn from people who once lived in the city or who still live in the surrounding areas. There could, therefore, be a connection between the targeting of sites and the patterns of city life known to the besiegers. There have also been indications that «informants» within the city notify gunners in the hills of potential targets on certain days. For example, a child was killed in November 1992 after a mortar shell exploded as people were leaving a show in the city. Subsequent notifications of performances and exhibitions in the city have been more discreet in order to avoid the attention of the BSA artillery.
Unlike artillery, mortar and tank shellings where accuracy may or may not be precise, and where the shelling may or may not be deliberate targeting, sniping is both deliberate and precise. It is a war crime when sniping is purposefully directed towards civilian targets. Sniping attacks by the forces *96 in and around the city display an intent to hit civilian and non-combatant targets. These shootings appear to lack military purpose or justification. Skilled marksmen often kill their targets with a single shot to the head or heart, and it is clear that they have exercised the specific intent to hit obvious civilian targets with no other purpose than to cause death or serious bodily injury. In many cases snipers with a clear view from high rise buildings and the surrounding hillsides have targeted the most vulnerable of civilians, including: children (even infants); persons carrying heavy plastic containers filled with water; persons in queues; pedestrians at intersections; and rescuers attempting to come to the aid of sniping and shelling victims.
Snipers have been reported in positions throughout the city and have been known to travel in teams. In numerous incidents documented in the chronology, sniper fire has been directed towards ambulance drivers, fire fighters, relief workers and others attempting to secure those wounded in attacks. *97 There have also been numerous sniping attacks on UN and UNPROFOR personnel and facilities near the airport, observation posts and barracks.
Heavy shelling of the city has occurred on numerous occasions prior to and during the various peace conferences, suggesting a political objective or link to the attacks. *98 There is an apparent correlation between the increase and decrease of shell fire in connection with political events such as: negotiations; meetings; the preparation for negotiations; the hardening or softening of public positions by international and local political leaders; and changes and potential changes of positions by certain governments. *99 The relevance of this is that it establishes a link between military and political activities or objectives. This fact also has a bearing on the interpretation of the rules of armed conflict with respect to proportionality and military necessity as mentioned above. It is also relevant to the establishment of senior command responsibility as well as the responsibility of political leaders who may have been involved in the decision making process related to the shelling activity.
The following are examples of reports appearing in the chronology which indicate a possible link between the shelling attacks in Sarajevo and political events: *100
The blockade of humanitarian aid has been used as an important tool in the siege. Such interference with humanitarian aid which endangers the lives and well being of civilians is a war crime. Four hundred and 30 thousand people are estimated to be dependent on food aid in Sarajevo and its surrounding areas. *102 Not only has the blockade of aid contributed to the demoralization of the civilian population, but it has adversely affected its physical health. *103 A shortage of food has led to a malnutrition rate described by UNHCR as being on par with that of the poorer developing nations. A shortage of fuel has resulted in the shutdown of the city's bakery, the water pumping station and other essential services. In addition, hospitals have been without power and have had to function without lights, x-ray machines, monitors, or proper anesthetics.
Unlike other enclaves in BiH which depend on overland convoys, the international humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo's United Nations controlled airport has helped to bring most supplies into the city. On 12 October 1994, the UNHCR announced that the Sarajevo airlift was in its 467th day, overtaking the 462 days of the Berlin airlift between June 1948 and September 1949. *104 On 18 January 1994, UN officials reported that 7,272 flights had brought in 81,948 tons of aid into Sarajevo via the humanitarian airlift. However, due to airport closings and airlift suspensions caused by shelling and sniping attacks in the area, this effort is often suspended. *105
The chronology documents the fact that the airport area has been one of the most often shelled areas of the city. *106 This activity suggests a possible correlation between the high level of shelling in the airport area and an intent to blockade humanitarian aid. *107 It can be argued that while the besieging forces are blockading overland humanitarian aid throughout BiH, they are accomplishing the same result in Sarajevo by shelling the airport area, forcing the suspension of the humanitarian airlift.
Over land, the city is surrounded by BSA forces and entry requires passing through numerous BSA checkpoints. The besieging forces have continued to use aid as a weapon in the siege. During late November 1993, the commanders on the Bosnian-Serb border reportedly delayed trucks carrying winter supplies to Sarajevo such as plastic sheeting and shoes in defiance of an aid-delivery accord signed at the beginning of the month. On 25 December 1993 a convoy carrying beans, mattresses and 60 tons of diesel fuel arrived in the city. However, the United Nations reported that the trucks were initially held up by BSA forces who tried to divert the convoy onto an impassable route.
Throughout the siege, the destruction of electric, gas, phone line and water facilities has been used as a weapon against the inhabitants of the city. Both the defenders and the besiegers have often accused each other of using these utilities as weapons of war. UN and local attempts to repair damaged lines and pumping stations have often been rebuffed with shell and sniper fire, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. For example, it had been reported that by March 1993, 18 of the city's water repair technicians had been killed while trying to repair damaged pipes.
The city's drinking water depends on power to the main pumping station. Power lines have frequently been cut by fighting or by forces using the utilities as weapons against civilians. The besieging forces have on several occasions reportedly turned off the city's main water supply and have refused to permit work crews to repair and replenish necessary water purification systems. The water cut-off has led to long queues outside water sources in the city. These long lines have attracted sniper and shellfire from the besieging forces on several occasions and have resulted in the deaths of many civilians. Civilians are also vulnerable to sniper fire as they are forced to carry containers filled with water obtained from the few remaining water sources. These heavy containers are frequently carried for miles by hand, or carted on bicycles, baby carriages and shopping carts.
Winter conditions put the city's residents in danger of starving or freezing to death. Because of a shortage of heating fuel, many of the city's trees have been cut down and used as firewood. *108 Residents have also been forced to burn books, furniture and any other materials gathered burn to provide themselves with heat.
On 5 February 1994, at least 68 persons were killed and 200 others were wounded in the shelling of a market in the Sarajevo city centre. *109 In reaction to that attack, NATO issued an ultimatum on 9 February giving BSA forces 10 days, beginning on 11 February, to withdraw their heavy weapons from a designated exclusion zone or face heavy airstrikes. Very little progress was made until 17 February when Russia announced that it was sending a contingent of 400 troops to the city and persuaded BSA forces to comply with the NATO ultimatum. On 20 February, NATO declared that there had been virtual compliance with its ultimatum and that there was no need for airstrikes at that stage. *110 Since that date, artillery fire has substantially decreased in Sarajevo. *111
Based on the events reported over the course of the siege, any military personnel who has engaged in unlawful sniping or shelling activity is individually responsible if he knew that such acts would cause the death or injury of innocent civilians, the destruction of protected targets, or the destruction of public and civilian property which had no apparent military purpose and for which there was no valid military necessity.
On the basis of the conduct observed from April 1992 to
February 1994, it is apparent that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of
the BSA and its commanders are responsible for a great deal of
the widespread destruction in Sarajevo. It is also apparent that
the command structure knew, or should have known, that they were
attacking civilian targets. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the
BSA has surrounded the city since the beginning of the siege.
Given the magnitude of the shelling over the course of the siege,
the logistics required to re-arm the besieging forces, and the
continuous attacks on civilian targets, the commanders of the
Sarajevo Romanija Corps should be held accountable for the
extensive destruction to private and public property, and for the
resulting loss of civilian lives.
Annex VI.A also concerns Sarajevo. It is a six page report
prepared by Commissioner Fenrick and a team of Canadian military
lawyers. The Commission decided to conduct an investigation of a
specific incident in the siege of Sarajevo to determine the
feasibility of identifying and prosecuting alleged perpetrators.
The Commission asked Commissioner Fenrick, the Rapporteur for On-
Site Investigations, and a team of Canadian military lawyers to
conduct the investigation. They chose to investigate the mortar
shelling of a soccer game in Dobrinja, a suburb of Sarajevo,
which occurred on 1 June 1993. *112 The investigation team
interviewed many Bosnian witnesses, but was unable to interview
Serbian witnesses. Additionally, the team reviewed an analysis,
prepared by UNPROFOR, of the mortar craters resulting from the
shells. Based upon the information gathered, the team wrote an
eight page report.
Annex VI.B is a 37 page study of the battle of Sarajevo and
the law of armed conflict. The study was prepared by
Commissioner Fenrick and a Canadian military lawyer from the
Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team. *113 The study addresses the
issues of armed conflict and misconduct on the part of the
military during the siege of Sarajevo. The objective of the
study was to impute command responsibility for violations of the
laws of war by preparing an analytical survey of the battle and
all violations committed.
Annex VII is a 16 page report on the Medak Pocket Operation
which occurred in early September 1993. *114 Croatian forces
entered and attacked the area of small, rural villages known as
the Medak Pocket. *115 However, when the forces agreed to relinquish
the territory, they allegedly destroyed and burned everything
before they left. UNPROFOR troops arrived at the end of the
retreat and were able to collect a significant amount of
evidence. Based on several witness interviews conducted by the
investigation team and the UNPROFOR reports, the team produced
the Annex.
Annex VIII was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni and consists of 880 pages of text.
This report on detention facilities, attempts to identify and provide relevant information concerning all alleged detention facilities (camps) within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This study is not designed to classify detention sites based on their prosecutorial potential, but is intended to provide a description and analysis of the detention facilities reported to have existed.
The report is divided into two sections. The first section is the summary and analysis. The summary and analysis discusses the methodology of the report and provides the total number of reported detention facilities in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The total number of detention facilities is also broken down by geographic region. In addition, the summary and analysis discusses patterns, trends and commonalities which have manifested themselves in the various reports of detention facilities.
The analysis by geographic location in Section II, divides detention facilities by their location, i.e, whether they were located in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), or Slovenia. Within those locations, it further breaks down reported facilities by the county or region in which they were located. The 1991 population and ethnic distribution figures are also provided for each county or region, as well as other background information.
To analyse the contents of the database for this report, all documents in IHRLI documentation centre were first reviewed to identify those reports containing allegations of detention facilities within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. After initial review, the documents were organized geographically by county or region and then analysed. Relevant information pertaining to alleged detention facilities was then gleaned, and individual geographic reports were thereafter prepared, containing information, wherever available, identifying: 1) the name, location, dates of operation, and physical description of alleged detention facilities; 2) information concerning command and control, including the identities and ethnicity of commanders and guards, and any other groups or individuals reported to be involved in the camp operation; 3) information pertaining to prisoners, including their ethnicity, civilian or military status, subsequent transfers, and total reported prisoner population; 4) the treatment of prisoners, including, maltreatment or good treatment, food, hygiene, toilet and medical facilities, sleeping accommodations, and other conditions.
The main criterion for determining whether a site would be deemed a detention facility for purposes of this report, depended mainly upon whether persons were alleged to have been held against their will, and whether the detention site appeared to have been established as a result of the armed conflict between the warring factions identified.
In some instances, the existence of certain detention facilities were well documented and independent sources corroborated reports of those alleged facilities. In other instances, only uncorroborated claims or corroborated reports by non-neutral sources were received. Those claims were included in the report and are indicated as such.
It is significant to note that a wide variety of sources were utilized in this report. It should also be noted that the Commission had no basis to confirm the information contained in that source material. To make a qualitative assessment of the information contained in this report, efforts were therefore made to confirm or corroborate allegations of camps wherever possible. To this effect, it is indicated in each camp report whether: 1) the existence of the detention facility was corroborated by multiple neutral sources; 2) the existence of the detention facility had been corroborated by a neutral source; 3) whether the existence of the detention facility had been corroborated by multiple sources, none of which were neutral; or 4) whether the existence of the detention facility had not been corroborated by multiple sources.
Since the armed conflict in Slovenia in June 1991, the warring factions have operated a variety of detention facilities (camps). It appears that as the situation in the former Yugoslavia disintegrated and war erupted, detention facilities came into existence in increasing numbers. A large number of camps came into existence in Croatia after the beginning of hostilities in September 1991. The greatest number of camps came into existence in BiH in the period after April 1992. It appears that many of the camps appearing in this report are now closed.
The reports reviewed allege a total of 960 reported places of detention in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Of those 960 alleged places of detention, 466 (48.5 per cent) were reportedly operated by Bosnian Serbs or forces of FRY; 121 (12.6 per cent) by Bosnian Croats or the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Army; 84 (8.8 per cent) by the Government and Army of BiH or Bosnian Muslims; 32 (3.3 per cent) jointly by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats; 9 (.9 per cent) as private prisons, individuals or groups; 4 (.4 per cent) by the Government or armed forces of Slovenia; and 244 (25.4 per cent) by unidentified forces.
As the above statistics and following discussion indicate, the number of camps and reported violations in camps controlled by the Government of BiH and its army are the fewest among the warring factions, irrespective of the ethnic or religious background of the detainees held. The number of reported violations by the Croatian Government, the Croatian Army, and the Croatian Defence Council is larger, particularly against Serbs in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia and against Muslims from BiH in Herzegovina. The period of time during which those camps were operated in each of these contexts is relatively limited. The two warring factions identified above are, however, reported to have committed far fewer numbers of violations than those committed by the Serb forces and those working on their behalf, whether in Croatia or BiH. Camps operated by Serbs in BiH are by far where the largest numbers of detainees have been held and where the harshest and largest number of violations occurred.
The information concerning the number of prisoners includes a wide range of estimates. It appears that none of the detaining powers involved in the conflict made a concerted effort to identify and maintain records of the number of individuals they detained. If they have done so, such information was not made available.
The camps reported range in size from small detention and screening centres that temporarily housed a few prisoners, to camps that housed large numbers of prisoners. The duration of their operation varied from days to months. The vast majority of places used to detain prisoners were pre-existing structures, such as penitentiaries, municipal buildings, administrative offices, schools, sports arenas, factories, warehouses, mines, farms and private homes, hotels, restaurants, and apartments. In a very few examples, camps were reported to have been newly constructed for the purpose of detaining prisoners.
Due to a lack of information, it was generally very difficult to determine the command and control in the camps. The information, when available, was usually limited to individual camps at a very immediate and local level. The extent to which superior or central authorities had control in the operation of camps was usually unknown.
Some reports describe a situation whereby camps were maintained and operated by a mix of military personnel, former army officers and soldiers, various paramilitaries, local volunteers, members of civilian police forces, or politicians. There were also many reports of situations where there was movement in and out of camps by visitors, including local civilians, paramilitary forces, and the army, who perpetrated abuses upon the prison population.
Most detainees appeared not to be prisoners of war, but, rather, civilians. POWs and civilian prisoners were detained together, and prisoners from the conflict were sometimes mixed in with the common criminal population of a penitentiary. Often, civilians were arrested and detained for the purpose of collecting prisoners for exchange.
There is little to suggest a legitimate purpose for the internment of so many non-combatant civilians by the various authorities and forces concerned. There is much to suggest that such internment was wholly illegitimate and intended to serve the geopolitical and military objectives of the detaining powers.
The parties to the conflict acknowledged and agreed on a number of occasions to the valid effect of those aspects of international humanitarian law relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, civilians and others detained by the parties to the conflict.
Under the law of armed conflict, prisoners of war are considered to be in the hands of the detaining power. The detaining power, therefore, is responsible for the treatment given prisoners of war irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist. The same holds true for the treatment of civilians detained.
It appears that little or no effort was made by any of the detaining powers to provide the judicial or administrative bodies required by law to identify, record, and determine the status of prisoners of war and internees.
Parties to the conflict appear to have considered the detention of those thought to be potentially capable of fighting as a legitimate activity. There are many instances of detention apparently based upon the suspicion of hostile activity against the detaining power.
Prisoners were commonly subjected to the most inhumane treatment imaginable. Mass executions, torture, rape, and other sexual assaults were frequently reported. Those in control of the apprehension and detention of prisoners were often reported to have stolen prisoner belongings. Guards and soldiers frequently humiliated those detained. Sometimes prisoners were placed in dangerous situations and used in military operations, such as mine clearing. There were also reports of reprisal killings carried out upon innocents detained in a number of camps.
The ethno-religious aspects of the conflict appear to have translated directly into prisoners suffering actively adverse distinctions based on nationality, religious belief, and political opinions.
The patterns and violations in the camps appear to differ to some extent, depending on the controlling authority, the purpose of the camp, and the camp commander.
The conditions in most camps were generally described as very poor. The camps commonly lacked sufficient heat, light, food, and water. Lack of hygiene was pervasive. Little or no medical attention was prevalent and a total lack of security for the prisoners was apparent. In fact, it was reported that those in control of camps often allowed drunk soldiers and others access to abuse the prison population.
Wounded and sick prisoners were often maltreated and/or left to suffer, although many wounded and sick prisoners were treated to some extent.
The following section of this summary and analysis is divided by location, and contains various observations relating to certain patterns and commonalities in the detention facilities reported. For a more detailed breakdown of individual regions and camps, see Section II below, which contains a geographical listing and full analyses of the individual detention facilities reported.
The reports reviewed alleged a total of 677 camps within BiH. Among those camps, 333 (49.2 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Bosnian Serbs; 83 (12.2 per cent) by Bosnian Muslims; 51 (7.5 per cent), by Croats; 31 (4.6 per cent) by both Croats and Muslims; 5 (.7 per cent), by private parties; and 174 (25.7 per cent) by unidentified forces.
The reports indicate that Bosnian Serbs operated numerous camps where grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law, including killing, torture, and rape occurred on a large scale. Those camps were mostly in BiH and predominantly held Bosnian Muslims, but also Bosnian Croats and a small number of Serbs.
The reports indicate that Bosnian Serbs used camps in BiH to facilitate territorial and political control of geographic regions and to expel and eliminate other ethnic and religious populations from that area. In essence, the Bosnian Serb forces, including former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) officers and soldiers, paramilitary units, police forces, civilians, and the political leadership of the Serbs of BiH, apparently with a significant degree of participation by and cooperation with the Serbs and Montenegrins of FRY, incorporated and exploited the detention of civilians as an integral aspect of their campaign of «ethnic cleansing». While armed, uniformed soldiers of the forces opposed to the Serbs were incarcerated in significant numbers, the vast majority of those imprisoned by Serbs in BiH appear to have been civilians.
Groups of camps appear to have been established and operated in clusters in various geographical areas and were frequently part of a network. Prisoners were frequently moved from one facility to another. Different facilities often appeared to have separate purposes, such as mass killing, torture, rape, and exchange of and detention of civilian prisoners.
The Bosnian Serb implementation of practically identical strategies and tactics for the conquest of territories and subsequent detention of non-Serb populations suggest an overall plan devised prior to the conflict and carried out locally. There seems to be a similarity in the structure of camps which might suggest a degree of pre-planning before the war was started. The notion of clusters of camps, triage camps, distribution camps, older persons and women and children held in established minimum security facilities, and men of fighting age held in established maximum security facilities, suggests such a plan. The similarities of the allegations of camp usage also strongly suggests that a plan did exist and was carried out across the board geographically. Reports suggest a common method of initial apprehension and identification of those non-Serbs detained for ultimate disposition (either long-term detention, deportation, or execution). A common plan is also suggested by the implementation of a system whereby prisoners were detained, classified, and subjected to similar types of abuse ( e.g., it was often reported that intellectuals, politicians, police, and the wealthy were regularly tortured and killed in certain camps). There is also a similarity in the command and control of the camps, whereby there was a mix of civilian, political, JNA, paramilitary, and local Serb reservists and civilians involved in camp operations. With regard to practical aspects of camp operation, large suitable facilities appear to have been selected and prepared, to some extent, in advance. Whether a plan was established by the military, police, or politicians, is something that could not be ascertained.
The method by which the campaign of «ethnic cleansing» was carried out ensured that, comparatively, the most brutal and inhumane treatment of those detained occurred within the geographic arc following the Sava and Drina Rivers of the former Yugoslavia. See examples, camps in Prijedor, Visegrad, Zvornik, Brcko and Foca, and Bijeljina. For, it is within this region of BiH that the Serbs required absolute control in order to establish a separate nation with contiguous borders and an uncompromised geographic link with Serbia and Montenegro. That control required the subjugation, if not the disappearance of the non-Serb populations of the area. In large part, that subjugation and elimination was accomplished by wholesale detention of those populations in various places of detention.
Commonly, Serb forces reduced the opposition of a county area and upon conquest of the territory of that BiH county (opstina) immediately began to round up the non-Serb population. It sometimes occurred that the entire population of a town or village was gathered together so that the Serb and non-Serb populations could be separated and dealt with accordingly. During the rounding-up process, members of the population were frequently tortured, raped, and killed. Sometimes, the local population would be interned in different locations. Other times, after an initial round of apprehension, non-Serbs would be released and weeks later re-apprehended and placed in various camps to be either killed or moved out of the area.
Frequently, the religious, political, civic, professional, and business leaders of the non-Serb population were immediately identified for detention and for the worst abuses. Often on the captors' side, local civil servants, political leaders, and particularly the police, participated or were involved in the rounding-up process. Prisoners were also often forced to surrender their money and valuables to their captors.
It was often reported that men between the ages of 18 and 60 were separated from women, children, and elderly men. Apparently, men between the ages of 18 (or younger) and 60 were considered to be of fighting age, constituting a class of quasi- prisoners of war or perhaps legitimate internees because of their potential for hostility. However, rarely did reports include any information to suggest that those considered capable of fighting had ever actually committed hostile acts or had organized to do so. In fact, many Muslim villagers simply surrendered the weapons they had upon an initial demand by the Serb forces in the region. After that surrender, the villagers were in many cases detained. The reports indicate that in many instances, men between the ages of 18 and 60, were ultimately transferred to heavily guarded larger camps where killings or torture were prevalent.
A large number of Bosnian Serb places of detention appear to have been used as short term detention facilities before transfer or transport of prisoners out of the area.
Smaller camps, in many cases, housed prisoners temporarily until the captors divided the prisoners into groups and transported them to the larger camps. The prisoners were often packed into buses, trains, and lorries, and were subjected to physical and mental abuse. During transport, and upon arrival at their new camps, prisoners were also reported to have been killed at random and denied food, water, and access to toilet facilities. The prisoners were on occasion transported by automobile to camps by locals, or were marched under armed guard.
Detainees were sometimes transported from camps within a given region to camps in another region because of overcrowding, anticipated International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) inspections, visits by the media, exchange of prisoners, and as a result of triage for unlawful purposes.
Very few camps appear to have been actually constructed for the purpose of detaining captured prisoners or interning the civilian population. The vast majority of the sites used for detention were pre-existing facilities. Some of those facilities were modified in order to create more secure camps. For example, electric and barbed-wire fences were sometimes reported to have been installed around a number of buildings.
Bosnian Serbs were also reported to have maintained Muslim «ghettos» in certain towns and sometimes used villages as camps to detain a large group of captives. See examples, Trnopolje camp in Prijedor, Es Naselje in Brcko, and Brezovo Polje in Brcko.
There is little to suggest that captured uniformed combatants were treated with the respect required by the law of armed conflict. Those prisoners who had in fact committed hostile acts against the Serbs were frequently punished. The punishments included severe mental and physical abuse and often execution.
Those women and children detained were also subjected to the worst kinds of abuse, including rape and other sexual assaults. *116 There are reports of many detention facilities in existence for the sole purpose of holding women and girls for rape and sexual entertainment. There are also numerous allegations of rape at camps wherever women and girls were held. Captors reportedly raped female prisoners in front of other prisoners. Those who resisted, were often reportedly killed or otherwise brutalized, often in the presence of others. There were also reports of the sexual abuse of men, as well as castration and mutilation of sex organs.
Elderly persons detained often suffered the same level of abuse as the others. This indicates that the captors spared no group from detention and maltreatment.
There were reports that certain individuals were spared detention and abuse, because of the intervention of influential Serbs in the area or because they were somehow able to bribe their way out of detention. There were also instances of local Serbs risking their own lives to help Muslims and Croats escape detention in various Serb camps in BiH.
There were also reports of Serbs who were detained in Serb- controlled facilities. In those cases, the prisoners had usually refused to participate in the conquest of a region or in the activities of «ethnic cleansing». Those imprisoned Serbs were treated as poorly as the other prisoners.
A large number of the Bosnian Serb-controlled camps appear to have served as screening stations for the purposes of interrogation and decisions as to how individual prisoners would be disposed of. Interrogation almost always consisted of questions relating to military and strategic information (including the location and possession of weapons), political affiliation, and political belief. Captors also interrogated detainees concerning the personal wealth and family connections of other detainees. Interrogations were commonly accompanied by brutal conduct and humiliation and, in some cases, by torture and killing. Confessions were often forcibly extracted from prisoners and used as a reason for their detention and treatment. The forced confessions on many occasions described some sort of offence or hostile act.
Reports indicate that upon arrival at the larger camps, prisoners were regularly subjected to random beatings. Reprisals appear to have been carried out against the prisoner population for Bosnian Serb setbacks in battle. Such reprisal activities included beatings, severe torture and killings. Apparently, one motivation for the punishment of inmates was retribution for supposed Serb casualties suffered in battle.
The type and amount of torture, abuse and maltreatment visited upon the prisoners detained in Bosnian Serb camps was of a great magnitude. Not only were prisoners physically abused, but they were also commonly humiliated, degraded, and forced to abuse one another. In several instances, prisoners were reported to have been forced to inflict injury upon each other, sometimes as entertainment for the guards. Humiliation often involved behaviour contradictory to the prisoners' religious background. Prisoners were also subjected to mental abuse and humiliation, including barrages of ethnic slurs.
Several Bosnian Serb controlled camps served as places of mass and continuous killing and execution by various means. Such camps also maintained large populations of prisoners for considerable periods of time. Other camps housed large numbers of prisoners but were not the site of a great number of killings.
At the larger camps, prisoners were reported to have been killed on a daily basis. In some cases, their bodies were left to rot on the camp grounds, or were loaded by prisoners and hauled away by truck to various destinations. The bodies were also reportedly disposed of in mass graves abutting the camps and thrown into rivers, lakes, ravines, mine shafts and mining pits, and other local venues. *117 Bodies were also reported to have been incinerated or dismembered.
Prisoners who were targeted for torture or death at the larger camps often included prominent members of the community who were wealthy, educated or politically influential. Guards often were reported to have information identifying which prisoners fell into those categories.
The conditions in the places of detention were almost uniformly harsh. There was consistently a lack of food, insufficient access to toilets and beatings accompanying toilet- use, little drinkable water supply, an absence of soap and infrequent opportunities to bathe or change clothes, inadequate bedding, and often little protection from the natural elements.
Prisoners in some camps were reported to have suffered from dysentery and lice epidemics. Medical attention was, for the most part, non-existent at the camps. In some instances, inmates with medical training, treated fellow prisoners. However, due to an absence of supplies and facilities, such treatment was very primitive.
In the larger camps, male prisoners were often reported to be packed tightly into the detention facilities, so that they had no room to lie down or sit, or sometimes even to breathe. The prisoners were in many cases forced to urinate and defecate in containers and on the floors of the rooms in which they were accommodated.
Prisoners were often reported to have been subjected to abuse during meals, and, at best, were given one meal per day consisting of small portions of soup or bread. In some reported instances where food was delivered to a camp by the ICRC, the food was not distributed to prisoners, but was instead diverted to Bosnian Serb guards or forces.
There appears to have existed a certain degree of acknowledgement by Bosnian Serb authorities that camps were maintained. The camps appear to have been maintained and operated by a mix of former JNA officers and soldiers, Bosnian Serb Army personnel, various Serb paramilitaries, local volunteer Serbs, local impressed Serbs, members of the various Serb police forces and at least some Montenegrins. There also exists information that civilian Serb politicians were intimately involved with the operation of such places of detention.
Bosnian Serb authorities often expressed the belief that the above-described detention facilities were legitimate. The reasons stated included the necessity of protecting civilians from the dangers of combat, interning those who threatened the security of the detaining forces and detaining those responsible for criminal activity.
It is interesting to note that in at least one Serb-run camp, Batkovic, Bijeljina, the local Serb population was reported to have become aware of the situation inside the camp and demanded that the prisoners there be treated better. Conditions for the prisoners were reported to have subsequently improved.
The BiH Government and Muslim forces and Bosnian Croat forces were also reported to have detained thousands of soldiers and civilians in BiH. At one point, because of an alliance between the two parties, they both imprisoned Serbs. A significant number of camps were reported to have been operated jointly by Croat and BiH forces. After that alliance disintegrated, both sides were reported to have imprisoned each others' soldiers captured in battle, and large numbers of civilians of their opponents' ethnicity.
There are indications that BiH forces and Bosnian Croats to some extent reacted to the method of warfare and «ethnic cleansing» initiated by Bosnian Serbs by taking up similar methods of warfare. This included the indiscriminate detention of civilians, rather than maintaining methods of behaviour required by the international law of armed conflict. There seemed to be elements of revenge for past imprisonment of Muslim and Croat civilians. Also, the idea existed, perhaps, that if one held a significant number of the «enemy» prisoner, the «enemy» would be more likely to treat its own prisoners well so as to avoid the impulse for reprisals by the other side.
Both BiH forces and Bosnian Croats are reported to have interned civilians for the purpose of exchange for members of their own forces and populations held by the other two parties to the conflict. There also seems to be rather isolated attempts at smaller scale «ethnic cleansing».
The BiH and Muslim forces were reported to have imprisoned a number of individuals who resisted military service. Some of those persons were tried and convicted of criminal offences, and others were sent to the front to dig trenches. The BiH authorities also arrested people for possession of weapons. In Kladanj, Serbs were said to be imprisoned for the purpose of protecting them against retaliation by the local Muslim population. In Zenica, the BiH captors reportedly established a tribunal to determine the status of those imprisoned as either military or civilian.
The treatment of prisoners in Bosnian Muslim run camps was in some cases reported to be brutal and degrading. That treatment was often reported to include violent interrogations and beatings. Reports of forced same-sex sexual acts between prisoners also exist. Drunk guards were reported to have abused detainees, and civilians were allowed access into camps to beat and harass prisoners. Personal vendettas were also allowed to be consummated against prisoners of war. The killing of prisoners was not uncommon. There were also reports the Bosnian Muslim forces used prisoners as human shields.
There were reports of Bosnian Muslim-run brothels and rape camps. A number of reports also alleged the operation of private prisons controlled by various Bosnian Muslim forces or individuals. The BiH Government, in fact, acknowledged the existence of such Muslim private prisons and officially deplored them.
Reported conditions at most BiH and Muslim camps, were generally described as being no better than the vast majority of other places of detention in the former Yugoslavia.
In Bihac, BiH forces were reported to have imprisoned captured soldiers and supporters of leader Fikret Abdic. Likewise, the forces of Fikret Abdic reportedly maintained a camp to hold captured BiH forces and civilians deemed in opposition to Abdic's authority.
Bosnian Croat forces were also reported to have maintained camps in areas under their control imprisoning both Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. While there is at least one report of a «death camp» run by Bosnian Croats in Orasje, killing of prisoners, though not uncommon, was on a scale much lower than that apparently perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs.
The Bosnian Croat camps were reported to have been maintained by both military and paramilitary forces. The forces of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnian Croat forces apparently cooperated in the detention and transfer of prisoners.
The Bosnian Croats were said to have apprehended a significant numbers of individuals to hold for the purpose of prisoner exchanges. Other prisoners were supposedly held to protect them from the dangers of combat. Men were also imprisoned who were considered to be of fighting age. In addition, there appeared to be some attempts to expel non-Croat populations from some areas, such as in Vitez. Some persons there were arrested for so-called security reasons and for possession of weapons.
In at least one site, the Central Mostar Prison, it was reported that Croats divided their prisoners into five categories: Serb combatants; enemy collaborators; prisoners held for purposes of exchange; civilians accused of common crimes; and Croatian soldiers serving time for disciplinary infractions.
Bosnian Croat captors reportedly maltreated a significant portion of those detained. Allegations of beatings, rape, and theft of prisoners' personal belongings were rather common. The prisoners were also reported to have been used as human shields. The litany of abuses perpetrated in those camps was much like the abuses perpetrated in the other camps in the former Yugoslavia.
Of the reports of 677 camps alleged in BiH, 381 were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources) and 296 were uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in BiH:
| Banja Luka | Total camps: 9 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 7 | 2 | |
| Bihac | Total camps: 14 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | 2 | |
| Muslims | 4 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 5 | ||
| Bijeljina | Total camps: 12 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 7 | 1 | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 2 | 1 | |
| Bileca | Total camps: 9 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 6 | 2 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Bosanska Dubica | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 4 | ||
| Bosanska Gradiska | Total camps: 6 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 5 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Bosanska Krupa | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | 5 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Bosanski Brod | Total camps: 8 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Croats | 1 | 2 | |
| Unknown | 3 | 1 | |
| Bosanski Novi | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 5 | 1 | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Bosanski Petrovac | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Bosanski Samac | Total camps: 6 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 4 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Bratunac | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Brcko | Total camps: 34 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 26 | 4 | |
| Unknown | 2 | 2 | |
| Breza | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 3 | ||
| Bugojno | Total camps: 12 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 3 | 1 | |
| Croats/Muslims | 1 | 2 | |
| Unknown | 2 | 3 | |
| Busovaca | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Cajnice | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 3 | 1 | |
| Capljina | Total camps: 6 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 3 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 1 | 1 | |
| Cazin | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Celinac | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 3 | 1 | |
| Citluk | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Derventa | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | 2 | |
| Doboj | Total camps: 13 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 8 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 4 | ||
| Donji Vakuf | Total camps: 5 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 3 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Foca | Total camps: 15 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 7 | 5 | |
| Unknown | 1 | 2 | |
| Fojnica | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | 1 | |
| Gacko | Total camps: 15 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 10 | 3 | |
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Glamoc | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs/Montenegrins | 1 | ||
| Gorazde | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 3 | ||
| Gornji Vakuf | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Gradacac | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | 3 | |
| Grude | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats/Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Han Pijesak | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Jablanica | Total camps: 5 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 2 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Jajce | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Kakanj | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Kalesija | Total camps: 5 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | 2 | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Kalinovik | Total camps: 5 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | 2 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Kiseljak | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 4 | 1 | |
| Kladanj | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats/Muslims | 1 | ||
| Kljuc | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 3 | 1 | |
| Konjic | Total camps: 29 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 6 | 5 | |
| Croats/Muslims | 4 | 12 | |
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Kotor Varos | Total camps: 9 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | 7 | |
| Kressevo | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 3 | ||
| Kupres | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Laktasi | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Listica | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats/Muslims | 1 | ||
| Livno | Total camps: 10 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Croats | 3 | ||
| Unknown | 3 | 3 | |
| Ljubinje | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Ljubuski | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Croats | 1 | 1 | |
| Lopare | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Lukavac | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Maglaj | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Modrica | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | 2 | |
| Mostar | Total camps: 15 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | ||
| Muslims | 2 | 1 | |
| Croats | 5 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 1 | 3 | |
| Mrkonjic Grad | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | 2 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Nevesinje | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Odzak | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 2 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Olovo | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Orasje | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Croats | 1 | 1 | |
| Posusje | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Prijedor | Total camps: 36 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 28 | 8 | |
| Prnjavor | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Prozor | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 3 | 3 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Rogatica | Total camps: 12 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 3 | 8 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Rudo | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Sanski Most | Total camps: 10 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 8 | 2 | |
| Sarajevo | Total camps: 91 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 7 | 20 | |
| Muslims | 11 | 18 | |
| Croats | 1 | 1 | |
| Croats/Muslims | 7 | ||
| Unknown | 11 | 13 | |
| Private | 2 | ||
| Sekovici | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 3 | ||
| Sipovo | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | ||
| Skender Vakuf | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Sokolac | Total camps: 8 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 3 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | 4 | |
| Srebrenica | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Stolac | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | 3 | |
| Tesanj | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Teslic | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | 3 | |
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Titov Drvar | Total camps: 6 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 3 | 2 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Tomislavgrad | Total camps: 9 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 3 | 2 | |
| Unknown | 3 | 1 | |
| Travnik | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | 2 | |
| Trebinje | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Tuzla | Total camps: 15 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 3 | ||
| Croats/Muslims | 1 | ||
| Private | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 5 | 5 | |
| Ugljevik | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | ||
| Vares | Total camps: 5 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Croats | 2 | ||
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Velika Kladusa | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Visegrad | Total camps: 21 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | 17 | |
| Private | 2 | ||
| Visoko | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 2 | 3 | |
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Vitez | Total camps: 8 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Croats | 2 | ||
| Unknown | 5 | ||
| Vlasenica | Total camps: 12 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 4 | 3 | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 4 | ||
| Zenica | Total camps: 16 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 2 | ||
| Croats/Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 5 | 8 | |
| Zepce | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 2 | ||
| Zvornik | Total camps: 28 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 23 | 3 | |
| Unknown | 2 | ||
The reports reviewed alleged a total of 201 camps within Croatia. Among those camps, 77 (38.3 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Bosnian Serbs; 70 (34.8 per cent) by Croats; 1 (.5 per cent) by Bosnian Muslims; 1 (.5 per cent) by both Croats and Muslims; 1 (.5 per cent) by Slovenians; 51 (25.4 per cent) by unidentified forces.
As armed conflict erupted between Croatians and Serbs in Croatia, the detention of combatants and civilians reached a large scale. Ultimately, at least several thousand Croatians and Serbs had been imprisoned in Croatia from the end of 1991 to the present.
Most of the places of detention in Croatia were maintained by Croatians or Serbs. There are, however, a significant number of reported detention facilities where it was unclear who maintained control.
The reports indicate that Croatian forces captured and detained both Serb combatants and Serb civilians. As the conflict progressed, it appears that the Croatians began to capture and detain Serb civilians for the purpose of later exchanging them for Croats held prisoner.
Some cooperation appeared evident between the Croats of the Republic of Croatia and the Croats of the Republic of BiH. At one point, at least, Bosnian Croat forces were apparently able to transfer prisoners from the Bosanski Brod and Odzak areas of BiH to Slavonski Brod in Croatia. Some of those prisoners were later transferred back to places of detention in the territory of BiH. Others were apparently transferred to places of detention elsewhere in Croatia.
The Croats appear to have used numerous sites to detain and interrogate Serbs for short periods of time and maintained only a few places for long term detention.
It was reported that the Croatian camps were often divided into three blocks. The first block consisted of former JNA members who surrendered without a struggle. The second block consisted of elderly persons and the third block was reported to have consisted of military police, volunteers, and individuals identified by the Croats as «Cetniks».
In Pakrac, Croats were alleged to have maintained two «death camps» for the elimination of captured Serbs. This was the only allegation of Croats operating a place of detention for the purpose of large-scale execution. However, there were numerous allegations of Croatian mistreatment of prisoners in other places of detention, as well as numerous allegations of killings.
The reported maltreatment inflicted upon prisoners in Croat- controlled detention facilities consisted mainly of indiscriminate beatings, some rapes, public humiliation, and forced appearance on television. Electric shock and forced same- sex sexual acts were also alleged as common methods of torture and abuse.
Those who were reported to have controlled and maintained the Croatian places of detention were the Croatian armed forces, local police forces and some paramilitary groups.
Camp conditions were generally poor. However, in at least one instance at Gospic Prison, it was reported that Croatian captors attempted to improve conditions when notified of an ICRC visit.
There were also Serb controlled places of detention in Croatia which were reported to have consisted mainly of pre- existing facilities. However, the Serbs apparently found it necessary to erect a few camps in order to effectively detain their captives. The Serb camps in Croatia held both civilians and prisoners of war.
Prior to the war in BiH, Serb captors in Croatia transferred some prisoners to the Manjaca camp in Banja Luka, Bosnia. Later, after fighting started in BiH, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were reported to have been held at Serb camps in Croatia.
Those reportedly responsible for the operation and maintenance of Serb-controlled camps in Croatia were a mixture of JNA officers and soldiers, SAO Krajina police forces, Serb Territorial Defence units and various paramilitary forces.
Maltreatment of prisoners was commonly attributed to the Serb controlled camps in Croatia. Camp commanders appear to have been well aware of the abuse that took place and often allowed Serb civilians and paramilitaries access to the prisoners in order to abuse them. In at least one case, Bosnian Serbs reportedly travelled to Knin, Croatia to participate in the abuse of Bosnian Croats and Muslims held there.
There are a number of reports that the guards in Serb camps consumed drugs and alcohol and in an intoxicated state subjected prisoners to different types of maltreatment.
As with other detaining powers, the Serbs in Croatia were reported to have attempted at times to deceive visitors interested in the condition of camps. For example, places of detention and the prisoners themselves were cleaned up before a visit and prisoners who appeared to be in satisfactory condition were shown off, whereas those who showed physical signs of maltreatment were hidden.
There were also reports of prisoners coerced to appear on Belgrade television to describe their supposed offences against Serbs.
Of the reports of 201 camps alleged in Croatia, 100 were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources) and 101 were uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in Croatia:
| Beli Manastir | Total camps: 6 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 4 | 1 | |
| Benkovac | Total camps: 5 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 5 | ||
| Bjelovar | Total camps: 6 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 3 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Daruvar | Total camps: 8 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | ||
| Croats | 4 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | 1 | |
| Djakovo | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Drnis | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Dubrovnik | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Dvor | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | ||
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Glina | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Gospic | Total camps: 5 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Croats | 2 | 2 | |
| Gracac | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Grubisno Polje | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Imotski | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Ivanec | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Karlovac | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 2 | ||
| Knin | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 4 | 3 | |
| Korenica | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Kostajnica | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | 1 | |
| Kutina | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Metkovic | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | 2 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Nasice | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Nova Gradiska | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | 1 | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Novska | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Ogulin | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | ||
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Osijek | Total camps: 14 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 2 | 4 | |
| Croats | 2 | 3 | |
| Unknown | 3 | ||
| Otocac | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Pakrac | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | 2 | |
| Croats | 1 | 2 | |
| Slovenians | 1 | ||
| Petrinja | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Podravska Slatina | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Pula | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Rijeka | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 2 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Sibenik | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Muslims | 1 | ||
| Croats | 2 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 2 | 1 | |
| Sinj | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Sisak | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 3 | ||
| Slavonska Pozega | Total camps: 5 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 2 | 2 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Slavonski Brod | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | 2 | |
| Croats/Muslims | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 3 | ||
| Slunj | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Split | Total camps: 4 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 3 | ||
| Vinkovci | Total camps: 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Varazdin | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Vojnic | Total camps: 3 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Vrbovec | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Vrginmost | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 1 | ||
| Vukovar | Total camps: 44 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs | 7 | 27 | |
| Croats | 9 | ||
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Zadar | Total camps: 7 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 3 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 3 | ||
| Zagreb | Total camps: 8 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Croats | 2 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 5 | ||
The reports reviewed alleged a total of 71 camps within FRY. Among those camps, 56 (78.9 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Bosnian Serbs or forces of FRY; and 15 (21.1 per cent) by unidentified forces.
A combination of JNA personnel, police forces and Serb paramilitaries, reportedly operated and maintained the camps in FRY.
A significant number of Croats, probably at least several thousand, were reported to have been captured by Serb forces in Croatia and transferred to what is now known as FRY. The majority of those imprisoned in various prisons and camps in FRY were apparently captured at the battle of Vukovar in approximately November 1991.
Those captured were a mix of soldiers and civilians. Apparently, the Serbs first regarded their Croat prisoners as insurgents and rebels and later, as the independence of Croatia was recognized, to a certain extent regarded their captives as prisoners of war. It was also reported that when the Republic of Croatia was internationally recognized, Croat prisoners in FRY were severely beaten as a result.
It was reported that Serb authorities tried and convicted a number of Croat prisoners for various offences. Those prisoners were often transferred to other detention facilities. Serbs also commonly transferred other prisoners between detention centres.
Treatment of prisoners at the FRY camps was commonly reported as very poor. Violent interrogation, and reports of beatings and sadistic treatment of prisoners were common. For example, it was reported that prisoners were forced to participate in various «games», the rules of which inevitably led to the abuse of the participants. It appeared that Serb authorities in FRY transported local Vukovar Serbs to FRY in order to identify certain prisoners and participate in their maltreatment. Personal vendettas were allowed to occur. Drunk guards were also reported to have inflicted great harm upon those imprisoned. There were also reports of women who were held and exploited for sexual purposes.
Living conditions for the prisoners were also reported as very poor. Common complaints included a lack of food, insufficient access to toilet facilities, and an inadequate opportunity to bathe and change clothes. Facilities were often cold and damp, and inmates were often left without sufficient bedding. The wounded and sick often suffered without adequate medical care.
It appears that the majority of Croat prisoners in FRY were exchanged by late summer of 1992.
It was also reported that prisoners captured in BiH were transported to camps in FRY. A number of the Bosnian Muslims held in such camps were reportedly captured around Visegrad and Bosanski Samac.
A number of Bosnian refugees in Montenegro, from Foca, were reportedly arrested by FRY police forces, held in various prisons, and later turned over to Serbs maintaining camps in Foca where they were then imprisoned. It was also reported that a significant number of Muslim prisoners held in Bileca, were transferred to a camp in Subotica.
Upon investigation by third party teams, certain alleged concentration camps for Muslims in FRY were found to be refugee centres where living conditions were poor.
Of the reports of the 71 camps alleged in FRY, 42 were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources), and 29 were uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in FRY:
| Kosovo | Total camps: 1 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs/FRY | 1 | ||
| Montenegro | Total camps: 9 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs/FRY | 5 | 1 | |
| Unknown | 1 | 2 | |
| Serbia | Total camps: 27 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs/FRY | 13 | 13 | |
| Unknown | 1 | ||
| Vojvodina | Total camps: 25 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Serbs/FRY | 10 | 13 | |
| Unknown | 2 | ||
| Unidentified Locations in FRY | Total camps: 9 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | |
| Unknown | 9 | ||
The reports reviewed alleged a total of seven camps within Slovenia. Among those camps, three (42.9 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Slovenian forces and four (57.1 per cent) by unidentified forces.
As the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia erupted and unfolded, detention of soldiers and civilians reportedly became commonplace. In June and July 1991, Slovenian forces reportedly captured and imprisoned a few hundred soldiers of the JNA and some civilian personnel of SFRY, including internal police, for a short period of time after Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June 1991.
The Slovenes reportedly held the prisoners in various places including mining facilities and a penitentiary. The captors allegedly subjected the prisoners to beatings, verbal humiliations, and threats. Since the prisoners' release and the subsequent conflicts in Croatia and BiH, there were no reports concerning detention in Slovenia.
Of the reports of the seven camps alleged in Slovenia, six were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources) and one was uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in Slovenia:
| Slovenia | Total camps: 7 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Run by | Corroborated | Uncorroborated | ||
| Slovenians | 2 | 1 | ||
| Unknown | 4 | |||
Annex IX, consisting of 124 pages, was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni.
The Commission investigated rape and sexual assault in three ways. The first method was through a study of the documentary evidence contained in the database at IHRLI. This study is discussed in paragraphs 28 through 294. The second method was through a field investigation. This investigation is discussed at Annex IX.A, in paragraphs 1 through 190. The field investigators conducted 223 interviews in Croatia. *118 The final method was through the analysis of investigations and interviews conducted by governments and submitted to the Commission, but not included in the database. For example, the government of Austria recently interviewed 18 refugees, several of whom were victims or witnesses of incidents of rape and sexual assault. Sweden conducted interviews of 35 refugees, most of whom were victims or witnesses of rape and sexual assault. *119 These investigations and their findings have been sent by the Commission to the office of the Prosecutor for the ICTFY. A great number of fact-finding missions have been carried out to try to assess the incidence and extent of the use of rape and sexual assault as a weapon of war in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *120
The question of the credibility of victims and witnesses and the reliability of the information provided has been foremost in the consideration of this analysis. Indeed, some of the information provided, as described below, is general, generic, or insufficient. But such information may none the less be credible because of some particular details it may contain and because of other corroborating facts. Furthermore, interviews, whether conducted by the Commission or by certain governments, of victims and witnesses in sufficient numbers confirm certain accounts. Such interviews also provide a first hand account and description of certain facts, which are also found in the documentation available in the database. Thus, it is the cumulative nature of the information which tends to corroborate the facts about incidents in the locations described, as well as patterns of behaviour. Consequently, it is this cumulative effect which gives the information credibility and reliability. This is also the basis which provides a sufficient numerical basis to develop a statistical analysis from which to derive the conclusions described below. Thus, for example, of the 1,100 cases examined, it is possible to identify with some degree of accuracy the patterns described in paragraphs 8 through 25. The macroanalysis aspect of this report is therefore well founded on the facts. Obviously, individual cases and their level of readiness for prosecution will vary and, without speculating on any ultimate prosecutorial outcome, it could easily be surmised that no less than 10 percent of these reports are very likely cases for prosecution. Finally, the analysis of allegations by geographical location has been written in a way to conceal the identities of victims, witnesses, and alleged perpetrators, for confidentiality and security reasons. The vagueness present should not be taken for a lack of information. Names have been provided when they are taken from widely published sources like the news media.
The relevance of the study is therefore threefold: 1) it identifies specific individual cases, patterns and policies; 2) it establishes foundations in fact for allegations of rape and sexual assault in this conflict, and more particularly their use as an instrument of war; and 3) it serves as a basis for the eventual prosecution by the ICTFY of rape and sexual assault cases, particularly with respect to the prosecution of commanders and other decision makers who may have been responsible for individual conduct and formulating policy. A most significant corollary of the study is that it has identified a number of cases ready for the final investigatory stages leading to prosecution.
This is a study by IHRLI of allegations of systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. The information for the study comes from the sources stated in paragraph 1. The database contains tens of thousands of allegations of rape and sexual assault. Rape is defined for the purposes of the study as non-consensual sexual penetration, while sexual assault encompasses rape and other forced or coerced sexual acts. It also includes sexual mutilations for purposes of this study. When duplicated information is eliminated and the most general allegations discarded, *121 the following statistics are revealed:
There are about 162 detention sites in the former Yugoslavia where people were detained and sexually assaulted:
This statistical information may not represent the true extent of what has occurred in the former Yugoslavia. This shortfall may be due to a variety of reasons:
These concerns are evidenced in many of the reports used in this study. Submitting sources often withhold the names of victims, witnesses or perpetrators to protect them. Additionally, many of the witnesses who gave testimony stated that they were afraid to allow their identity to be revealed because of retaliation by the alleged perpetrators or rejection by their own community. Some of the victims report that the people who assaulted them said never to tell what had happened or they would hunt down the victims and kill them.
To analyse the contents of the database, all of the allegations of rape and sexual assault were gathered. Summary sheets were created for each allegation. These worksheets separated out some of the vital information, such as the identity of the witness who reported the incident, the identity of the victims and perpetrators, the date and location of the incident, the source of the report, and the method of recording the information. The worksheets also contained a comprehensive summary of the incident of rape and sexual assault. These summary sheets were then used as analytical tools to compare the information in a standardized format. They were organized geographically, divided by the setting in which they allegedly occurred, and arranged chronologically within that subheading. The analysis which follows is also organized geographically by county in alphabetical order. This particular form was chosen because of the number of «warring factions», and the generally confusing nature of the conflict.
The setting was defined as either custodial or non- custodial, and those reports which did not specify the setting were assumed not to have occurred in custody. *129 This classification was used for several reasons, primarily because some level of organization and coordination is required to hold people in custody. The greater the number of rapes and sexual assaults in custody, the greater the likelihood of higher-level control over, or acquiescence to the practice. About 600 reported cases specify that they occurred in settings where the victims were held in custody.
Rape and sexual assault have been reported to have been committed by all of the «warring factions». Additionally, many ethnic groups *130 were reportedly victims of rape and sexual assault: Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Croatians, Croatian Serbs, Croatian Muslims, Albanians, Czechs and others. However, it is important to avoid moral equivalency in the analysis. The vast majority of victims are Bosnian Muslim and the great majority of alleged perpetrators are Bosnian Serb. Serbs reportedly run over 60 percent of the nearly 150 detention sites where men and women were allegedly raped and sexually assaulted. Finally, for purposes of prosecution, it is important to distinguish between «opportunistic» crimes and the use of rape and sexual assault as a method of «ethnic cleansing». Rape and sexual assault should be examined in the context of the practice of «ethnic cleansing»; discussed in Annex IV, and the practices in concentration camps, discussed in Annexes V and VIII. Most of the reported cases occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), *131 and none were reported to have occurred in Slovenia.
Several patterns of conduct are revealed in the reported cases, regardless of the ethnicity of the perpetrators or the victims. These patterns are:
The first pattern occurs before any widespread or generalized fighting breaks out in a region. This type of rape and sexual assault is accompanied by looting, intimidation, and beatings. Tensions in an area grow, and members of the ethnic group controlling the regional government begin to terrorize their neighbours by intimidation, looting and beatings. Two or more men reportedly break into a house, intimidate the residents, steal their property, beat them, and often rape and sexually assault female residents. Some of the reported rapes and sexual assaults are singular and some are multiple. In either case, there is often a gang atmosphere where all the abuses are part of the same event, and all the attackers participate in the event, even if they do not sexually assault the victims. A distinct pattern of rape and sexual assault within this general type is peculiar to one area of BiH and Croatia. Paramilitary groups roam the countryside, abducting primarily Bosnian Serb women from their homes. The women are taken to a specific location, raped and sexually assaulted repeatedly, and then abandoned. The size of the groups of men range from four to 15. The victims are usually assaulted by each of the men in the group. *135
The second pattern of rape and sexual assault occurs in conjunction with widespread or generalized fighting. When forces attack a town or village, the population is gathered and divided by sex and age. Some women are raped and sexually assaulted in their homes as the attacking forces secure the area. Others are selected after the roundup and are then raped and sexually assaulted publicly. The population of the village is then transported to camps.
The third pattern of rape and sexual assault occurs in sites of detention or other «collection centres» for refugees. After the population is rounded up in a town or village, men and women are separated. Men are executed or sent off to camps, and women are generally sent off to separate camps. In these custodial situations, soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries, and even civilians are allowed to enter the camp, pick out women, take them away, rape and sexually assault them, and then either kill them or return them to the site. There is a significant amount of gang-rape and sexual assault reported in this context, and beatings and torture accompany most of the reported rapes and sexual assaults. Survivors report that some women are taken out alone, and some are taken out in groups. The women who are not killed are eventually exchanged. Though this is the general pattern, there are also many allegations that women are raped and sexually assaulted in front of other detainees, or that other detainees are forced to rape and sexually assault each other. The sexual assault of men in these camps is generally public, and the men are not usually removed from the camp. In these camps, other forms of humanitarian law violations, such as torture, occur simultaneously. In camps with only male populations and in camps with mixed populations, men are also subjected to sexual assault. Examples of this type of camp include Serb-run Trnopolje in Prijedor, *136 Croatian-run Odzak camp in Odzak, *137 and the Muslim-run camp in Gorazde. *138
The fourth pattern of rape and sexual assault occurs in specific types of sites of detention. Survivors of some camps report that they believe that they were detained for the purpose of rape and sexual assault. In these sites, all of the women are raped and sexually assaulted, the raping is quite frequent, and it is often committed in front of other internees. In this context as well, beating and torture accompany rape and sexual assault. Often, the captors state that they are trying to impregnate the women, pregnant women are treated better than their non-pregnant counterparts, and pregnant women are detained until it is too late in the pregnancy to obtain an abortion. *139 Examples of this type of camp include the Serb-run Usara High School camp in Doboj, *140 Muslim-run Celebici camp in Konjic, *141 and Croatian-run Dretelj camp in Capljina. *142
The last pattern of rape and sexual assault is detention for the purpose of providing sex. Women are collected from their homes and from camps and taken to hotels or similar facilities where they serve to provide sexual gratification for the armed forces. *143 The women kept in these sites are reportedly killed more often than they are exchanged, unlike the female population in most camps. Additionally, unlike camp detention, the motive for detention of these women seems not to be to cause some reaction in the women detained, but instead to provide sexual services to men. The Yugoslav Mission submitted a list of such sites run by Croats and Muslims in BiH and the women's group Tresnjevka submitted a list of such sites run by Serbs in BiH.
In both custodial and non-custodial settings, many victims report that the alleged perpetrators state that they were ordered to rape and sexually assault the victims, or that they were doing it so that the victims and their families would never want to return to the area. Also, every reported case occurred in conjunction with an effort to displace the civilian population of a targeted ethnic group from a given region. Reports of rape and sexual assault between members of the same ethnic group are few and have some ethnic component, such as sheltering members of the target ethnic group or marriage to a member of the targeted ethnic group. Very few reports fail to display some ethnic motivation.
Some characteristics of the rapes and sexual assaults include:
There also are many cases where female victims are protected by someone from the same ethnic group as their attackers. Men take women out of the camps to protect them from rape and sexual assault, tell other guards or soldiers that the women are «taken», or help them escape. Women hide other women or bring them contraceptives. There is insufficient information on the sexual assault of men to determine a similar pattern.
Men are also subject to sexual assault. They are forced to rape and sexually assault women, they are forced to perform fellatio on guards and on each other, they are forced to perform other sex acts on each other, and they suffer castrations, circumcisions, and other sexual mutilations.
Some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases are clearly the result of individual or small group conduct without evidence of command direction or an overall policy. However, many more cases seem to be part of an overall pattern. These patterns strongly suggest that a systematic rape and sexual assault policy exists, but this remains to be proved. It is clear that some level of organization and group activity is required to carry out many of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults. One factor, in particular, that leads to this conclusion is the large number of allegations of rape and sexual assault which occur in places of detention. Out of about 1,100 reported cases, about 600 occurred in places of detention. These custodial cases do not appear to be random and indicate a policy of at least tolerating rape and sexual assault or the deliberate failure of camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the personnel under their authority.
Other factors to consider in discerning a possible pattern include: similarities among practices in non-contiguous geographic areas; simultaneous commission of other humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations; common elements of the commission of rape and sexual assault, maximizing shame and humiliation to not only the victim but also the victim's community; and the timing of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults.
The reported cases of rape and sexual assault contained in the database occurred between 1991 and 1993. The majority of the rapes and sexual assaults occurred during April to November 1992 and very few occurred before or after that. In the same time period, the number of media reports increased from a low of none in March of 1992 and of 13 in April 1992 to a high of 535 in January 1993 and 529 in February 1993. This correlation could reflect the lag in the ability of the media to cover the information, waning media interest in the subject, that media attention caused the decline, or that the purposes for which the alleged rape and sexual assault was carried out had been served by the publicity. The last two possible explanations would indicate that commanders could control the alleged perpetrators, leading to the conclusion that there was an overriding policy advocating the use of rape and sexual assault as a method of ethnic cleansing.
The numbers of alleged rapes and sexual assaults and the patterns present are different among the different countries. Most of the alleged assaults occurred in BiH in the latter two- thirds of 1992. All of the patterns described above were present. A smaller number of alleged rapes and sexual assaults occurred in Croatia, mostly in late 1991. There were only a few sites of detention, run by both Serbs and Croats, and most of the reported rape and sexual assault occurred when tensions were high in an area or in conjunction with the fighting. Nearly all the rapes and sexual assaults reported to have occurred in the FRY were committed while the victims were in custody. Most occurred in late 1991 in Begejci, Stajicevo, and Livade camps near Zrenjanin, Vojvodina.
Rape and other forms of sexual assault harm not only the body of the victim. The more significant harm is the feeling of total loss of control over the most intimate and personal decisions and bodily functions. This loss of control infringes on the victim's human dignity and is what makes rape and sexual assault such an effective means of «ethnic cleansing». *144
Some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases are clearly the result of individual or small group conduct, without evidence of command direction or an overall policy. However, many more cases seem to be part of an overall pattern. Factors to consider in discerning a pattern include: similarities among practices in non-contiguous geographic areas; simultaneous commission of other humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations; common elements of the commission of rape and sexual assault, maximizing shame and humiliation to not only the victim, but also the victim's community; and the timing of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults. The presence of these factors strongly suggest that a systematic rape and sexual assault policy exists, but this remains to be proved. It is clear that some level of organization and group activity is required to carry out many of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults. One factor in particular that leads to this conclusion is the large number of allegations of rape and sexual assault which occur in places of detention. Out of about 1,100 reported cases, about 600 occurred in places of detention. These custodial cases do not appear to be random and indicate a policy of at least tolerating rape and sexual assault or the deliberate failure of camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the personnel under their authority.
Some of the allegations of rape and sexual assault are
clearly instances of a policy of commission. In some cases,
military commanders and camp commanders are reported to have
ordered their subordinates to rape and sexually assault people
who were not members of the subordinates' ethnic or religious
group. Other cases point to a policy of omission, where military
and camp commanders failed to prevent such conduct and failed to
punish their subordinates for such criminal behaviour when it was
discovered. There is evidence that rape and sexual assault have
been used by all parties of the conflict to displace targeted
ethnic groups, though not necessarily as part of an overall
policy of «ethnic cleansing». However, the vast majority of
victims are Bosnian Muslim and the great majority of alleged
perpetrators are Bosnian Serb. Serbs reportedly run over 60
percent of the 162 detention sites where detainees are allegedly
raped and sexually assaulted. *145 Finally, for purposes of
prosecution, it is important to distinguish between
«opportunistic» crimes and the use of rape and sexual assault as
a method of «ethnic cleansing». *146
Annex IX.A is a 62 page report of the sexual assault
investigation conducted by the Commission in February and March
of 1994, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni. *147 The Annex
contains two parts. Part one is the report of the interview
coordinator which contains the following: 1.) a discussion of the
methodology used to conduct the interviews and choose the victims
and witnesses to be interviewed; 2.) comments regarding the
substance; 3.) recommendations for further investigation; and 4.)
the plan of action for the interview process. Part two is the
report of the mental health team which discusses the activities
and role of the experts as well as the psychological effects of
giving testimony and the psychological and physical status of
those interviewed.
Annex IX.B is eight page report of the results of a pilot
rape study conducted in Sarajevo, under the direction of
Commissioner Fenrick. The investigation team consisted of two
Canadian military police investigators and a Canadian military
lawyer. Sarajevo was the chosen site because the State
Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of
BiH and the League for the Help of Victims of Genocide are
located in Sarajevo. Both organizations previously indicated
that they had collected extensive information regarding rape.
The objective of the study was to assess the feasibility of
prosecuting alleged perpetrators and their superiors in certain
cases of rape.
Annex X, a 104 page report, was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni.
Because of the large scale of victimization in the Yugoslav conflict, many persons are buried in individual and mass graves. The mass graves report attempts to identify and provide relevant information concerning any and all alleged mass graves in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This study is not designed to classify sites based on their prosecutorial potential, but to provide a factual description, and whenever possible, some analysis of the mass graves reported to be in existence as of 30 April 1994. It should be noted that the reporting or existence of a mass grave does not necessarily imply that a war crime has been committed.
It is significant to note that further study of mass graves should be made for three reasons:
This report is divided into two sections. The first section is the summary analysis and the second section consists of factual descriptions of all reported gravesites and analysis by geographic location. The Summary Analysis, in Section II below, discusses the methodology of the report, defines relevant terms, and tracks the following information: total number of graves; number of graves in each geographic region; number of graves by ethnicity of victim and of perpetrator; number of graves containing a given range of bodies; number of graves where information suggests the bodies were victims of mass killings; number of graves near detention facilities, and so forth. In addition, this section will discuss patterns, trends, and commonalities which have manifested themselves in the various reports of mass grave sites.
The Analysis By Geographic Location, in Section II(B), describes gravesites by county and is organized alphabetically. The 1991 population and ethnic distribution information is provided for each county, as well as a brief summary of military activity in the region, if available. Many of the counties reported multiple mass graves. The section also contains the following:
For the purposes of this report, «grave» is defined as any site which: 1) is intended as a place of permanent interment and 2) has physical characteristics which prevent the bodies from being moved by the natural elements. Accordingly, rivers do not fall within the definition of mass graves for this report, nor do groups of bodies left to decompose on forest floors. «Mass» is defined as any group of two or more persons sharing the common place of interment. «County» is defined as a region known as an «opstina». An opstina is larger than a municipality or town, and includes smaller villages and hamlets which surround the larger cities. «Ethnicity of perpetrator» is defined as the ethnicity or religious affiliation of the party responsible for the deaths that led to the creation of a mass grave. In many instances, the party responsible for the killing is not the party directly involved in creating the mass grave. This would occur in a situation where civilians were killed and their neighbours had no choice but to bury them in mass graves, due to time, sanitary, or safety considerations.
Reports of mass graves are entered into the IHRLI database. The database generates a separate screen for each reported mass grave and tracks all relevant information available about each site.
When a report of a mass grave is received by the database, it is cross-checked against any factual information already on hand to avoid duplication. If the report contains data on a gravesite previously identified in the database, any new data is incorporated into the active file in the database. If the report concerns a new mass grave, a file is opened for that grave. The purpose of the files is to develop and organize information for analysis and track corroborative accounts of mass graves.
This report is based on over 10,000 pages of source information received and database incidents developed by IHRLI. This information is submitted by a variety of sources, including U.N. organizations, member states, governments of the warring factions, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. *155 The substance of the information received varies from general reports of patterns of activity in the former Yugoslavia to detailed witness accounts, which describe specific incidents at length.
Based on the available information, there are four general types of mass graves which exist in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The first type is a gravesite where the bodies were victims of a mass killing but the method and manner of burial were proper. *156 The second type is a gravesite where the bodies were those of civilian casualties or soldiers killed in combat, and therefore not unlawful killings, but the method and manner of burial were improper. The third type includes gravesites where the bodies were victims of a mass killing and the method and manner of burial were improper. Finally, the fourth type includes gravesites where neither the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the victims nor the manner and method of burial were improper.
The number of mass graves reported to exist is as follows:
The number of bodies said to be contained in the graves are as follows:
The ethnicity of the victims buried in reported mass graves are as follows:
The ethnicity of perpetrators responsible for killing persons buried in mass graves are as follows:
Of the reported sites, 54 of the reported sites are at or near detention facilities. This comports with the data that suggests many of the victims buried in mass graves were prisoners who died or were killed at detention facilities run by an adversarial ethnic group.
Over half (99) of the alleged gravesites appear to contain victims of mass killings. In these instances, the source information clearly detailed the circumstances of the killing *161 or provided witness testimony about the deaths of the victims.
There are several trends which appear throughout the report of mass graves in both BiH and Croatia, including Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia, such as Krajina and Eastern and Western Slavonia. The first is the coexistence of mass graves and detention facilities. Mass graves are frequently reported in areas where numerous identified detention facilities were located and where many individuals were reportedly killed. This coexistence suggests that mass graves were and are deliberately being used as a means of secretly disposing of the bodies of those persons unlawfully killed. *162 Some of these persons may have been killed in detention, while others were killed in the course of «ethnic cleansing». *163 This is particularly true in the counties of Brcko, Foca, Pakrac, and Prijedor.
A second trend concerns the manner in which the graves are created. After a mass killing, the occupying troops or detention camp guards will often select a handful of civilians or prisoners to assist with loading dead bodies onto trucks to transport them to a burial site. Other prisoners are forced to actually dig the grave in which the dead are to be buried, usually with their bare hands or shovels. After the transport or excavation is completed, the prisoners or civilians are also killed and thrown into the grave with the dead bodies, presumably to eliminate any potential witnesses to the killings and subsequent burials. Lack of available witnesses also accounts for the poor quality of information about many of the gravesites.
A third trend appearing from the data concerns a blatant disregard for the rites of a proper burial. Most of the dead in mass graves are neither placed in coffins nor wrapped in any sort of protective material. In many cases, the victims are not identified by name, or registered as dead before burial. *164 These actions deny the dead a dignified burial and effectively prevent the families of those killed in the conflict from ever tracing their whereabouts.
A fourth trend suggested by the data concerns the burial site itself. There is a pattern whereby perpetrators dispose of bodies in pre-existing but non-traditional sites, which provide a ready-made place for body disposal without the use of mechanical diggers or excavators. Dead bodies are frequently thrown in mine- shafts, canals, quarries, landfills, caves and the like. In addition, these are the types of sites where bodies are said to be buried in large numbers as opposed to small numbers, possibly because it is easier to effectuate the burial of many people if the need for actual excavation is eliminated.
A fifth pattern appearing from the data is the delay or denial of burial by the occupying forces. In many instances, dead bodies will be left on streets, lawns or forests for days or weeks, forcing the surviving civilian population to view the devastation. When villagers attempt to bury the bodies themselves, they are often prevented by the opposing faction or must risk their own lives to do so.
A sixth trend is the circumvention of interment altogether. Victims' bodies have been disposed of in a variety of ways which do not embrace actual interment in a grave, be it real or makeshift. The most common non-burial method of disposal is the dumping of bodies into rivers. The Danube, Sava, Sana, and Drina Rivers have all been reported to contain the bodies of killed persons. Some victims have allegedly had their stomachs slit and filled with sand so the bodies remain submerged once in the river. Also, many persons were reportedly burned in ovens or gathered into homes and set ablaze.
Many of the methods of burial or disposal of bodies are designed to instil fear and intimidate the civilian population still living in contested areas. This is particularly true in the case of bodies dumped in rivers, where the population downstream is forced to witness masses of bodies floating in the water. When bodies are buried, they are often placed in very shallow graves or merely covered with a layer of dirt, so that body parts often surface during inclement weather. Another example of a burial designed to provoke fear is in Blagaj, located in Prijedor county, where bodies were buried only from the waist down, so that passers-by were forced to view a line of decomposing persons. *165
Many of the attacks which led to the creation of mass graves in BiH occurred in late April, May and June of 1992. This is particularly true in the south-east quarter of BiH, which includes Foca, Gacko, Rogatica and Vlasenica; the north-east quarter of BiH, including Brcko and Zvornik; and the north-west quarter of BiH, which includes Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kotor Varos.
Mass graves in many regions appear to be the final phase in
an «ethnic cleansing» process. *166 Mass graves are usually found in
sectors where forces have followed a distinct pattern of
expulsion: the county is attacked by artillery; infantry troops
enter the villages and force villagers from their homes, during
which time many are killed. Once the houses are emptied, they
are looted and burned. Those villagers who are still alive are
rounded up and the men are separated from the women, children and
elderly. These villagers are either killed, deported or
detained; in any event, they rarely return to the village from
which they came. The bodies of those killed during the initial
expulsion, subsequent detention, or expulsion after release are
often deposited in mass graves in and around the area where they
were killed or died from torture or other wise. *167
Annex X.A is report of the mass grave investigation
conducted in Ovcara, near Vukovar in UNPA Sector East, Croatia.
The 14 page report was prepared by Commissioner Fenrick, members
of the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team and the Royal
Netherlands Army, and Physicians for Human Rights. The Annex
contains two parts - the report of the Canadian War Crimes
Investigation Team and the report of the forensic team. The
Canadian team's report contains an account of the team's efforts
to obtain the necessary permission from local Serbian authorities
to conduct the investigation and all events leading up to
securing the area. The forensic team, Physicians for Human
Rights, prepared a report containing an extensive explanation of
the technical equipment and procedures that were employed and
followed during a mass grave exhumation.
Annex X.B concerns the mass grave exhumation at Pakracka
Poljana, UNPA Sector West, Croatia. The report was prepared by
Commissioner Fenrick, members of the Canadian War Crimes
Investigation Team and the Royal Netherlands Army, and Physicians
for Human Rights. It is substantially similar to Annex X.A, but
is lengthier and more detailed because the full mass grave
exhumation actually took place in Pakracka Poljana. The 47 page
report contains two parts. Part one consists of an interim
report and an investigation report prepared by the WCIT. Part
two is the forensic report of the Physicians for Human Rights
team which contains a description of the methods employed to
exhume the bodies and catalogue physical evidence as well as the
findings on how the victims were killed.
Annex XI is a 12 page study of the destruction of cultural
property prepared by Commissioner M'Baye. The study does not
attempt to cite every violation of the laws of war concerning the
destruction of cultural property. Rather, Commissioner M'Baye
focussed on two incidents: the battle of Dubrovnik which occurred
in October to December 1991 and the destruction of the Mostar
Bridge which occurred on 9 November 1993. The analysis of the
incidents and the application of the laws of war are to serve as
examples for the Office of the Prosecutor to follow in its
investigation of the deliberate destruction of cultural property.
Annex XI.A is a 33 page study of the Battle of Dubrovnik and
the law of armed conflict. *168 The Annex was prepared by members of
the Canadian and Norwegian Armed Forces, under the direction of
Commissioner Fenrick. A team of experts on the law of armed
conflict and an art historian were sent to Dubrovnik to
investigate the alleged damage to cultural property and
civilians. The objective of the study was to prepare a study
which focussed on injury to civilians and cultural property in
order to 1.) determine whether and when indiscriminate or
deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian objects had occurred;
2.) quantify the loss of civilian life, injuries, and damage to
civilian property, especially cultural property; and 3.) impute
responsibility for violations of the law of armed conflict. In
the preparation of the study, the team relied on the following
evidence: oral and written statements of eye-witnesses; hearsay
statements; photographs and videotapes; unexploded ordnance;
reports from other investigations conducted by national bodies,
such as the civilian police, or other United Nations bodies, such
as UNESCO; and a local criminal court judgment. In addition, the
team sought out secondary sources of information to supplement
its evidence.
Annex XII, which was prepared by members of the Royal Netherlands Army under the direction of Commissioner Fenrick, concerns the radiological investigation conducted in October 1993 in UNPA Sector West, Croatia. The seven report contains the findings of the two nuclear, biological and chemical experts sent to investigate allegations of nuclear waste dumping in the sector. The team took several soil samples throughout the area with negative results.