. NMT03-T1011
Volume III · Page 1011
| [con...] cerned the incontestability of such law. Both principles were expounded by the learned Professor Jahrreiss, a witness for all of the defendants. Concerning the first principle, Dr. Jahrreiss said: |
"If now in the European meaning one asks about legal restrictions, and first of all one asks about restrictions of the German law, one will have to say that restrictions under German law did not exist for Hitler. He was legibus solutus in the same meaning in which Louis XIV claimed that for himself in France. Anybody who said something different expresses a wish that does not describe the actual legal facts." |
| Concerning the second principle, Jahrreiss supported the opinion of Gerhard Anschuetz, "crown jurist of the Weimar Republic", who holds that if German laws were enacted by regular procedure, judicial authorities were without power to challenge them on constitutional or ethical grounds. Under the Nazi system, and even prior thereto, German judges were also bound to apply German law even when in violation of the principles of international law. As stated by Professor Jahrreiss: |
"To express it differently, whether the law has been passed by the State in such a way that it was inconsistent with international law on purpose or not, that could not play any part at all; and that was the legal state of affairs, regrettable as it may be." |
| This, however, is not to deny the superior authority of international law. Again we quote a statement of extraordinary candor by Professor Jahrreiss: |
"On the other hand, certainly there were legal restrictions for Hitler under international law. * * * He was bound by international law. Therefore, he could commit acts violating international law. Therefore, he could issue orders violating international law to the Germans." |
| The conclusion to be drawn from the evidence
presented by the defendants themselves is clear: In German legal theory
Hitler's law was a shield to those who acted under it, but before a tribunal
authorized to enforce international law, Hitler's decrees were a protection
neither to the Fuehrer himself nor to his subordinates, if in violation of the
law of the community of nations. In German legal theory, Hitler was not only the supreme legislator, he was also the supreme judge. On 26 April 1942 Hitler addressed the Reichstag in part as follows: |
"I do expect one thing: That the nation gives me the right to intervene immediately and to take action myself wherever a person has failed to render unqualified obedience. * * * " |
