. NMT05-T0069
Volume V · Page 69
| 8. The prosecution wants
to wash its hands of the matter. It would transfer the responsibility for the
legalization of extradition to the Court, from the decision of which it
anticipates the possibility to do so. By its statement the prosecution demands
nothing more or less than a confirmation by the Court for the benefit of its
own secret motives. Such a legal policy is not in harmony with American
justice. My fight for Hildebrandt's life, this "pure, unselfish character of a
courageous and humane attitude" (Hildebrandt 95, Hildebrandt Ex. 21) is
directed against this policy. 9. However, the action of the prosecution is also ill-advised. The prosecution is about to add its voice to the threatening voices abroad against its own trial procedure, and to make out of the RuSHA trial the "Hildebrandt Case", which would increase the mistrust of this system to an intolerable extent. 10. In this moment, who does not remember an incident of almost two thousand years ago, although unlike in great dramatic force when the Roman provincial governor was induced by Caiphas to surrender the guiltless to death, with whose blood he did not wish to stain his own hands? I have trust that the Court in its justice, will bring to naught such intention. As the result of all my statements, no weight can be attached to the statement made by the prosecution on 2 February 1948 from the standpoint of criminal law. In spite of this statement, judgment must be made as to the culpability or non-culpability of Hildebrandt for his activities in Danzig-West Prussia, as was requested by the prosecution with the submission of the indictment. |
| * * * * * * * * * * |
| B. Statement by the Prosecution |
| PRESIDING JUDGE WYATT: In the opinion of the
Tribunal, Dr. Froeschmann representing Hildebrandt, poses a rather important
legal question and, that is, the right of the prosecution after the evidence
has all been concluded, to carve up the indictment and simply restrict the
Court to a consideration of a certain portion of it. That is a legal question
to which the Court has already given considerable thought. It is one that the
Tribunal is of the opinion you are entitled to have decided now, rather than in
the Judgment itself. The Tribunal will give more thought and consideration to
this question and rule on it before this argument is concluded, probably just
after the recess we are now to take. The Tribunal will recess for fifteen minutes. |
* Tr. pp. 5138-5140, 18 February 1948.
