. NMT05-T0070
Volume V · Page 70
| THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in
session. PRESIDING JUDGE WYATT: Mr. Shiller, the Tribunal has determined at this time to make a ruling on the legal question raised by Dr. Froeschmann. At your request, we have decided to allow you to state your position very briefly, and "briefly" means "briefly". MR. SHILLER : May it please the Tribunal, the position of the prosecution on the legal question involved, that is, the question of the charges against the defendant Hildebrandt as Higher SS and Police Leader for Danzig-West Prussia, is as follows: Our position is, first, that the indictment contains no charges against the defendant Hildebrandt as Higher SS and Police Leader for Danzig-West Prussia. As clearly set forth in the beginning of the indictment, in the description after the individuals named as defendants, whereas after the defendant Hofmann the indictment gives "later Higher SS and Police Leader for Southwestern Germany," after the name of the defendant Hildebrandt, there is no description given of his position as Higher SS and Police Leader. Furthermore, in paragraph 22 the defendant Hildebrandt is especially charged with responsibility for and participation in the extermination program, known as the Euthanasia Program, from September 1939 to February 1940. No mention is made of the fact that he was then Higher SS and Police Leader, and the sole charge in that paragraph is in connection with the Euthanasia Program. The prosecution claims that by construing these sections of the indictment, and the careful exclusion from the indictment of the position of the defendant Hildebrandt as Higher SS and Police Leader for Danzig-West Prussia that no charge was therefore made. The second position of the prosecution is that if the Tribunal should determine that, nevertheless, charges were included in the indictment which cover the defendant Hildebrandt as Higher SS and Police Leader, that the withdrawal, or rather, the clarification by the prosecution on 2 February 1948 (Tr. p. 4749) of the charges, should be construed as a withdrawal of these charges; and the prosecution maintains that this withdrawal of the charges, even though it came after a time when all the evidence had been submitted both by the prosecution and the defense should nevertheless be accepted by this Tribunal. I know, and will be in a position, if the Tribunal so wishes, to cite instances where charges have been withdrawn after the evidence has been submitted both by the prosecution and the defense in cases before other Military Tribunals. I refer specifically to Case |
