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In the IMT trial the prosecution accused
Rosenberg, for instance, of breeding a false ideology in the people by his kind
of philosophy, which had psychologically prepared them for aggressive war.
Therefore the defense wanted to develop all this pseudo-philosophy and
systematically to justify it as neo-romanticism, as a so-called modern sprout
on the tree of knowledge. Lord Justice Lawrence rejected these attempts by
declaring that Rosenberg was not brought before the court for his ideas, but
because of his deeds, not because of his doctrine, but for its practical
application.
Thus the judge averted the danger, which was to be found
in the reasons for the indictment of the first trial, and which has again
become almost more clearly discernible in this trial. This danger lies in the
fact that a judgment of history is formed by the prosecution in this particular
case versus Pohl and others, a judgment on events which have become historical,
pronounced by means of criminal proceeding against individuals. But both trials
are on quite a different level and should be kept apart, otherwise the criminal
case becomes a showcase, one not in the sense of consciously defeating the ends
of the law, but in the sense of a verdict which has jurisdiction over the body
and soul of certain persons, but which aims at the impersonal factors, such as
the "evil forces", quoted by Robert H. Jackson. The difference between this
historical trial and criminal proceedings is the fact that those people thus
acting are held responsible to history for the evil forces operating through
them; whereas in criminal proceedings, circumstances permitting, such "evil
forces" can lessen or even exclude the responsibility.
The prosecution
endeavors to prove the enormous guilt of the defendants, by presenting for
instance all the horror-evoking events, connected with the concentration camps.
The task of the defense as opposed to this is summarized in a brief sentence:
It must not attempt only to justify these horrible events as such, but merely
to discuss to what extent the consciously responsible guilty behavior of the
defendants contributed to these events.
The extent and the number of
the victims is of decisive importance for the historical method of approach. On
closer and more penetrating consideration the following apparently strange
result ensues for the individual whose particular share in the guilt is to be
determined here. The individual guilt does not increase in any mathematical
progression with the number of victims mentioned in this trial. One murder
suffices to have a person's life legally delivered to the executioner. But if
one speaks of the murder of millions of people, forces are set in motion, and
conceptions are aroused in us, which suddenly overshadow the indi-
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