 |
employed abroad by the Konzern; it names the Carl Schurz Association
whose president my client was, and which, as I shall prove, endeavored to bring
about an understanding between the American and German nation. The prosecution
believes that the gatherings which took place in the course of the "Kieler
Woche," and at which meetings were arranged between the representatives of the
German economy and industrial and commercial representatives from abroad, have
to be looked upon as infamous and camouflaged enterprises, whose sole purpose
was espionage. Even the trips abroad which my client undertook in the interest
of his firm were, according to the prosecution, nothing else but the trips of a
man whose object it was to utilize the experiences and informations which he
had gathered abroad for the planning and waging of a war of aggression.
So many statements, so many errors. I believe to be more precise when I
say that the prosecution has construed suppositions which lack any conclusive
and valid proof to sustain its accusations. I should like to point out right
here that not a single witness for the prosecution, cross-examined by the
defense, has confirmed up to now that Dr. Max Ilgner, either on his own, or
with the aid of the mentioned offices or meetings, has been active in a manner
which could be described as espionage or be accepted in law as preparation and
planning of a war of aggression. At this point, I am not taking into
consideration the fact that the prerequisites under which a defendant could be
considered guilty of planning, preparing, and waging a war of aggression,
according to the verdict of IMT, apparently have not been observed by the
prosecution. I shall elaborate on this point in my final plea.
I shall
try, therefore, to observe those principles in my argumentation which are the
tools of every lawyer, namely to examine: (1) what has been asserted, (2) is
the assertion conclusive, and what is the proof offered, and (3) what is the
counter-evidence. Then I shall draw the conclusions which I intend to present
to the Court after due consideration of the result of the evidence.
An
important point which will be my guiding principle is the question of personal
guilt. I shall not neglect to point out in this trial, as I have already done
in the trial of Flick et al., the principles stated by Military Tribunal
II in its judgment against former Field Marshal Milch, which I consider of
prime importance. In this judgment, the Court took into consideration the
ancient and fundamental concepts of Anglo-Saxon law which are deeply rooted in
the English common law, and which have |
319 |
. 
