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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT EC-128
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT
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EXTRACTS FROM A TOP SECRET MILITARY MEMORANDUM.
30 SEPTEMBER
1934, CONCERNING PROGRESS
IN ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION |
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| Part A |
| 10 Copies, 2d Copy |
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| Report on the status, on 30 September 1934, of the economic
mobilization project, including a short explanation of the attached compilation
of regulations |
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| Top Secret |
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| * * * * * * * * * * |
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| Berlin, 30 September 1934. |
| Section I |
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| Introduction. The Problem and Methods for its
Solution |
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(1) The Problem
Importance of the task
Following the establishment of the Reich Defense Council and its
permanent committee, the Reich Ministry of Economics has been charged with the
task of mobilization for economic warfare. [Note in the original] (For
limitations of its departmental responsibility, see page 6.)
The
tremendous importance of this task really ought not to require any further
explanation. The terrible consequences of the lack of any economic war
preparations for World War I are still vividly remembered. During World War I
itself we suffered grave and irretrievable losses through the initial policy of
unscrupulous waste. These losses were increased by the, in many cases, belated
start of a policy of conservation. All these measures were of necessity of an
improvised nature. At first a uniform conception of the over-all
economic-political situation was lacking; this only came about gradually. Only
then could the multifarious measures be coordinated and the reactions taken
into account, which any one measure would be liable to have in another sphere.
But even after this stage of war economy had been reached — approximately
in the autumn of 1916 — the lack of a thoroughly considered plan for
preparing the war economy made itself felt in a detrimental way. There are
natural limitations to war economy, even if it is prepared in the best possible
way in all its aspects as to organization, law, and economic policy. These
limitations depend on the amount of raw |
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