 |
| crisis already appeared over the horizon.” Several significant
events had already occurred by that time which were consistent with the
publicly proclaimed program of Hitler revealing what the IMT characterized as
“the unmistakable attitude of aggression.” The Treaty of Versailles
had been repudiated by the Nazi government; the building of a military air
force had been announced by Goering over 3 years before; for more than 3 years
an army had been in the making since the enactment of compulsory military
service in 1935; in defiance of the Versailles Treaty, the demilitarized zone
of the Rhineland was entered by German troops in 1936; as was stated by the
IMT, “At daybreak on 12 March 1938 German troops marched into
Austria.” Witness Kuepper said: |
| |
“* * * There was no question
of an aggressive war; there was a general feeling of the darkening of the
general political situation, and the general talk not only was in Farben, but
in the whole German public, about the possibility of war; the kind of war, that
was not discussed.” [Mim. Tr. p. 2908.] |
The talk of war by the German public at that time was natural in view
of the public events during the recent years as above reviewed. Of course, it
was not specifically discussed whether it was to be an aggressive war or a
defensive war. The “possibility of war” was present in view of
repeated aggressive acts committed by the Nazi government. Reasonable men were
only being logical when they realized the prospect of war as a consequence of
the policy being followed and began prudently to do what they could to protect
their foreign assets in the event of war. Such a course of conduct was in
keeping with the far-sighted intelligence always exhibited by Farben officials
in managing and directing the Farben enterprise. Of course such conduct was not
in itself the commission of the crime against peace, but it is significant as
indicating the seriousness of the situation in the state of mind of officials
of Farben when they undertook to map out the policy for the protection of the
concern’s foreign holdings. It shows a realistic appraisal of the foreign
policy of Germany and an understanding of the imminent possibility of war.
Within 2 days after German troops had occupied Bohemia and Moravia,
contrary to the agreements made at Munich in September 1938, the Legal
Committee of Farben, presided over by defendant von Knieriem, met in Berlin on
17 March 1939 to consider the problem of protecting Farben assets in foreign
countries “in the event of war.” [NI 2796, Pros. Ex. 1020.]
The minutes of that meeting show that this Legal Committee made specific
recommendations as to legal steps necessary to camouflage Farben assets abroad
to prevent seizure in the event of war. In the minutes [NI-2796, Pros. Ex.
1020] it is said: |
1287 |
. 
