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ee. If the shares or
similar interests are actually held by a neutral who resides in a neutral
country, enemy economic warfare measures are ineffective; even an option in
favor of IG will remain unaffected. A sole exception arises if the neutral is
placed on the 'blacklist,' since then the liquidation of the shares or similar
interest may also be ordered. The English during the war made very sparing use
of the authority to liquidate assets in the United Kingdom of a 'blacklisted'
neutral, inasmuch as such procedure invariably resulted in controversies with
the government of the neutral involved, controversies which frequently were out
of all proportion to the results obtained by such liquidation.
This survey shows that the risk of seizure of the sales
organizations in the event of war is minimized if the holders of shares or
similar interests are neutrals residing in neutral countries. Such a
distribution of holdings of shares or other interests has the further advantage
of forestalling any conflicts troubling the conscience of an enemy national who
will inevitably be caught between his patriotic feelings and his loyalty to IG.
A further advantage is that the neutral, in case of war, generally retains his
freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the
service of their country, in various capacities, and therefore can no longer
take care of business matters. |
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However, as far as possible
with due regard to the other interests which call for our consideration,
neutral influences should be strengthened in our agencies abroad by the
transfer of shares or similar interests to neutral holders. If this is not
possible, it seems advisable to transfer the shares or similar interests to
parties who are nationals of the particular country and to provide for options
on these shares or similar interests, not in favor of IG directly but running
to some neutral party with an ultimate option in IG's
favor. |
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The adoption of these
measures would offer protection against seizure in the event of war, although
this protection may not be a complete one. |
This indicates careful and thorough consideration by Farben of
the whole problem of protecting foreign holdings in the event of war so as to
reduce the hazard of loss to a minimum.
A summary of the minutes of
that meeting was, on 8 June 1939, sent to several executives of Farben,
including defendants von Schnitzler, ter Meer and Kugler. In the evidence is a
memorandum, dated 22 July 1939 [NI-4928, Pros. Ex. 1022] entitled
Safeguarding measures for the case of war, which
refers specifically to Farbens holdings in Belgium, France, Egypt,
England, United States of America, Canada, |
1288 |