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| that the IMT gave a restricted construction to the provisions of the
London Charter relating to the crime of conspiracy, but with due deference to
all concerned. I have felt bound to disagree. |
| |
[Signed] HU C. ANDERSON
Presiding Judge |
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| 7 July 1948 |
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I. Special Concurring Opinion of Judge Wilkins on the
Dismissal of the Charges of Aggressive War |
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The Tribunal, on 5 April 1948, sustained a joint motion filed on
behalf of all the defendants on 12 March 1948, after the prosecution had rested
its case-in-chief, for a judgment of not guilty on counts one and four of the
indictment. On 11 June 1948 the Tribunal filed an opinion with respect to this
matter. At that time I stated that I reserved the right to file a special
concurring opinion at the time the judgment is rendered. Presiding Judge
Anderson filed a concurring opinion on 7 July 1948.
The accusation to
have committed a crime against peace is the gravest that can be raised against
any individual. It transcends any other crime, as far as regards the sinister
character of the criminal intent, the amount, magnitude, and duration of harm
and evil which it necessarily involves and the disregard for the sufferings of
persons and entire nations, including the wrongdoer's own fellow citizens and
own country.
The defendants in this case, all high officials of the
Krupp organization, have been accused of this offense, as recognized in Control
Council Law No. 10. It is not necessary to belabor the Point that the Nazi wars
of aggression have brought disastrous consequences to millions of innocent
persons and a large number of nations. The criminal character of these acts has
been established by a competent International Tribunal.
Having to deal
with a matter of such gravity, I feel in conscience bound to put forth, as
briefly as possible, the reasons which have prompted me to concur in the ruling
of this Tribunal, dismissing counts one and four of the indictment.
The
principles of criminal liability applicable with respect to the clime against
peace are the same elementary and basic principles applicable generally with
respect to other crimes. The basic principle is that criminal guilt requires
two essential elements, namely, action constituting participation in the crime,
and criminal intent. To establish the requisite participation there must be
|
455 |
. 
