Study 1

 Part I  Part II  Part III  Part IV  Part V Part VI  Part VII

Contents

Preface
Introduction and Summary
Chapter 1:	Country Brief The physical setting Demographic and social features The land question The position of women The economy
Chapter 2:	Pre-Colonial Period Patron/client relationships Ethnicity in pre-colonial Rwanda
Chapter 3:	Colonial Period and Independence The colonial era Transition to independence The events of 1959 - 62: reversal and confrontation The Second Republic
Chapter 4:	Towards Crisis in Rwanda 1990-1994 General outline: main actors/main factors Evolution of the conflict
Chapter 5:	April 1994 and its Aftermath The genocide Churches The civil war The role of the international community The refugees Rwanda after the war The internal political situation
Annex 1:	Rwanda in the Region The Banyarwanda Rwanda and regional organizations Rwanda and Burundi in crisis: comparative and regional perspective The national dialogue in Burundi: a way towards conflict resolution?
Annex 2:	Arming Rwanda Rwanda government Rwandese Patriotic Front International peacekeeping
Appendix 1:	Tables: Economic Indicators
Appendix 2:	Chronology
Appendix 3:	Annotated Bibliography Pre-colonial period Colonial period/independence 1990 - 1994 April 1994 and after Bibliography
Appendix 4:	Interviews and Meetings
Appendix 5:	List of Abbreviations

Preface

Within a period of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighbouring countries and maybe half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda. This human suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the violence create continuing suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region.

For several years preceding the massive violence of 1994, the international community contributed to efforts to find a peaceful solution to escalating conflict and provided substantial assistance to alleviate the human suffering. During the nine months of the emergency in 1994, April to December, international assistance for emergency relief to Rwandese refugees and displaced persons is estimated to have cost in the order of US$1.4 billion, of which about one-third was spent in Rwanda and two-thirds in asylum countries. This accounted for over 20% of all official emergency assistance, which in turn has accounted for an increasing share, reaching over 10% in 1994, of overall international aid.

This growth reflects the worldwide proliferation in recent years of so-called complex emergencies. These tend to have multiple causes, but are essentially political in nature and entail violent conflict. They typically include a breakdown of legitimate institutions and governance, widespread suffering and massive population displacements, and they often involve and require a range of responses from the international community, including intense diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts, UN policing actions, and the provision of multilateral and bilateral humanitarian assistance by official and private agencies. A complex emergency tends to be very dynamic, characterized by rapid changes that are difficult to predict. Thus complex issues are raised regarding the timing, nature and scale of response. The Rwanda complex emergency shares all these characteristics and more.

Although some evaluations of international assistance for complex emergencies have been carried out, experience from the planning and execution of large-scale aid for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction has not been extensively documented and assessed. Recognizing both the magnitude of the Rwanda emergency and the implications of complex disasters for constricted aid budgets, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its development cooperation wing, Danida, proposed a Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.

This initiative resulted in the launching of an unprecedented multinational, multi-donor evaluation effort, with the formation of a Steering Committee at a consultative meeting of international agencies and NGOs held in Copenhagen in November 1994. This Committe1 is composed of representatives from 19 OECD-member bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD; nine multilateral agencies and UN units; the two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC and IFRC); and five international NGO organizations

Objective of the Evaluation
The main objective of the evaluation is to draw lessons from the Rwanda experience relevant for future complex emergencies as well as for current operations in Rwanda and the region, such as early warning and conflict management, preparation for and provision of emergency assistance, and the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development.

In view of the diversity of the issues to be evaluated, four separate evaluation studies were contracted to institutions and individuals with requisite qualifications in the fields of (i) emergency assistance planning and management; (ii) repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees; (iii) history and political economy of Rwanda and the surrounding region; (iv) institution and capacity building in development; (v) conflict and political analysis; and/or (vi) socio-cultural and gender aspects. Institutions and individuals were also selected for their proven ability to perform high-quality, analytical and objective evaluative research.

The institutions and principal individuals responsible for the four reports are listed below. Space precludes listing all team members for each study, which ranged from four persons for Study I to 21 for Study III; in all, 52 consultants and researchers participated. Complete identification of the study teams may be found in each study report. Several of the studies commissioned sub-studies that are also identified in the respective study report.

Study I:	Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors
	The Nordic Africa Institute (Uppsala, Sweden)
	Tor Sellström and Lennart Wohlgemuth.
Study II:	Early Warning and Conflict Management
	Chr. Michelsen Institute (Bergen, Norway)
	York University (Toronto, Canada)
	Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke.
Study III:	Humanitarian Aid and Effects
	Overseas Development Institute (London, United Kingdom)
	John Borton, Emery Brusset and Alistair Hallam.
Study IV:	Rebuilding Post-Genocide Rwanda
	Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
	US Agency for International Development; Development Alternatives, Inc.;
	Refugee Policy Group (Washington, DC, USA)
	Krishna Kumar and David Tardif-Douglin.

Evaluation oversight was performed by the Steering Committee (which held four meetings between December 1994 and December 1995), and by a Management Group, comprised of one lead bilateral agency for each study: Study I: Claes Bennedich, Sida, Sweden; Study II: Jarle Hårstad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway; Study III: Johnny Morris, ODA, United Kingdom; and Study IV: Krishna Kumar, USAID/CDIE, USA; and Niels Dabelstein, Danida, Denmark, as chair. The evaluation teams were responsible to the Management Group and the Steering Committee for guidance regarding such issues as terms of reference and operational matters, including time frames and budget constraints, and they were obliged to give full and fair consideration to substantive comments from both groups. The responsibility for the content of final reports is solely that of the teams.

The approach taken to this evaluation has reflected two concerns:

• to try, through involving experienced outsiders, to examine as objectively and critically as possible an experience about which it is impossible for any person with humane values not to be deeply affected;

• to engage leading Africans in a critical review of the analysis, findings and recommendations while they were still in draft.

For this last reason, a panel of distinguished experts from Africa has provided a critique of the report through participation in two panel discussions with the authors of the reports and selected resource persons. The panel comprised: Reverend José Chipenda, General Secretary, All-Africa Conference of Churches, Kenya; Dr. Adama Djeng, President, International Commission of Jurists, Switzerland; Professor Joseph Ki-zerbo, Member of Parliament, Republic of Burkina Faso; and Dr. Salim A. Salim, Secretary General, Organization of African Unity, Ethiopia. Also, Mr. Gideon Kayinamura, Ambassador of Rwanda to the UK; Ms. Julie Ngiriye, Ambassador of Burundi to Denmark; and Ms. Victoria Mwakasege, Counsellor, Embassy of Tanzania, Stockholm, made significant contributions through their participation in the December 1995 Steering Committee Meeting.

While the Steering Committee is particularly grateful to these African participants for contributing their wisdom and keen insights at one stage of the evaluation process, it is also acutely aware of the fact that African researchers and institutions were not, with the exception of selected sub-studies, involved in its execution. However, the Steering Committee is committed to disseminate the evaluation widely among African leaders and organizations and anxious that they participate fully in discussions about the evaluation´s recommendations.

The following resource persons have commented on drafts at various stages and/or participated in panels or workshops: Mary B. Anderson, Consultant, USA; Hanne Christensen, Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, France; John Eriksson, Consultant, USA; Professor André Guichaoua, Université des Sciences at Technologies de Lille, France; Sven Hamrell, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Sweden; Larry Minear, Humanitarianism and War Project, Brown University, USA; Professor Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Colegio de México, México; and Stein Villumstad, Norwegian Church Aid, Norway.

The Synthesis Report was prepared by John Eriksson, with contributions from the authors of the four study reports and assistance from Hanne Christensen and Stein Villumstad in the preparation of findings and recommendations.

This evaluation was initiated on the premise that in spite of the complexity and chaos that characterize Rwanda´s experience, it would be possible to identify applicable lessons to be learned by the international community in attempting to respond to future complex emergencies and in its continuing attempt to help Rwanda rebuild its society. The international teams who have produced this evaluation believe they have identified such lessons. It will be up to the governmental and non-governmental leaders of the international community for whom this evaluation has been prepared to apply the lessons.

Niels Dabelstein
Chairman of the Steering Committee for
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda

Introduction and Summary

The purpose of this study is to present a historical background to developments in Rwanda that culminated in the genocide that began in April 1994. The subject is dealt with in chronological order. The two chapters "Rwanda in the region" and "Arming Rwanda", although not less important, fall outside the chronology and are therefore presented as separate annexes.

There is an abundance of books, research reports and studies on different aspects of the history and recent developments in Rwanda (see the annotated bibliography in Appendix 3). This study relies on available written materials supplemented by interviews with established scholars (Rwandese as well as foreign). We wish to thank them all for letting us draw upon their knowledge, in particular Professors Filip Reyntjens, David Newbury and Gérard Prunier, who have commented on our drafts.

Our review of documentation on the historical evolution of Rwandese society has not led us to any easy answers or to pinpoint one or two ultimate reasons for the tragic events. On the contrary, it has rather led us to conclude that recent events result from a cumulation of events of the past, with one factor forming a building block for the next, and all actors and factors interrelating and interacting.

However, we wish to use this summary to highlight a few specific developments in Rwanda´s history that we think have been of decisive importance, and need to be understood in order better to comprehend what led to the tragedy in 1994 and what is going on in Rwanda today. We think that they are all important and hesitate to stress one more than the other. The scholarly debate on Rwanda has often been "reductionist", trying to establish whether one or the other factor has been more important - a debate that has helped to clarify the different standpoints, but has led to little conclusive result.

The aspects we wish to stress are:

1. The build-up of indigenous social and political structures towards the end of the pre-colonial period, in particular under the reign of the Tutsi king Rwabugiri during the second half of the 19th century. Rwabugiri´s administration (1860 - 1895) imposed a harsh regime on the formerly semi-autonomous Tutsi and Hutu lineages, confiscating their lands and breaking their political power. Rwabugiri amplified feudal labour systems, in particular the uburetwa, i.e. labour in return for access to land, a system that was restricted to Hutu peasant farmers while exempting Tutsi. He also manipulated social categories, and introduced an "ethnic" differentiation between Tutsi and Hutu based on historical social positions. Polarization and politicization of ethnicity thus began before the advent of European colonialism.

2. The German and Belgian colonial (trusteeship) policy of indirect rule, favouring the strengthening of Tutsi hegemony and resulting in a political and administrative monopoly in the hands of the aristocratic Tutsi overlords of the Nyiginya clan from the 1920s. Under the influence of the so-called hamitic thesis, this policy culminated in 1933 with the introduction of compulsory identity cards, reinforcing and accelerating the late pre-colonial process towards a separation of Tutsi and Hutu (and Twa). From then on, all Rwandese had to relate to "their" respective ethnic group, which in turn determined avenues and fortunes in society. Under European colonialism, a policy of "ethnogenesis" was actively pursued, i.e. a politically-motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially-constituted categories of the pre-colonial past. The minority Tutsi became the haves and the majority Hutu the have-nots.

3. The abrupt change by Belgium only some 25 years later, when - under the influence of the general decolonization process in Africa, the build-up towards political independence in the Congo (Zaire) and in a belated attempt to redress past injustices - the colonial administration (and the Catholic church) shifted support from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu. This eased the way for the so-called peasant, or Hutu, revolution of 1959 - 61, through which Rwanda underwent a profound transition from a Tutsi-dominated monarchy to a Hutu-led independent republic in less than three years. The replacement of one political elite by another introduced a new dimension of political and social instability and a potential for future ethnic violence. The events of 1959 - 61 also forced tens of thousands of Tutsi into exile in neighbouring countries, from where groups of refugees began to carry out armed incursions into Rwanda, sowing the seeds of the country´s ethnically-defined refugee problem.

4. Largely due to extreme population pressure, in addition to complex agricultural production systems and competition for land between crop-farmers and cattle-owners, the Rwandese society developed over the centuries into a remarkably organized state, with a high degree of authoritarian social control from the centre. This was not only the case with the core Tutsi-dominated pre-colonial feudal kingdom (i.e. excluding the northern and south-western areas of present Rwanda) - in which a vertical chain of command through layers of chiefs regulated the economy and the life of peasants through various social contracts - but also during the German and Belgian administrations, through which a policy of indirect rule continued, and strengthened, the control from above.

   What is important in the context of this study is, first, that the highly organized and centralized Rwandese state formation over the years constrained the scope for the emergence of non-governmental organizations and independent interest groups. Political parties did appear on the scene towards the end of the 1950s, but on the whole the development of an independent NGO-based civil society has been largely dwarfed by the state. Thus, along with the oppression and exploitation of Rwandese women farmers - carrying most of the agricultural work and being physically drained through constant pregnancies - there are, for example, in male-dominated Rwanda only a few rural wome´s associations to voice their interests.

   Secondly - and most importantly - the political culture of centralized social control has facilitated policies aiming at mobilization or manipulation of the Rwandese rural people, for peaceful as well as violent purposes. Subjugated receivers of instructions from above and without means to disobey, the peasant population has largely joined campaigns launched by the government, whether the essentially constructive umuganda labour regime from the mid-70s or the later fatally destructive interahamwe militias.

5. Increasing intra-Hutu tensions - mainly between groups from the northern Gisenyi and Ruhengeri regions and those from the rest of the country - developed during the First and Second Republics (1962 - 1990) and came to form an important factor underlying the cleavage between Hutu in the 1990s. In addition to competition over political spoils, at the core of this division is the historical fact that the northern Hutu were independent until the first decade of the 20th Century, when they were militarily defeated by combined German and Tutsi-led southern Rwandese troops. To this day, the northerners form a distinctive Hutu sub-culture in which awareness of a pre-Tutsi past is more pronounced than in other parts of Rwanda. President Habyarimana´s informal council - or akazu; constituted around his wife and brothers-in-law - represented this independent Hutu tradition, deeply suspicious of any reconciliatory gestures towards the exiled Tutsi community and, therefore, also essentially hostile to the Hutu political groups favouring a dialogue with the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The slow and often flawed democratization process in 1990 - 94 was to a great extent due to this intra-Hutu division. The akazu was also behind the genocide from April 1994, preparing the tragic events through instructions to presidentially-appointed bourgemestres (mayors), building up the interahamwe militias and mobilizing the Burundian Hutu refugees pouring into southern Rwanda after the assassination of the Burundian Hutu president Ndadaye in October 1993.

6. The economic slump starting in the late 1980s and the effects of the actions subsequently taken by the government in consultation with the international donor community, i.e. the structural adjustment programme of 1990 - 1992. The economic deterioration, largely due to a sharp decline of world market prices for coffee - Rwand´s prime export earner - as weel as to unfavourable weather and economic policies such as increased protectionism, price controls and other regulations, affected the whole society. In US dollar terms, GDP per capita fell by some 40 percent over the four years 1989 - 1993. The slump hit the Rwandese peasantry particularly hard. Combined with the effects of the civil war from October 1990, continued demographic pressure on available resources and decreasing agricultural yields, the economic crisis introduced yet another element of stress and instability into the Rwandese political and social fabric. The international community, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, overlooked these potentially explosive political consequences when designing and imposing their economic conditions for support to Rwanda´s economic recovery.

7. The refugee crisis, starting in 1959 and developing into a constant political and social problem throughout the history of independent Rwanda. Tens of thousands of Tutsi, in several waves from the Hutu revolution onwards, were forced into exile in neighbouring countries. Largely due to the intransigence of the Rwandese Hutu-led governments towards their demands to return, and to the unwelcoming policies of some of the host countries, the exiled Tutsi communities became over the years increasingly militant. In turn, this led to the creation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), the military attack on Rwandese in October 1990 and the ensuing civil war.

8. Of crucial importance in this context is the two-generations-old unsolved issue of impunity for genocidal crimes in Rwanda. The International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, confirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1951 and ratified by Rwanda in 1975, stipulates that persons committing genocide shall be punished, "whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals". In addition to the crime of genocide as such, punishable acts according to the convention are conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide. In Rwanda, those who over the years have been responsible for ethnic mass killings have not, however, been brought to justice. For the psychological health of the people, and the political health of the country, the crimes must be addressed. If a culture of impunity is allowed to continue, the spiral of violence seems almost bound to be repeated in the future.

9. Linked to the problem of impunity is the legacy of fear that exists in the Rwandese social fabric as a result of repeated mass killings since 1959, and which has its origins in the process of ethnogenesis and division between privileged Tutsi and under-privileged Hutu during the colonial period. With creation of the ethnicity issue followed a social construct of Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority, contempt and mistrust, which ultimately permeated the entire society and developed into a culture of fear. It largely contributed to the outburst of violence at the time of Rwanda´s independence, when the tables were turned and the fear among the majority Hutu gave way to a fear among the minority Tutsi. Since then, it has been repeatedly exploited for purposes of political manipulation.

10. Developments in Rwanda are, finally, closely related to developments in the Great Lakes region, comprising Rwanda, eastern Zaire, Uganda, north-western Tanzania and Burundi. This is the historical region of the banyarwanda, i.e. the people who speak the language of Rwanda, kinyarwanda, and who throughout modern history share a common heritage. It was violated by European powers, who at the turn of the century divided the region and the people into Belgian, British and German colonial dominions, with far-reaching consequences for later, including the most recent, events. Thus, regional political, economic, social and cultural dynamics - taking the form of, among other things, cross-border flows of refugees, weapons, ideas and fears - must be borne in mind when considering solutions to Rwanda´s problems, as well as the problems of - above all - Burundi and Zaire. If not, the ghastly events in Rwanda in 1994 could easily draw the entire region into similar, or still greater, human tragedies.

All these factors, sometimes fuelled and sometimes constrained by interventions from the international community, led to the manipulation of ethnicity in the 1990s, which in turn led to the genocide from 6 April 1994. We hope that this study of the history of Rwanda will help the reader to be aware that the causes of polarized ethnicity are not easily defined. On the one hand, we do not wish to draw the conclusion that such ethnicity only stems from differences based on ancestry, culture or social position. As shown below, the complexity of the pre-colonial society was such that differences could just as well be explained by lineage, clan, occupation, class etc. On the other hand, neither can we draw the conclusion that the contemporary antagonistic cleavages along ethnic lines can be attributed solely to specific events during the colonial period, nor in the period thereafter. There are no simple answers. The truth is that the present can be explained only as a product of a long and conflict-ridden process, where many factors contribute to the total picture.

Map of Great Lake Region Omitted. 

Chapter 1

Country Brief

The physical setting

With just over 26,000 square kilometres, Rwanda is one of the smallest countries in Africa, comparable in size to its southern neighbour, Burundi, and to its former colonial power, Belgium. Situated immediately south of the Equator, it borders on Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. Often called "the Land of a Thousand Hills "of "the Switzerland of Africa" - , Rwanda is dominated by mountain ranges and highland plateaus of the great watershed between the Nile and the Zaire river basins (Congo-Nile Divide). The populous central part - from Ruhengeri in the north to Butare in the south - lies between 1,500 and 2,000 metres above sea-level. West of the central plateau, the Congo-Nile Divide reaches altitudes above 2,500 metres, with the highest parts in the north-western volcanic Virunga chain. Here, the Karasimbi peak reaches 4,507 metres. Lake Kivu - which separates Rwanda from Zaire - lies 1,460 metres above sea-level and is the highest lake in Africa. East of the central plateau, i.e. from the capital, Kigali, to the border with Tanzania, the land gradually gets lower, but is still within the 1,00- - 1,500 metre range and with a number of higher areas.

Administrative division

Map of Administrative Divisions Omitted

Although Rwanda is just below the Equator, the high altitudes moderate the climate. The average annual temperature in Kigali is 19 degrees Celsius, with only small variations between rainy and dry seasons. Rwanda enjoys rich rainfall from October to June, followed by a short dry season in July to September. The average monthly rainfall on the central plateau is 85 millimetres, which supports a wide range of crops grown on every available patch of land. The moderated tropical climate supports two, and sometimes three, agricultural seasons a year, which gives parts of the country a potential for agricultural production unparalleled by most African countries.

Rwanda is a land-locked country, which for its economy depends on a costly and vulnerable transit trade to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania or Uganda and Kenya, or to the Atlantic through Zaire. The distance from Kigali to the Indian Ocean is approximately 1,500 kilometres and to the Atlantic coast some 2,000 kilometres.

Not less than 10 percent of Rwanda´s area has been protected as national parks or forest reserves, considerably more than in most other African countries. The best-known of the parks are Virunga on the border with Zaire in the north-west and Akagera on the eastern border with Tanzania. The Virunga park - made famous through the film, Gorillas in the Mist - is home to the last mountain gorillas, while the savannas of Akagera sustain a wildlife as varied as that of the better-known game parks in Kenya and Tanzania.

For administrative purposes, Rwanda is divided into 10 préfectures (regions), each headed by a préfet (prefect) appointed by the President of the Republic. The préfectures are divided into 143 communes, governed by a bourgemestre (mayor). The mayors are also appointed by the President.

Population density

Graphic of Population Density Omitted

Demographic and social features

According to the 1991 census, in August of that year Rwanda had a total population of 7.15 million, with an annual increase of 3.1%. This translates into a very high population density. In fact, with 271 people per square kilometre, it was the highest in mainland Africa; if lakes, national parks and forest reserves are excluded, it was far higher. Thus, the actual area of arable agricultural land (some 17,600 square kilometres out of the total of 26,300) had to support an average of 406 people per square kilometre over the whole country. The most densely-populated area was Ruhondo in the Ruhengeri préfecture, with some 820 people per square kilometre of usable land. At the other end of the scale was Rusomo (Kibungo), with 62 people to the same unit (République Rwandaise, 1993:II).

The reasons behind Rwanda´s historically high population density are many. Both land and climate are generous. In addition, the mountainous area has been protective. The natural fortress formed by the highlands served as a shield against hostile intruders, such as the nineteenth century Swahili slave traders from the Indian Ocean coast. Coupled with effective military structures, the Rwandese society was thus one of the very few in Africa that were saved from the ravages of the Arab and European slave trades. As a result, the population was not reduced by this trade but actually increased as other people sought refuge in the country (Waller, 1993; Prunier 1995). In addition, the strong influence of the Catholic church against population control measures, as well as the traditional position of women, are important explanatory factors for the high population growth.

Rwanda is a country of peasant farmers, or rather large-scale gardeners. The crucial question of land will be presented below. Already here, however, it should be stated that many observers link the tragedy that unfolded in 1994 to high population pressure and increasing competition for means of survival. Thus, in the words of Prunier (1995):

the decision to kill was of course made by politicians, for political reasons. But at least part of the reason why it was carried out so thoroughly by the ordinary rank-and-file peasants (...) was the feeling that there were too many people on too little land, and that with a few less there would be more for the survivors... (Prunier, 1995).

According to the 1991 census, 90.4% (or some 6.5 million) of the resident population in Rwanda was Hutu, 8.2% (0.6 million) Tutsi and 0.4% (approximately 30,000) Twa. In general, though with some exceptions, commentators are in agreement that these figures reflect the reality. They also correspond to the results obtained when extrapolating from earlier census and migration data. The historical relationship between Hutu and Tutsi is discussed below. Here it should be noted that the marginalized minority of pygmoid Twa actually consists of two groups: those making a living from pottery and those who live by hunting and gathering. The latter group - also known as Impunyu - numbers less than 5,000 people and is concentrated in the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi préfectures. They are often exploited and looked down upon by their fellow Rwandese.

In 1991, there were some 1.5 million households with an average of 4.7 members in Rwanda. The dominance of agriculture - and traditional life - is underlined by the fact that not less than 94.6% of the population lived in the countryside, while almost two-thirds of the urban population were concentrated to Kigali. Rwanda is thus a rural country, where most of the people live and farm on hills (collines in French or musozi in kinyarwanda), which form the basis of the society. This has determined a very precise and peculiar form of human settlement. The Rwandese peasant - Hutu or Tutsi - is part of a rugo, which broadly translates into enclosure, compound or household. (In a polygamous household, each wife occupies her own rugo). Every hill consists of several ingo (plural for rugo), where Hutu and Tutsi traditionally live side by side on the same slopes, "for better or for worse; for intermarriage or for massacre" (Prunier, 1995).

The 1991 census showed that 48% of the population was below the age of 15 and that the average life expectancy was 53.1 years. At the same time - i.e. before the massacres and the demographic upheavals of 1994/95 - more than 20% of the sexually active adults in the urban areas were infected with the HIV virus (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). Women get infected at younger ages and in greater numbers than men. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 Rwandese in their prime age will die from AIDS by the year 2,000.

A large section of the rural population suffers from endemic diseases such as bilharzia, diarrhoea, dysentery and respiratory infections. Water-related diseases are the main causes of death among children. According to World Bank estimates, the infant mortality rate fell from 142 per 1,000 in 1970 to 117 in 1992. In 1992, 1.5 million Rwandese were without access to health services; 2.6 million were without potable water, and 3.2 million without sanitation (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995).

The official language of administration is French, but people communicate in the common national vernacular kinyarwanda and, as a lingua franca for traders, Swahili (while returnees from Uganda and Tanzania also speak English). According to the 1991 census, 44% of the population could not read or write, with a higher illiteracy rate among women (50%) than among men (37%). The World Bank estimates that 71% of primary age Rwandese attended school in 1991, compared with 68% in 1970. However, only 8% benefitted from secondary and less than 1% from tertiary education.

The Catholic church has played a major role in Rwanda's history. In a sense, it would be more appropriate to characterize the colonization of Rwanda as a venture by the French Catholic "White Fathers" than by the German Empire. They arrived in 1899, and had within a few years set up a number of missions around the country. During the colonial period, the Catholic church worked hand-in-hand with the German and Belgian authorities, and after Independence there has been a remarkably high degree of political intertwining between the Church and the state.

The founding fathers of modern Hutu nationalism - among them the future President, Gr‚goire Kayibanda - all formed part of the small elite of so-called ‚volu‚s educated at Catholic schools and seminars. In the mid-1970s, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kigali, Vincent Nsengiyumwa, became a member of the Central Committee of the ruling MNRD party, official confessor to President Habyarimana's wife and close to the akazu inner circle of Hutu nationalists.

The wide spread of Christianity in Rwanda should be seen against this background. According to the 1991 census, not less than 90% of the population was Christian, out of which 63% Catholic, 19% Protestant and some 8% Adventist. The Muslim faith has a certain following in Kigali and in other urban centres, but is of marginal importance on a national scale, representing just over 1% of the population.

Employment data, finally, are sketchy, since only about 4% of Rwanda's population live wholly within the cash economy. World Bank statistics for 1985 suggest that 93% of the labour force worked in the agricultural sector (well above the average for sub-Saharan Africa), 3% in industry and 4% in the service sector. In the beginning of the 1990s, the biggest employer in the formal sector was the government, with about 7,000 employees in the central and some 43,000 in the local administration, not including personnel in the armed forces.

The overwhelming majority of peasant farmers are self-employed, and neither the government nor the small industrial sector can absorb the annual physical increase of the working population. Thus, the agricultural sector has had to support the rapid demographic growth, which, however, in many regions has outstripped the rise in agricultural yields. Few rural households therefore survived on farming alone. In 1990, the government estimated that 81% also earned money from informal activities such as brick-making, carpentry and sewing. In addition, almost everyone was active in the parallel or "black" economy, if only from time to time. This included cross-border trade and barter, or smuggling, with neighbouring countries (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). 

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