| Source: http://www.um.dk/danida/evalueringsrapporter/1997_rwanda/book1.asp#c5 Accessed 06 November 2001 Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors by Tor Sellström
with contributions by Patrick Dupont
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Part III Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V Part VI Part VII The events of 1959 - 62: reversal and confrontation Most observers agree that the revolutionary transition from the Tutsi-dominated monarchy to the Hutu-led republic, which took place between November 1959 and September 1961, culminating in the proclamation of Independence on 1 July, 1962, constitutes a crucial period for the understanding of the subsequent ethnic division of the country (Reyntjens, 1985; Lema, 1993; C. Newbury, 1988). During this brief period - initiated by the 1959 jacqu‚rie or so-called peasant revolt - the historical tables were turned. Under pressure from the democratic winds of change over Africa, the Belgian authorities shifted their support from the Tutsi aristocracy to the majority Hutu, withdrew their backing of the mwami, abandoned the policy of indirect rule and hastily brought Rwanda (and Burundi) to national independence. This process, as noted by Linden (1995), marked the beginning of a cycle of turbulent clashes for power, where "capture of the Rwandan state from political opponents has been a violent zero-sum game in which the winner takes all". The struggle for state power in an arena abandoned both by the colonial power and its former ally, the traditional monarchy, explains why the ethnic exacerbations came to the fore. While Tutsi, through their dominant position in colonial society, already saw themselves as a group, it was now felt necessary by the emerging Hutu political elite to appeal to a common "Hutu-ness" of the underprivileged to challenge the indigenous leadership successfully, compete for the vacant state and redress historical injustices. Towards the end of the 1950s, the Belgian authorities suddenly started to pay marked attention to the situation of the Hutu peasant majority. A similar, radical change of mind occurred within the Catholic church, as exemplified by the pastoral letter issued by Monsignor Andr‚ Perraudin in the late 1950s, in which he adopted a pro-Hutu attitude by stating that the social discrimination faced by the Hutu was no longer consistent with a sound organization of Rwandese society (Reyntjens, 1994). On 1 November, 1959, ethnic violence broke out as a result of a leader of the Parmehutu party being molested by Tutsi youth. The ensuing riots led to a widespread Hutu uprising, during which hundreds of Tutsi were killed. The Belgian government responded by sending troops to the country. Contrary to contemporary expectations, however, the Belgian military did not attempt to crush the Hutu revolt, but adopted a de facto pro-Hutu policy through the installation of a military-led administration and the appointment of more than 300 Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs to replace those Tutsi incumbents who had been deposed, killed or had fled during the initial s tages of the uprising. (C. Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995). Soon thereafter - in May 1960 - the Belgian authorities confirmed the new policy through the setting up of an indigenous military territorial guard of 650 men, based on ethnic proportionality, with 85% Hutu and 15% Tutsi. As stated above, the tables were turned. This was further confirmed in the local elections held in June-July 1960, which left the Tutsi-dominated political parties with merely 16% of the votes and, thus, resulted in an overwhelming Hutu victory. Following the elections, no less than 211 out of 229 bourgemestres were Hutu (C. Newbury, 1988). In this situation, and against a background of continued ethnic clashes, mwami Kigeri V opted to leave Rwanda on 29 June, 1960, officially to attend the independence celebrations in the Congo. He was, however, never to return. Belgium's policy in Rwanda encountered severe criticism in the General Assembly of the United Nations. From December 1960 to June 1962, it called on different occasions for reconciliation with both the mwami and imprisoned Tutsi representatives, also urged Belgium to keep Rwanda and Burundi together, but to no avail. Instead, the Belgian authorities proceeded to strengthen the process towards Rwandese independence through the granting of internal autonomy under a temporary government led by the founder of Parmehutu, Gr‚goire Kayibanda, a Hutu leader from the Gitarama region in central Rwanda. Throughout this period the ethnic confrontation between Hutu and Tutsi not only continued, but escalated, with mainly Tutsi killed, expelled or exiled. The transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination was sealed through the parliamentary elections of 25 September 1961, which resulted in a crushing victory for the Hutu-led parties. Parme- hutu obtained no less than 78% of the votes, gaining 35 seats out of 44, while UNAR (the Tutsi-dominated party) received 17% and seven seats. A simultaneous referendum led to an equally massive rejection of the monarchy in favour of a republican system of government. Following the elections, Gr‚goire Kayibanda was elected President by the new parliament on 26 October, 1961, appointing a government that initially was composed of members of Parmehutu, UNAR and APROSOMA. Eight months later, on 1 July 1962, Rwanda and Burundi finally gained formal independence as two sovereign states, a fact the General Assembly of the United Nations reluctantly had to endorse. During the ensuing three decades, the Hutu jacqu‚rie of 1959 and the events leading to independence in 1962 came to constitute crucial points of reference in the political life of Rwanda, positively or negatively, depending on the fears or hopes of those involved. Why, then, did these political developments take the form of a violent Tutsi-Hutu confrontation? In the words of C. Newbury, the salient fact was that virtually all those who controlled the state (before 1959) - the chiefs and the sub-chiefs - were Tutsi, and here is where the ethnic factor becomes important [...] An appeal to Hutu solidarity became, for Hutu leaders, the most effective rallying point for revolutionary activity. Although Hutu could and apparently did distinguish among Tutsi of different types and attitudes, the fact that the chiefs and other African agents of the state were seen as exploiters, and that virtually all of these were Tutsi, made an appeal to ethnic solidarity potent where an appeal to "all poor people" may have been less so. Because colonial policies had repeatedly pressed upon Hutu their inferior, excluded status, even poor Tutsi did not experience quite the same forms of discrimination as did those classified as Hutu (C. Newbury, 1988). Three major consequences of this crucial turning-point determined, and still continue to determine, political developments in Rwanda. Three major consequences of this crucial turning-point determined, and still continue to determine, political developments in Rwanda. 1. Exile of a huge number of Tutsi. The exact number of refugees has been the topic of many debates and has also been used for propaganda purposes. This was especially so during the crisis in October 1990, which followed the RPF (Rwandese Patriotic Fro nt) incursion from Uganda. In fact, Tutsi refugees left Rwanda during a number of successive crises, most notably in 1959-1961, 1963-1964 and 1973. The total number in the early 1990s amounted to some 600,000, including descendants of the original refugees (Guichaoua, 1992). This figure is contested by many. Prunier establishes, however, that this is the best estimate available (Prunier, 1995). The figure is impressive, corresponding to about 9% of the total estimated population inside the country, or half the Tutsi population. They constituted an element of structural insecurity, especially since the communities of Tutsi refugees never accepted exile as a fait accompli - on the contrary, they always claimed "Rwanda-hood" or "Rwanda-ness" and their right to return. Even before independence, groups of refugees began to make armed incursions in an attempt to regain their former positions. They were easy to carry out given the fact that the majority of refugees resided in the four neighbouring countries. These activities by groups of Tutsi refugees, the so-called inyenzi (cockroaches), only came to an end in 1967 (Reyntjens, 1994). The official attitude of the Rwandese governments with respect to this problem changed considerably over the years. Already in 1960, the provisional government had expressed its concern by setting up a State Secretariat for Refugees. During the First Republic (1962-1973), the refugees were invited, on many occasions, to return to the country. This goal was never achieved. For one thing, Tutsi refugees never believed in the sincerity of the government's change in attitude; for another, the inyenzi were making regular incursions. At the end of 1963 and at the beginning of 1964, new waves of refugees left Rwanda. During the Second Republic - from 1973 onwards - this state of affairs changed somewhat (but, of course, did not disappear) as a result of a policy of ethnic pacification. However, a new hindrance was put forward by the regime, arguing that the country was overpopulated and unable to reintegrate a large number of refugees. Mass repatriation was therefore ruled out. This position was endorsed by a declaration of the Central Committee of the ruling MRND (Mouvement R‚volutionnaire National pour le D‚veloppement) dated 26 July 1986. The return of individual refugees was further linked to certain conditions amenable to a variety of interpretations: For example, it was anticipated that a possible candidate for repatriation should "demonstrate that, upon return to the country, he will be able to provide for himself" (Ndagijimana, 1990). This position, which seemed to become the "definitive" stance, caused the refugees to hold, for the first time, an international conference in Washington in August 1988. The position of the government was rejected and the full right to return was reaffirmed. At this point, perhaps without being fully realized, an imminent confrontation was in the making. The crisis of October 1990 was, therefore, essentially a crisis of refugees, with roots in the events of 1959-62, reinforced by subsequent political developments within Rwanda and in the neighbouring states, particularly Uganda. 2. Virtual exclusion from public life of all Tutsi. This exclusion came about in two ways: 1) the Tutsi parties suffered the same fate as the other opposition parties (see below) and 2) Tutsi citizens became the victims of all sorts of abuses. In fact, the revolt of November 1959 was only the beginning of a series of violent actions against Tutsi. While the events of 1959 were responsible for hundreds of deaths, the toll gradually increased during successive crises. The first political victims were Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs. Of the 43 Tutsi chiefs and 549 sub-chiefs in office in early November 1959, 21 and 314 respectively were eliminated through murder, expulsion or exile. They were replaced by "temporary" Hutu authorities that, six months after the revolt, occupied about half the posts. During the municipal elections of June-July 1960, the Tutsi parties obtained 289 municipal councillors out of a total of 3,125, i.e. a mere 9%. It should be noted, however, that UNAR had called for a boycott of these elections, which might have affected the outcome in favour of Hutu parties. Elimination by physical means continued, especially during periods of political tension, such as before and during the municipal elections of 1960 and the parliamentary elections of September 1961. Still, the final blow was dealt at the end of 1963. An attack in Bugesera by inyenzi led to a great deal of violence. In the pr‚fecture of Gikongoro alone, it was estimated that between 5,000 to 8,000 Tutsi were killed; that is, about 10-20% of the total Tutsi population of the pr‚fecture. The majority of the Tutsi leadership that remained inside the country was eliminated: 15 of its most important leaders were immediately executed without any kind of trial. This was the end of the two Tutsi parties, UNAR and RADER, and at the same time it brought to an end any Tutsi participation in public life. Crises with lesser impact would still continue to affect the minority ethnic group. The last time this occurred until 1990 was in the beginning of 1973, constituting a prelude to the coup of 5 July, 1973 (Reyntjens, 1994). 3. Concentration of power and growing authoritarianism. As in many other African countries, after an initial period of multi-partyism, Rwanda became a de facto single-party state. The elimination of the opposition was achieved through a combination of various techniques such as intimidation, arrest, physical violence and, sometimes, by negotiation. The actual policy of Parmehutu aimed at extinction of other parties, both Hutu and Tutsi. Already during a speech delivered on the occasion of the first anniversary of independence, President Gr‚goire Kayibanda indicated his preference for "a majority party - an 'overwhelming' majority - with some minor opposition on the side". Thus, he asserted that "a proliferation of political parties would distract the population, render the progress of the country rather incoherent and lead to harmful stagnation of the nation" (Chronique de politique ‚trangŠre, 1963). The outcome was that in 1965 the MDR-Parmehutu was the only party to propose candidates for the parliamentary and presidential elections. Without being fully constitutionalized as such, it nevertheless called itself "National Party". Having eliminated the opposition, the concentration of power within the party increased. Especially from 1968 onwards, numerous conflicts or divisions within the government forced the regime to withdraw more and more within itself. In 1972, the usurpation of power by a small group of politicians from Gitamara, President Gr‚goire Kayibanda's home region in central Rwanda, was completed (Reyntjens, 1985). The Second Republic Faced with expressions of discontent, especially on the part of politicians and military from the north, Gr‚goire Kayibanda's government eventually tried to resort to "ethnic" tactics. In 1973, violence - initially of an ethnic nature - erupted in schools, in the administration and in business enterprises. Psychologically, these developments were certainly influenced (and facilitated) by the bloody events of 1972 in Burundi, where Hutu were the victims of genocideal killings (UN Human Rights Commission, 1972). It remains to be emphasized, though, that the impulse aimed at expelling Tutsi found its origin within the centre of power, which tried to detract attention from other issues (Reyntjens, 1985). However, the politicians from Gitarama lost sight of the dynamism such a policy could provoke in a situation where complete control became rather precarious. Thus, the population began to attack the rich (and not only Tutsi); Hutu of the north began to chase those of the central region; politicians of the north shifted their attention from the schools - where everything started - to the ministries and the enterprises where they felt underrated or ostracized. As certain politicians from the north, especially the National Defense Minister, Major General Juv‚nal Habyarimana, felt in danger of being physically eliminated, he finally decided on army intervention; an army in which, historically, the north had always been dominant. Gr‚goire Kayibanda's regime was overthrown by a coup on 5 July 1973, which took place without any violence and was received largely with satisfaction by the population (Reyntjens, 1994). This marked the beginning of the Second Republic under President Habyarimana. After a judicial proceeding held in utmost secrecy, a court martial of June 1974 passed death sentences on former President Gr‚goire Kayibanda and seven other eminent personalities from his regime. Others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Even though clemency was granted in some cases, this only had symbolic significance. In fact, during the 1970s scores of dignitaries of the First Republic perished in the infamous "special section" of the Ruhengeri prison, whereas Gr‚goire Kayibanda, who was under house arrest in Kavumu, died in 1976, having been denied the medical care he needed. After the "moral revolution"of 1973, the militants of the "social revolution" of 1959 had disappeared - some through political, others through physical means. Nevertheless, the regime of the Second Republic laid claim to the revolutionary legitimacy of the previous regime: "Anxious to preserve the achievements of the Social Revolution of 1959, the MRND intends to mobilize all the people of Rwanda under the banner of peace and national harmony by restoring a climate of confidence among the sons and daughters of the Nation" (MRND, 1985). Still, the break with the First Republic was considerable. In many respects, the Second Republic contrasted sharply with the First. To begin with, we witness a period of distinct modernization, manifesting itself in an opening towards the outside world, in urban growth, in investment, and also in business. Whereas the regime of the First Republic was turned inwards, that of the Second Republic adhered to a policy of opening up the country. One notes a sudden increase in the number of diplomatic posts of Rwanda abroad and of other countries in Kigali. President Habyarimana travels frequently and entertains a lot. Kigali hosts the sixth Franco-African Conference in 1979. Rwanda is co-founder of the Communaut‚ conomique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) in 1976 and of the Organisation pour l'am‚nagement et le d‚veloppement de la riviŠre Akagera (OBK) in 1977. Heavy investments in infrastructure, such as the road network and telecommunications, are made. Kigali, with its mere 15,000 inhabitants in 1965, grows into a town of some 250,000 in the beginning of the 1990s and many small centres are gradually urbanized, facilitated by expansion of the electricity grid. The increased mobility related to investment, communication and training, however, is not always conducive to the ambition of social control, the maintenance of order and "morality", and the fight against a rural exodus (Reyntjens, 1994). Also, as regards business dealings, the particular "first republican" austerity gives way to a somewhat different ethic. For example, all civil servants are without any restrictions allowed to get involved in private business. Also allowed are: ownership of rented houses, the purchase of rented vehicles, and interests in both mixed economy enterprises and commercial enterprises (Presidential Instruction No. 556101, 11 June 1975). This phenomenon was less prominent in Rwanda than elsewhere, but the fact that Rwanda after all was not that different led to a change of the particular image many had of the country up to the mid-1980s. The myth of an "egalitarian republic" had evaporated: a quaternary bourgeoisie (military, administrative, business and technocratic) embezzles for its own benefit an important part of the national income (Bezy, 1990). Gradually, the link between town and countryside (which had always constituted an important element of equilibrium and cohesion) begins to crumble. One of the persons interviewed by Hanssens puts it as follows: While the actual leaders are still "peasants" at heart the children of the cadres or office holders take to an urban model and when they are in power they will have lost all contact with reality. Hence the Za‹risation of Rwanda with an elite that is bound to neglect social infrastructures in order to boost its own well-being (Hanssens, 1989). A process towards a break between an urban minority and a rural majority was well under way during the 1980s. Newbury observes that the economic change of the 1980s resulted not only in a widening gap between rich and poor, but also in an affirmation of class interests on the part of those in power (C. Newbury, 1991). Finally, it should be observed that access to power and knowledge came to very few regional groups in the country, notably in the northern pr‚fectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. This concentration took place over a number of years and narrowed down to these two pr‚fectures in the late 1980s. This is seen to happen on all levels, but we shall limit ourselves to three illustrations. In the mid-1980s, the pr‚fecture of Gisenyi alone arrogated to itself nearly one-third of the 85 most important posts in the republic, as well as near-total leadership of the army and security services. According to a survey dating back to the early 1990s, 33 public institutions out of a total of 68 were under the directorship of people coming from Gisenyi (19 posts) and Ruhengeri (14 posts). During the period 1979-1986 the "disparity indices" regarding grants to study abroad read 1.83 in favour of Gisenyi and 1.44 for Ruhengeri (the worst off pr‚fecture being Kibungo in the East, with an index of 0.67). By 1990, ethnic conflict had been overtaken or even transcended by regional conflict and - within the dominant region - by small scale antagonisms (for example, the pr‚fectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri were at loggerheads in the north while in Gisenyi itself Bushiru, Habyarimana's home area, competed with Bugoyi) (Reyntjens, 1994). In spite of all the difficulties during the Second Republic, a number of positive developments took place. Measured simply in terms of increase in GNP per capita, Rwanda was quite successful, especially if we take into account its inherent handicaps (land-locked nature, demographic pressure, lack of raw materials) and, certainly, in comparison with its neighbours. Table 1 represents Rwanda's progress and that of its neighbours in the rankings of the World Development Reports published by the World Bank during the period coinciding with the Second Republic. Table 1. GNP per Capita in Rwanda and Neighbouring Countries (ranking from bottom)
Source: World Bank, World Development Reports in Reyntjens (1994). Thus, within 15 years, Rwanda improved its relative position, moving from bottom to top ranking, while Burundi remained in its original position and the other neighbouring countries became poorer, some even considerably so. Put differently, from poorest of the five in 1976, Rwanda was the least poor in 1990. In other areas such as, for example, infrastructure, progress was equally remarkable, with a road system that may be considered among the best in Africa, a reliable post and telecommunication system, an adequate water supply, expansion of the electricity grid, etc. Rwanda was during the 1980s seen by the World Bank and others as a successful African economy, with a moderate debt as compared with most other countries on the continent, at least up to the second half of the decade. (In 1987 Rwanda's debt amounted to 28% of GNP-one of the lowest percentages in Africa.) The economy was in balance and the currency was fairly stable, to the extent that it served as hard currency in the region. Though far from being acceptable, the situation of human rights also improved. For example, the number of political prisoners was reduced, and efforts made to limit and control the undue and excessive use of regulations on preventive custody and on restricted freedom of movement. Furthermore, it should be observed that, between General Habyarimana's assumption of power and the war of October 1990, no major ethnic violence occurred. Today, it is often forgotten that President Habyarimana was rather popular among Tutsi of the interior and that he has even been accused, by some Hutu, of favouring Tutsi (Chr‚tien, 1993). Chapter 4 Towards Crisis in Rwanda 1990-1994 General outline: main actors/main factors On 1 October 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), or more specifically its military wing, RPA (Rwandese Patriotic Army), began to invade the north of Rwanda from Uganda. Eventually some 7,000 (Tutsi) troops crossed the border. Almost four years later, on 6 July 1994, a RPF-dominated government took over in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. The RPF invasion started a continuous crisis that would escalate dramatically after the shooting down in April 1994 of the plane that took President Habyarimana (and his counterpart from Burundi) back from a peace meeting in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania). Before dealing in more detail with the period after the RPF invasion and the Arusha process, the main actors and factors in the Rwanda crisis of the 90s will be described. The main actors are the challenged Habyarimana regime, the RPF, the internal political opposition and the international community. The main factors are the refugees and the economic and the political crises. The regional dimension of the whole crisis will be described in a separate chapter. The RPF; the refugee crisis The creation of the RPF in the beginning of 1988 in Kampala, the capital of Uganda (following discussions in late 1987), is related to the large involvement of Tutsi men in the Uganda army (NRA) of President Yoweri Museveni. Major-General Fred Rwigyema, who led the RPF into Rwanda on 1 October 1990, was Vice-Minister of Defence under Museveni. Major Paul Kagame, at present Vice-President of Rwanda, was deputy director of military intelligence in Uganda (Prunier, 1995). Rwandese refugees and citizens in Uganda contributed, in large measure, to Museveni's victory in 1986. Ethnically, they were the third largest group in the NRA (Prunier, 1992). There is recorded evidence that Museveni gave support to the RPF (Prunier, 1992 and 1995; Human Rights Watch /Arms Project, 1994). The RPF constituted a highly-motivated and well-trained force. About 2,500 RPF soldiers had belonged to the Ugandan army (Prunier, 1995). On 3 October, 1990, the RPF offensive was temporarily stopped by the Rwandese Armed Forces (Forces Arm‚es Rwandaises, FAR) (Reyntjens, 1994; Prunier, 1995). RPF is a creation of the Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda, mainly between 1959 and 1966. Over the years, the desire of the 600,000 refugees in Uganda, Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania (including their descendants) to return to their country of origin remained strong (Guichaoua, 1992; Watson, 1991). The political change in Uganda after 1986 and the involvement of Tutsi in the consolidation process provided a good framework for the planning of a military invasion. Another contributing factor was the support that RPF got for their cause at the refugee congress in Washington, DC in August 1988. Although the immediate motive for the RPF was settlement of the refugee crisis, the Front also worked out an eight-point political programme with the aim to structurally modify Rwandese political culture. The programme accused the Rwanda government of undemocratic and corrupt practices and of ethnic discrimination. The RPF explicitly projected itself as multi-ethnic. Nevertheless, the vast majority of its leaders and members were Tutsi. Some observers question the wisdom of the RPF in taking military action at that particular time (Prunier, 1993). The invasion occurred only two months after the 30-month talks supervised by UNHCR and OAU on the refugee problem had led to a (third) ministerial agreement between Rwanda and Uganda that might have led to concrete results, and during a gradually developing political liberalization process within Rwanda. Although it seems as if the negotiations might have led to a breakthrough, the RPF, however, was not prepared to wait any more; it was apparently tired of the continued stalling by the Rwandese government. It is, however, argued that RPF attacked at that time because a possible breakthrough in the areas of democratization, human rights and refugee repatriation would have diminished the legitimacy of an attack (Reyntjens, 1994). The challenged regime The Habyarimana regime, with the MRND party and the army as its main pillars, had never really been challenged during its 17 years of existence, until the RPF invasion. This did not mean that the regime was not exposed to criticism. Some men who were or had become hostile to the Habyari- mana regime during the 70s and 80s - among them radical Hutu such as Alexis Kanyarengwe and Jean Barahinyura - appeared in the early 90s as prominent RPF members (Reyntjens, 1994). Others would join the domestic opposition, out of which political parties would emerge in 1990. In general, though, Habyarimana enjoyed considerable popularity, in the Hutu as well as in the Tutsi community. From 1985 onwards, that popularity would begin to erode as a result of a general political and economic crisis. As the conflict evolved, the President was increasingly criticized, even within his own party. He was caught between demands for political liberalization from the opposition and the international community, on the one hand, and refusal of his own supporters to give up political-economic positions, on the other. The build-up of party militias (Interahamwe) and of an extremist pro-Hutu party (Coalition pour la D‚fence de la R‚publique, CDR), in particular, and expressions of ethnicity in general, are indicators of this opposition to the reform process. "Extremists within the MRND set up the CDR" officially in March 1992 "with an explicit agenda of Hutu extremism" (African Rights, 1994). Although the CDR probably never enjoyed a big support in numbers, it did exert an important influence on the ethnic and political attitude of the MRND (Reyntjens, 1994). Its ideas were spread via media (the newspaper Kangura since 1989, and the radio station RTLMC since July 1993). "Kangura used its close links with the highest circles of the military security services and CDR to leak important information to the public, with the explicit aim of generating fear and expectation". "Closer to the most extreme ideologues of CDR than it was even to Habyarimana, it did not hesitate to criticize the President over the concessions he was forced to make in the course of the Arusha process." (African Rights, 1994). Most observers agree with the notion and possibility that Habyarimana had to pay with his life on 6 April 1994 for not giving in to a total boycott of the political liberalization process resulting from the peace negotiations with the RPF and the domestic opposition in Arusha between July 1992 and August 1993 (Reyntjens, 1994; Prunier, 1995; Lemarchand, 1995). The economic crisis The conflict described above can be viewed as a struggle between an increasingly worn-out regime and its challengers. The latter could no longer reconcile with a one-party government they viewed as authoritarian, undemocratic and thus not adapted to the new political situation. That opposition was fueled by news in the press about corruption within the regime. The Habyarimana regime was further seen as an obstacle to economic recovery. Indeed, one can see a link between the economic crisis that had hit Rwanda hard since 1985 and the increasing opposition from different parts of Rwandese civil society (Chr‚tien, 1991). Until the end of the 1980s, Rwanda was described as a small and poor, but economically healthy and self-sufficient country (see under Country Brief above and tables 1-8 in Appendix 1). The average inflation rate during the 1980s was not higher than 4% per annum, compared to sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) average rate of 20%. From 1965 until 1980, Rwanda's GNP per capita grew at a rate one percentage point higher than that of SSA. Substantial support from multilateral agencies, bilateral donors (Belgium, France, Germany, United States) and NGOs contributed to its development. In 1991, for instance, bilateral and multilateral donor support represented 21.5% (IBRD, 1993) of Rwanda's GNP and 60% of the government's development expenditures, which is higher than SSA's average but far from the highest in the region. Rwanda drew international attention due to its low rural-to-urban migration rate, its sound monetary policy and the active involvement of government and civil society in anti-erosion and reforestration activities, education and health services. International support to Rwanda grew rapidly, from an annual level of US$35 million in 1971-74 to US$343 million in 1990-93, the latter figure representing almost US$50 per capita (OECD statistics). Problems did develop, however. One major problem was the scarcity of land. Population increase in the already densely-populated country had led to a situation in which the average peasant family did not possess more than 0.7 hectare of land. Under prevailing crop patterns, families faced increasing difficulties to produce sufficiently for their own needs. Whereas in 1982, 9% of the population consumed less than 1,000 calories a day (extreme poverty level), the proportion had increased to 15% in 1989 (with partial famine in the south) and to 31% in 1993 (Maton, 1994). The country, therefore, had in 1993 become more and more dependent on food aid. This deterioration was of course also a result of the civil war. A major attack by the RPA in the most fertile part of the country in January and February 1993 resulted in a massive displacement of 13% of the country's total population and a drop by 15% of agricultural marketed production in one year (Marysse & de Herdt, 1993). All this created ground for extremism and ethnic conflict. Apart from the internal economic limitations, some major external economic shocks affected Rwanda from the late 1980s. To start with, Rwanda had to close its last tin mine in 1985 due to increasing costs, collapse in world prices and mismanagement (Reyntjens, 1994). Tin provided 15% of Rwanda's export earnings. More dramatic was the decrease in coffee prices on international markets. Coffee usually accounted for more than two-thirds of Rwanda's foreign revenues. Between 1986 and 1992, coffee prices decreased by 75%, resulting in a four-fold increase of the debt service ratio. Other factors included a severe drought in 1989-90 (which recurred in 1991 and 1993) and diseases affecting two staple crops, cassava and sweet potatoes, which resulted in half a million people experiencing food shortages and malnutrition; increasingly blatant and widespread government corruption; and a diversion of budgetary resources for military expenditures that escalated sharply after the invation of forces of the RPA from Uganda in October 1990. Over the following three years, several RPA incursions, efforts by government of Rwanda forces to repulse the RPA, reprisals against Tutsi and, most importantly, massive internal population displacements of a million people in the northern half of the country in 1993, all combined to deal a crushing blow to the economy. The international community responded generously to Rwanda's worsening economic crisis. Net official aid disbursements increased by almost 60% in two years, from US$242 million in 1989 to an all-time high of US$375 million in 1991, and were sustained at roughly that level through 1993. A major milestone in the provision of aid to Rwanda was the agreement in September 1990 of a structural adjustment programme with the World Bank and the IMF, which, along with joint and co-financing from seven bilateral donors plus the African Development Bank and the European Union, amounted to US$216 million. After having resisted structural adjustment for several years, the government of Rwanda decided to initiate discussions after pressures had mounted on both the trade account and the fiscal budget, caused in part by the collapse of coffee prices. The link between coffee prices and the government of Rwanda budget stemmed from a long-standing policy of guaranteeing a fixed price to farmers through a Coffee Equalization Fund, in effect a subsidy when the world coffee price, net of marketing and shipping margins, fell below the guaranteed price. With the continued slide in world prices, the degree of budgetary subvention required to meet the guaranteed price shot up dramatically from 1987 (Marysse 1994; IBRD 1993; World Bank, 1991). The following list of some of the elements of the programme that was approved in June 1991 suggest the wide range of policy measures incorporated in the structural adjustment package:
Implementation of these measures varied. Two key measures that were not implemented were the elimination of subsidies to coffee producers and meeting the budget deficit target. Rather than falling, the deficit increased to 18% of GDP in 1992 and 19% in 1993. Since the conditions were not met, the second tranche of the World Bank structural adjustment credit was not provided (Marysse, 1994; World Bank, 1995). Of possible relevance to the issue of influence on proximate causes of the genocide are the following questions:
With respect to the first question, one issue concerns the impact of the devaluation and the changes in the guaranteed price to coffee farmers. The government of Rwanda reduced the guaranteed price from RWF 125 per kilo to RWF 100 in 1990, but rather than reduce the price further, in line with the SA programme, the government unilaterally raised it to RWF 115 in 1991, out of concern for the im- pact that a lower price would have on export earnings, as well as on the purchasing power and political support of the rural population. In any event, the "benefits" of the devaluation were not passed on to coffee farmers, so their real incomes undoubtedly fell, owing to the relatively modest decline in the farmgate price of coffee, but probably more importantly, to increased inflation associated with devaluation and deficit financing in the early 1990s (Marysse, 1994; World Bank, 1992; World Bank, 1995). However, the major cause of worsening conditions for the rural population during this period was the reduction in food production caused by prolonged drought, crop disease and massive population displacement (Maton, 1994). Relevant to the welfare of both rural and urban populations is what the government of Rwanda did with the "windfall" resulting from the devaluation, which was not passed on to farmers. One of the basic rationales for the devaluation was to enable the government of Rwanda to reduce the budgetary deficit and at the same time maintain essential expenditures in the social sectors, health and education. While the structural adjustment programme called for increased fees and "user charges" in health and education, there were also provisions to maintain public sector social expenditures and initiate programmes intended to protect the poor. But this outcome was also based on an assumption that military expenditures would be brought under control. In fact, military spending quadrupled from 1989 to 1992, from 1.9% to 7.8% of GDP, and subsidies to the coffee sector amounted to 46% of export receipts in 1992. Among the consequences of these pressures was severe damage to the "social safety net"; for example, spending for essential drugs targeted to the poorest was only 25% of the budgeted allocation (Marysse, 1994; World Bank, 1992; World Bank, 1995). While the structural adjustment programme did not require a retrenchment in civil service employment levels, a freeze on public wage scales was implemented. Some employees were able to compensate by participating in the increased private sector activity associated with liberalization and the expansion of external aid. For others, the freeze compounded their fears about the future, kindled by the marked deterioration in their purchasing power after the two devaluations, the generally deteriorating economic situation and the escalating civil war and violence. Donors had significant potential leverage on Rwanda in view of the very substantial and increasing levels of economic assistance being provided. As is further developed in Study II, while most of the major donors made economic aid conditional on the human rights situation in principle, and several donors and diplomatic representatives made representation to the government of Rwanda, no donor reduced aid with specific and exclusive reference to the increasingly severe human rights violations taking place in the early 1990s. Instead, the donor response to the escalating civil violence was to employ "positive conditionality" to promote democratization through support to the justice system, the free press and local human rights organizations. Only when the economic and internal security situation deteriorated even further, in later 1993 and early 1994, did several donors sharply reduce or suspend development aid. But the rationale for this stemmed less from concern over civil violence and human rights violations than it did from (1) the need to increase humanitarian aid, some of which came from restructured project aid, in order to meet the needs of the swelling numbers of internally displaced; and (2) the erosion of project accountability and implementation efficiency as the situation in the country rapidly deteriorated. The domestic opposition; the political crisis
As in other parts of Africa in the early 1990s, several protest demonstrations were held in Rwanda in 1990. A strike was suppressed by the police on 4 July, 1990, and a letter denouncing the one-party system was published and circulated on 1 September. Important also was the resignation from the Central Committee of MRND (on the insistance of the Pope) of the Catholic archbishop, Vincent Nsengiyumva. Up to that date, the Catholic church, and the archbishop, had been traditional allies of the MRND. In April 1990 and in September the same year, on the occasion of a visit by the Pope, the church expressed its dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation in the country. The discontent, however, mainly stemmed from the lower echelons of the church. The leadership both of the Catholic and the Anglican churches continued to liaise closely with the President and his government throughout the whole period (Reyntjens, 1994; African Rights, 1994). Whereas in January 1989 President Habyarimana considered any political change feasible only within the one-party system, one and a half years later, on 5 July 1990, he agreed to the necessity of a separation between party and state. On 24 September, 1990 (i.e. before the armed conflict with the RPF), a national expert commission was set up with the task of working out a national charter that would allow the establishment of different political parties (Reyntjens, 1994). It is difficult to ascertain the President's sincerity with respect to the reforms. However, the subsequent RPF invasion did speed up the formal democratization process. Initially, the expert commission's mandate ran over two years. The new political-military situation following the invasion of 1 October led to the acceptance of the multi-party system by Habyarimana in a speech on 13 November, which led to the creation of new political parties. In March 1991, the Mouvement D‚mocratique R‚publicain (MDR) was publicly launched, explicitly stating that it was the successor of MDR-Parmehutu of the first President, Gr‚goire Kayibanda. About half of the launchers of the "new" party originated from Gitarama-Ruhengeri, Gr‚goire Kayibanda's traditional stronghold (Reyntjens, 1994). Other, smaller parties that came into existence, and that would play a role in the immediate future, were the so-called intellectuals' Parti Social D‚mocrate (PSD), with some popularity in the south, and the Parti Lib‚ral (PL), which enjoyed some support from business people and, consequently, from the Tutsi group and the Parti D‚mocrate Chr‚tien (PDC). Except for the desire to oppose the Habyarimana regime, there were few ideological differences in the programmes of the different parties (Reyntjens, 1994). Formally, the one-party system was abrogated with the adoption of a new constitution on 10 June 1991 and the law on political parties, one week later. The position of Prime Minister was institutionalized and parliamentary elections were scheduled for the immediate future by the President. Only six weeks later, on 31 July 1991, the most significant "new" parties (MDR, PDC, PL and PSD) denounced in a common declaration the plans to hold elections so soon. Immediate elections could benefit only the MRND, which had held power for two decades. Instead, they demanded a national convention to discuss in detail reform of the institutions and the call for democratic elections. Habyarimana rejected the idea of a national convention. Only the small PDC was ready to join a transition government. Also, no elections were held. The other opposition parties showed their political dissatisfaction in demonstrations on 17 November 1991 and 8 January 1992 (Chr‚tien, 1992). This was a major setback for the Presidential hope to build a unified front of Hutu parties against the RPF. It also meant the introduction of an increasingly violent policy on the part of the Habyarimana regime against any Hutu and Tutsi opposition. On 6 April 1992, after heavy national and international pressure, a new transitional government was established. It included all the major opposition parties and was led by President Habyarimana and a Prime Minister from the opposition (Dismas Nsengiyaremye, MDR). However, relations between Habyarimana and the MRND on the one hand and the opposition parties on the other remained tense throughout the conflict with the RPF. The domestic opposition was vehemently accused of collaborating with the RPF and the Tutsi, who were more and more being incited as ethnic enemies. The international community
The French sent 370 men to Rwanda in October 1990 and, after a scaling down in March 1991, increased this number to about 670 in February 1993, i.e. after a relatively large-scale attack by the RPF. Some sources claim that France gave active support both in 1990 and in 1993 (African Rights, 1994; Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994; Prunier, 1995). During the latter clashes, the French were observed "assisting the Rwandese army mortaring RPF-positions" (African Rights, 1994). "French soldiers were deployed at least 40 kilometers north of the capital on the road to Byumba, just south of the RPF's recognized zone of control. No French citizens or other Western expatriates are known to be living there." (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994). It is thus maintained that the French played an important supporting role: by manning checkpoints and advising FAR officers; by providing military training after the start of the conflict; by sending at least $6 million worth of war material in 1991-92; and by financially guaranteeing material for the same amount shipped via third parties (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994). Not surprisingly, from the start of the conflict the RPF would require the departure of the French. The French government, however, has officially denied that it actively participated in the conflict. As far as African countries are concerned, the role of Uganda has been discussed above. The Tanzanian President played an important role bringing the fighting parties to the negotiation table in Arusha and during the whole negotiation process. President Sese Seko Mobutu of Zaire was also involved in the cease-fire negotiations immediately after the start of the conflict. Later, Zaire would play only a secondary role in the conflict. When the conflict had started in October 1990, 500 Zairean troops were sent to Rwanda to help the FAR repel the RPF invasion. Several weeks after their arrival, they were withdrawn amid charges that they had lacked discipline and had abused Rwandese civilians (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994). A major international involvement in the conflict came through the the United Nations as a direct result of the Arusha agreements of 4 August 1993. As well as governments and international institutions, human rights groups that regularly issued reports criticizing and exposing human rights abuses during the Habyarimana regime played an important role between 1990 and 1994. The real influence of the international community is difficult to measure. However, the threat to cut aid in March 1993, following publication of a human rights report blaming Habyarimana for the death of at least 2,000 citizens, for example, is widely believed to have incited the Rwandese President to resume peace talks with the RPF (Reyntjens, 1994). |
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