Study 1

Part VI

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Annex 2

Arming Rwanda

The influx of weapons from foreign sources to the Rwandese government as well as to the RPF contributed significantly to the civil war during 1990-1994, as well as to the massacres in 1994. Some foreign governments and other suppliers were ready to supply arms.

The major sources for this Annex on the supply of arms to Rwanda are the Human Rights Watch/ Arms Project, which issued a comprehensive report on Rwanda in January 1994 and a complementary report in May 1995, and the Human Rights Watch report of December 1994. The reports substantiate their findings with different kinds of evidence. The content of these reports has been discussed with a number of respected researchers, who themselves have found evidence supporting most of the findings therein.

Rwanda government

When the war began in 1990, Rwanda had an army of some 5,000 men (Prunier, 1995). They were equipped with light arms, including Belgian-made FAL, German-made G-3 and Kalashnikov automatic rifles manufactured by China or countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The army's weaponry included eight 81mm mortars, six 57mm anti-tank guns, French-made 83mm Blindicide rocket launchers, 12 AML-60 armoured cars and 16 M-3 armoured personnel carriers (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990).

During the war, the Rwandese armed forces expanded, and the arsenal of weaponry increased and became more sophisticated. France, Egypt and South Africa supplied the majority of the weapons. According to the Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, Egypt was the key arms supplier and France the major military supporter.

A major weapons deal was made in March 1992 when Egypt sold US$6 million worth of arms to Rwanda. The deal was guaranteed by the French bank, Cr‚dit Lyonnais. It included a wide range of light arms, infantry support weapons and ammunition.

France has played an important role in arming and supporting Rwanda. Apart from equipment such as mortars, light artillery, guns, armoured vehicles and even helicopters, France also provided spare parts, technical assistance and military training. The Arms Project has further documented rather large arms supplies coming from South Africa (light arms, machine-guns, grenade launchers and ammunition, valued at US$5.9 million), and US$2.3 million worth of military equipment sold by the US to Rwanda.

Belgium was traditionally Rwanda's main supplier of assistance and training. However, after the civil war started in October 1990, Belgium withdrew. France, in contrast, continued its military role, and provided weapons, munitions and advisors. France furthermore deployed troops in Rwanda.

The weapons obtained by the Rwandese government did not go only to the army. Already in 1991, a programme was started by the government to distribute a gun for every unit of 10 households.

At the beginning of the war, France sent 300 soldiers to Rwanda. Part of this force was later withdrawn, but 170 soldiers remained stationed in the country. Immediately after the RPF launched its offensive on 8 February 1993, the number of French soldiers increased to some 670. Two companies were deployed on the main roads north of the capital, and two were posted in strategic positions in Kigali, including the airport.

While the French insisted that their troops were deployed for the purpose of protecting French nationals only, the Arms Project has witnessed first hand French military activities tantamount to direct participation in the war, e.g. French soldiers manning checkpoints just north of Kigali. In addition to combat troops, France sent military advisors to provide training in, among other things, combat skills and commando operations, to Rwandese troops.

In December 1993, following deployment of the UN forces, all French troops were withdrawn.

When the war started in October 1990, the government of Zaire sent about 500 soldiers to assist the Rwandese government against the RPF. They were withdrawn after charges that they lacked discipline and had abused Rwandese civilians.

After the genocide, the pre-war Hutu leadership began reorganizing its army in the refugee camps in Zaire. Representatives of NGOs and the media have reported that troops of the former Rwandese government have been training at a number of sites, including those near the Katindo and Mugunga camps (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3) Zaire allowed most soldiers to enter the country with their arms, including some heavy weaponry. Rwandese soldiers reportedly maintain howitzers and armoured personnel carriers hidden in a warehouse in Goma that is supposedly under the control of the Zairian military. Human Rights Watch reports on a detailed inventory of arms held by the former Rwandese army: The list includes six helicopters, 50 anti-tank weapons, 40-50 SA-7 missiles, 15 Mistral AAM missiles, 46 air defence weapons, 255 mortars, six 105mm howitzers and 56 armoured personnel carriers.

According to the Human Rights Watch/Arms Project report of May 1995, arms continued to flow to the Hutu ex-government after the massacres started in April 1994 and the United Nations arms embargo of 17 May, 1994. Some weapons came directly from Zairian sources, some from outside the country into the French-controlled zone through Goma airport in Zaire. Zairian troops helped to move the arms across the borders.

As regards arms supplies in the period from June 1994, the Arms Project report lists a number of flights of weapons into Goma. The arms, according to the report, came from France, South Africa and Zaire. Thus, in an interview the honorary French consul in Goma at the time identified five shipments of arms in May/June 1994 as a fulfillment of contracts negotiated with the government of Rwanda prior to the arms embargo. He also mentioned several other shipments that arrived at Goma airport for the exiled Rwandese armed forces in May-July from sources other than the French government. Additional sources referred to by Human Rights Watch/Arms Project are interviews made with airport staff, local businessmen, Zairian officials and aircargo company crews. Reports from NGOs give the same accounts (Observatoire Permanente de la Coop‚ration Fran‡aise, 1995).

Particularly Zaire seems to have given direct support to the Hutu government in exile and its army. The report notes that a number of Hutu, including the former President's wife, Agathe Kanziga, and her brother participated in a Zairian government delegation to China to discuss the supply of arms.

The report further points to Zairian support by noting that, at a Zairian army base in Goma, an investigator in February 1995 saw heavy weapons and equipment brought from Rwanda being maintained by soldiers of the ex-Rwandese government. The observer also reports that Zairians have allowed the Hutu army to set up camps and conduct training openly at a number of sites close to the border.

Currently, the Rwandese army in exile has an estimated troop strength of 50,000 men in over a dozen camps and has brought the Hutu militias under its control. The Human Rights Watch/Arms Project reports from visits to these camps of an army that is rebuilt, where military ranks are recognized, military discipline observed, an extensive communications network has been set up, and the weaponry and logistics well built up. Finally, the army in exile has aligned itself with Hutu militia from Burundi, inflaming the already tense situation inside Burundi and threatening to regionalize the conflict.

The French government has reacted strongly to the allegations made in the May 1995 report of Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, stating that:

this report contains incorrect information regarding the attitude of France. The French government did, in fact, very strictly respect the arms embargo regarding Rwanda which was decided by the Security Council on 17 May 1994. Nor were, of course, any arms delivered to Rwandese refugees outside their country. The French government thus categorically denies the allegations on this matter contained in the report, which are completely unfounded.*

In an effort to look further into the matter of arms to Rwanda, on 7 September 1995, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on the establishment of an international commission of inquiry into the sale and supply of arms and related material to the former government forces in violation of the UN embargo implemented on 17 May 1994 (UNSC Resolution 1013, 1995). The commission shall within three months from its establishment submit an interim report on its findings and conclusions, including recommendations on measures to end the illegal flow of arms into the Great Lakes region.

Rwandese Patriotic Front

The most important source of arms to the RPF has been Uganda. Funds for buying arms were also received from RPF supporters in exile, especially in North America and Europe. A major source was, in addition, weapons and ammunition captured from the Rwandese army.

Many of the Rwandese refugees who stayed in Uganda for decades participated in the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) under Yoweri Museveni and played an important role in its final victory. When the RPA (the RPF military wing) was created, some 3,000 Rwandese of the NRA defected, taking their uniforms and personal weapons as well as ammunition with them. RPA forces also took other weaponry, including landmines, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and cannons. While the RPA commanders quite openly maintain that they just kept their weapons, this has never been officially accepted by Uganda. The defecting NRA troops were declared to be in violation of the law of Uganda. No one, however, has been reported arrested in spite of frequent visits by RPA commanders and soldiers to Uganda. Journalists, diplomats and international military observers reported a steady flow of light arms, ammunition and supplies from Uganda to the RPA since October 1990. RPA troops were also seen coming back to Uganda, camping in border areas for months.

The RPA claims to have captured most of its weapons from the Rwandese army. The availability of such weapons has been verified by reporters invited to RPA camps inside Rwanda. The quantity of these captured arms is, of course, difficult to assess. In addition, a considerable amount of weapons was purchased with funds from Rwandese exiles. It is also rumoured that Libya and Iraq sold weapons to the RPF, but this has not been possible to verify.

Both the Rwandese government and the RPF have procured and used landmines ranging from World War II-vintage mines to modern, non-metallic, anti-personnel and anti-tank types. The heaviest concentration of mines is along the Uganda border.

International peacekeeping

In mid-1992, the Rwandese government and the RPF requested the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to establish a military observer group to monitor the cease-fire as well as to take steps towards ending the war. The 50-member group has operated since the autumn of 1992. In July 1993, at the request of Rwanda and Uganda, the United Nations deployed a contingent of peacekeeping personnel in southern Uganda along the Rwanda border with a mandate to monitor the flow of arms and other supplies into Rwanda.

As an integral part of the Arusha peace agreement, UN peacekeepers should assist in its implementation. UN Security Council Resolution 872 authorized the deployment of 800 soldiers, later growing to 2,500. After the massacres, UN peacekeepers were again deployed in Rwanda, with the latest extension of the mandate valid until 8 March 1996.

Appendix 1

Tables: Economic Indicators

Table 1: Rwanda: Sectoral origin of domestic product (current market prices)

	1987		1992*
	Rwfr bn	% of total	Rwfr bn	% of total
Agriculture	65,4	38,0	84,0	40,6
Industry	37,9	22,0	46,4	22,4
of which:
manufacturing	25,7	15,0	33,1	16,0
Services	68,7	40,0	76,5	37,0
GDP	171,9	100,0	206,9	100,0

* Estimates.
Source: World Bank, World Tables.

Table 2: Rwanda: Gross Domestic Product in billions of Rwanda francs (198- - 1992)

	GDP	Annual growth %
	Rwfr bn	nom. terms	real terms
1980	108,0
1981	122,6	13,5	2,8
1982	130,9	6,8	4,1
1983	142,1	8,6	6,2
1984	159,1	12,0	-5,0
1985	173,6	9,1	4,6
1986	168,9	-2,7	5,1
1987	171,9	1,8	-0,6
1988	177,9	3,5	0,5
1989	174,2	-2,1	-6,0
1990	176,5	1,3	-0,1
1991	193,8	9,8	-3,3
1992	207,2	6,9	-1,3
Average 81-91		5,6	0,8

Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook.

Table 3: Agricultural production for export

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Coffee*:
?000 60-kg bags	679	510	578	435	647	487
tons	40,740	30,591	34,680	26,131	38,824	29,220
Pyrethrum flowers (tons)	608	816	1,047	915	n/a	n/a
Tea (tons)	12,300	12,900	12,800	13,400	13,400	n/a

* Crop years (Apri- - March) starting in calendar years.
Sources: Département - - agriculture; F. O. Licht.

Table 4: Food crop production (´000 tons)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992*
Plantain	2,290	2,287	2,477	2,551	2,502	2,745
Beans	265	254	207	195	205	150
Sorghum	188	178	147	183	205	154
Maize	91	95	95	101	104	109
Sweet potatoes	895	879	704	857	1,000	1,063
Cassava	483	451	210	347	396	261

* Provisional.
Source: Département - - agriculture.

Table 5: Foreign trade (Rwfr millions)

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993*
Merchandise exports fob	8,291	7,635	9,224	11,598	8,917	6,404
of which:
coffee	6,544	4,691	6,108	7,210	n/a	n/a
tea	1,082	1,557	2,031	2,797	n/a	n/a
tin	0	381	287	320	n/a	n/a
Merchandise imports cif	28,280	26,642	23,059	38,454	38,263	35,861
of which:
petroleum	3,647	3,550	3,885	4,555	n/a	n/a
Trade balance	-19,989	-19,007	-13,835	-26,856	-29,346	-29,457

* Januar- - September.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Table 6: Main trading partners, 1992

Exports to:	Rwfr m	%	Imports from:	Rwfr m	%
Netherlands	1,982	21,7	Belgium-Luxemburg	6,549	17,0
Germany	1,833	20,1	Kenya	3,718	9,7
Belgium-Luxemburg	1,264	13,8	Germany	3,405	8,9
UK	899	9,8	Japan	3,154	8,2
Total incl others*	9,139	100,0	Total incl others*	38,437	100,0

* Totals differ from those in table above.
Source: Banque nationale du Rwanda, Bulletin.

Table 7: Gross official development assistance* ($ millions)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Bilateral, of which:	147,1	144,0	142,3	199,6	241,7	192,5
Belgium	33,5	29,1	26,7	43,4	55,8	45,7
Germany	22,0	25,0	27,2	31,8	40,1	43,6
France	33,2	23,7	19,6	37,2	43,1	30,2
Japan	8,0	10,4	17,1	14,4	9,2	16,8
Switzerland	9,4	12,9	9,1	10,2	17,1	13,8
Canada	6,0	7,6	12,7	13,8	21,2	13,6
Multilateral, of which:	103,9	115,5	99,4	105,6	133,1	171,1
EU	20,6	39,1	32,5	36,0	21,4	82,6
IDA (World Bank)	39,0	25,0	27,0	22,0	49,0	31,8
ADF (Afr. Dev. Bank)	20,7	21,0	16,7	19,4	12,0	23,5
UNDP	7,6	10,2	9,0	12,3	12,8	10,2
Total, of which:	251,1	259,5	241,7	305,2	374,8	363,6
grants	153,7	188,2	178,4	236,8	266,7	285,3

* Disbursements. Official development assistance is defined as grants and loans with at least a 25% grant element, provided by OECD and OPEC member countries and multilateral agencies, and administered with the aim of promoting development and welfare in the recipient country.
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.

Table 8: External debt ($ millions unless otherwise indicated)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Total external debt	606,1	654,5	644,3	736,2	833,1	873,3
Long-term debt	559,8	609,3	598,9	687,8	768,7	804,3
Short-term debt	39,3	41,5	44,5	48,3	51,9	56,9
of which:
interest arrears on
long-term debt	0,3	0,7	0,9	2,8	4,5	7,6
Use of IMF credit	6,9	3,7	0,9	0,1	12,5	12,0
Public & publicly guaranteed
long-term debt	559,8	609,3	598,9	687,8	768,7	804,3
Official creditors	548,5	601,9	593,9	684,1	766,1	802,8
Multilateral	390,6	436,3	478,2	542,2	612,6	646,5
Bilateral	157,9	165,6	115,7	142,0	153,5	156,3
Private creditors	11,3	7,4	5,0	3,7	2,6	1,5
Total debt service	23,8	22,7	29,0	21,6	25,3	24,4
Principal	14,2	11,6	16,6	10,3	13,0	11,6
Interest	9,6	11,1	12,3	11,3	12,3	12,8
of which:
short-term debt	2,4	2,8	4,8	5,2	5,6	6,1
Ratios (%)
Total external debt/GNP	29,8	30,8	27,2	33,2	51,4	55,4
Debt-service ratio*	13,3	12,9	18,4	14,4	17,7	n/a
Short-term debt/total
external debt	6,5	6,3	6,9	6,6	6,2	6,5
Concessional long-term
loans/long-term debt	97,7	98,6	99,0	99,2	99,5	99,7

Note. Long-term debt is defined as having original maturity of more than one year.
* Debt service as a percentage of earnings from exports of goods and services.
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables.

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