| Source: http://www.um.dk/danida/evalueringsrapporter/1997_rwanda/book1.asp#c5 Accessed 06 November 2001 Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors by Tor Sellström
with contributions by Patrick Dupont
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Part V Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V Part VI Part VII The role of the international community During the 1990s, the international community (OAU, UN, Belgium, France, Germany, USA and Rwanda's neighbouring countries, notably Tanzania) had taken upon itself an important and active role in implementing peace and democracy in Rwanda (see above). There were numerous prior warnings of the violence that erupted on 6 April (African Rights, 1994). Some observers point to detailed written plans that UNAMIR and some of the foreign embassies had seen before the massacres took place (Reyntjens, 1995). Despite all warnings, it appears, however, that the international community was caught unprepared when the massacres broke out. The inactivity, or rather inadequate or misdirected kind of activity, continued for several weeks after the massacres started. (This is discussed in detail in Study II.) This was partly due to the successful disinformation campaign by the leaders of the massacres, partly to the fatigue after the Somalia debacle (Guichaoua, 1995), but also to the fact that most foreign observers did not want to accept the killings for what they were. This was particularly true for the French, who had given their support to the Rwandese government and army all through the early 1990s. However, public opinion in France also cried out heavily against the massacre. Zaire also maintained good relations with the Rwandese interim government throughout the crisis and allowed it and its supporters after the RPF victory to settle in Zaire, keep their weapons and even to operate their radio from Zairian territory. In addition, Zaire, and particularly President Mobutu himself, reaped both diplomatic and economic benefits from the French - as well as the UN - interventions. The Belgians, who had played an important role during the Arusha process, contributed by sending the largest group of soldiers to UNAMIR. The murder of 10 Belgian soldiers on 7 April led, however, to a popular outcry in Belgium and to the almost immediate withdrawal of its soldiers from Rwanda and the UN task force. Most tragic of all, however, was the inactivity of the UN and its failure to meet expectations, including those of the citizens of Rwanda. After the arrival of UNAMIR, many Rwandese had high hopes. Those hopes were badly shattered, a fact widely repeated in many of the interviews made by African Rights and personal interviews in Rwanda. Discussions in the Security Council after Belgium announced the withdrawal of its troops continued throughout the period of the massacres, without any real conclusions. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda, Jacques Booh-Booh, his successor, Shaharyar Khan, and other representatives of the UN did not criticize the interim government over the whole period. Instead, they concentrated all their efforts on obtaining a cease-fire between the RPF and the Rwandese army. As the RPF had announced that it would not even discuss a cease-fire unless the killings came to an end, the persistence of the UN to attain a cease-fire without mentioning the massacres was futile. Thus, while the UN could not respond with any action on the ground, the OAU at least attempted to act more decisively. It was a step ahead of the UN in its analysis, and its public statements. However, divisions among the African countries did not allow for any real intervention. Although there were UN and OAU soldiers in Rwanda (albeit very few), they did not get an appropriate mandate and sufficient equipment and transport, which might have saved lives. A condem-nation of the massacres might have given moral support to the few who tried to stop the killings and a moral leadership role to the UN, but it never came. In the words of Ian Linden: The withdrawal of the bulk of the UN forces and the failure of the Security Council to re-inforce them and acknowledge that genocide was taking place cost thousands of lives and will be recorded as one of the most culpable and tragic of the UN's many mistakes on intervention (Linden, 1995). Although a decision to enlarge and strengthen UNAMIR to 5,500 men was taken by the Security Council on 17 May 1994, decisions on the financing of the force and on operational matters took until the end of July. By then, the French, pressed by public opinion in their country and francophone leaders of Africa, had decided to dispatch 2,200 soldiers to Goma and Bukavu in Zaire, from where they entered western Rwanda. Op‚ration Turquoise started on 23 June. Much has been written about this intervention (See Study II). Suffice it here to say that the Security Council gave this unilateral military force UN status and a Chapter VII mandate (allowing it to use force) for two months until the enlarged UNAMIR force would take over. The French intervention was welcomed by the interim government, but strongly opposed by the RPF. However, the French came too late to have any sustainable effect either on the war or the massacres (Prunier, 1995). It is estimated, however, that the French, within the so-called Safe Zone they declared in the south-west of Rwanda, saved some 12-15,000 Tutsi. They also helped to provide relief to Hutu internally displaced persons in south-west Rwanda, some of whom stayed in the country after the French left, thereby saving Burundi from an additional refugee crisis (African Rights, 1994; Guichaoua, 1995). The French left Rwanda in August 1994, handing over their Safe Zone to Ethiopian UN troops. The UNAMIR mandate has since been extended a number of times - the latest to 8 March, 1996 - and the UN troops are still present in Rwanda, although their presence is increasingly opposed by the government. The refugees The massacres and the war during April-July 1994 provoked massive population movements, internally in Rwanda and from Rwanda to neighbouring countries. In total, about two million people fled Rwanda and the number of internally displaced persons, many in camps, were estimated at about one million* . The first refugees started to flow into Burundi in the end of April; some 270,000 entered the country. The major influx, however, was into Tanzania (580,000) in April-May and into Zaire (1,200,000) in July. The refugee problem is discussed in detail in Study III. Here it suffices to say that the problems and the sacrifices resulting from the inflow of such a large number of refugees in such a short time have been enormous. The international community (multilaterals, bilaterals, neighbouring countries and NGOs), however, responded very rapidly. Though at first acting as the major obstacle to a firm UN intervention in Rwanda, the US government also reacted swiftly to the human crisis in Goma, when hundreds of thousands fled to that small town. Almost immediately, the US Air Force was mobilized to deliver supplies to Goma to save the lives of refugees (African Rights, 1994). Some were Tutsi fleeing from the massacres, but the majority were Hutu, scared of revenge by the RPF. Most of these Tutsi have since returned to Rwanda, while only a smaller part of the Hutu refugees have done so. Table 2. Rwanda and Burundi refugee figures as of March 1995
The former leadership of Rwanda, including that of the army, de facto if not de jure, has taken over control of the external refugee camps and refuses to let the refugees return home, knowing that keeping them in the camps gives leverage over the international community and, thus, over the Rwandese government. They use propaganda and spread stories of revenge by the RPF, as well as threats and violence against anyone who shows interest in returning home (Human Rights Watch/ Africa, 1994:3). Within the camps, they have re-established the political structures that existed in Rwanda before the massacres: i.e. cells, sectors, communes and pr‚fectures. They have even reportedly established a system of taxing refugees who work outside the camps. Representatives of international organizations, including NGOs, have been challenging the system, but with little success. Further, reports and observations have it that the camps are used to build up a new force to strike against the government in Rwanda. Troops of the former Rwandese army have been seen exercising at a number of points close to the camps in Zaire. These troops seem to be well armed. Incursions into Rwanda have already been reported and verified (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3; Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1995). At the end of December 1994, the former President, Th‚odore Sindikubwabo, and Prime Minister Jean Kambanda proclaimed a new government in exile in Zaire. At the same time they called for renewed war and preparedness for attack. However, some recent reports point to a loss of power of the self-proclaimed leaders and a deterioration of the morale of the soldiers and the militia. Other reports tell of new training camps for soldiers being established in countries other than Zaire (Amnesty International, 1995). According to Human Rights Watch Arms Project's report of May 1995, the situation, however, still seems to be very serious: Ensconced in refugee camps, primarily in eastern Zaire, the perpetrators of the Rwandese genocide have regrouped, rebuilt their military infrastructure, and succeeded in asserting their control over the civilian population in most of the camps during the last year. Acting with impunity, these forces rule over the refugee population through intimidation and terror, effectively preventing the return of refugees to their homes in Rwanda, while inducting fresh recruits into the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and militias. Emboldened by military assistance, including arms, from France* and Zaire, among other countries, they have openly declared their intent to return to Rwanda and, in the words of one ex-FAR commander, Col. Musonera, "kill all Tutsi who prevent us from returning." Currently, the ex-FAR has an estimated troop strength of 50,000 men in over a dozen camps, and has brought the militias more tightly under its control. These forces have launched cross-border raids to destabilize the already precarious situation in Rwanda and to obtain information and experience for a future offensive against the current government in Kigali. In addition, the ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militias have aligned themselves with Hutu militias from neighbouring Burundi, inflaming an already tense situation inside Burundi and threatening to regionalize the conflict (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1995). The situation has also created problems in Zaire. Conflicts between the refugees and the local community have become more and more common and violent. In the second half of 1995, Zaire increased its pressure on the international community to assist in solving the refugee problem. In August 1995 there were mass deportations of refugees and threats to expel all refugees. However, towards the end of the year it seemed that an agreement was close between Rwanda, Zaire and UNHCR on preparing for an orderly return of refugees from Zaire. Rwanda after the war As of 18 July 1994, the new government of the RPF had taken over the leadership of Rwanda. As described above, the country they took over was a country in shock and complete economic and social disruption. The economy had collapsed, almost all institutions of local and central government had been destroyed and the social fabric was torn apart. Among the casualties of the conflict were thousands of educated and skilled people. Hence, the country lacked most of the expertise needed for the running of an administration and a government. Taxes could not be collected and the government lacked funds for the most basic services. The situation was aggravated by the large number of persons who had fled the country as refugees (some two million) or were internally displaced (one million, of which 500,000 in camps) and by the return of the former (Tutsi) refugees (some 500,000) to Rwanda after tens of years outside the country (Prunier, 1995). The internal situation has improved, particularly with regard to the private sector. However, calls for revenge and the unresolved question of property rights are factors that from time to time cause setbacks to the slow progress achieved. In order to avoid militia activity in the displaced persons' camps inside Rwanda, the government decided at an early stage to close these, by force if necessary (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3). Efforts to persuade the displaced to return home voluntarily met with some success in September and October 1994 and even more so in January and February 1995, but came to a complete halt thereafter. In total, some 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) had returned home by the end of March 1995, leaving around 250,000 still in the camps. Reports of arrests and in some cases even of torture of homecoming IDPs caused the government, after pressure from the international community, led by the UN coordinating body UNREO, to postpone further actions in the camps. While the government's intention was to repatriate the IDPs by force, the international community prepared new plans for a gradual and safe settlement. The situation, however, exploded in mid-April 1995, when government troops finally closed down the remaining camps, leading to a massacre in Kibeho camp. The new government quickly recognized the primacy of the rights of current property owners. But the return of some 500,000 refugees, most of them having lived outside Rwanda since the Tutsi outflows of the 1960s, has made government policy virtually impractical. The new arrivals have occupied land and houses all over the country. Hutu are the major victims of this development. A commission has been created to resolve property disputes. However, this problem is, and will remain, a major problem and obstacle to a peaceful reintegration of Tutsi and Hutu in the future (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3). The situation within the government sector is still difficult. Government institutions lack most things required to run a government and a country. Available funds are used to pay salaries, but are far from sufficient. This leads to new problems, which can be summarized as follows: Because the RPA soldiers receive no government salary, they are susceptible to (bribes) [...] and increasingly participate as well in small-scale extortion and banditry to fill their pockets (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3). As the system of tax-collection is only partly repaired, government relies heavily on foreign funding. The international community, however, so far has not, with some exceptions, delivered any substantial aid to fund the new Rwandese government. At the same time, donor organizations in Kigali have all the equipment necessary for implementing their programmes, while the government has very little. This contrast has further exacerbated relations between the government and the donors. Lacking the means to establish a functioning civilian administration and a judicial system, the government cannot respond to the wishes and requirements of either the international community or its own population. Lack of resources, and, some would argue, lack of political will (Reyntjens, 1995, Human Rights Watch, April 1995), has also had the consequence that the government has not been able to begin prosecuting persons accused of participation in the massacres. The original intention was an orderly prosecution of all accused of killing. With no resources available, and most legal personnel either killed, in exile or themselves implicated, implementation has been stalled. In the meantime, thousands have been arrested and are awaiting trial, lodged in inhuman conditions in prisons and other sites (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3). Amnesty International emphasizes the large number of "secret detentions", with risks of torture, execution and "disappearance". These are not included in the estimated figure of 58,000 detainees as of October 1995 (Amnesty International, 1995). With the judicial system in disarray, reprisal killings and disappearances continued. Reports on new abuses of human rights, such as arbitrary arrests, torture and acts of revenge, are made every day. The situation in the overcrowded prisons is appalling. The government has therefore appealed for assistance in the form of judges and prosecutors from other countries to begin the work of investigating and prosecuting the persons charged. The government has been cooperating with the UN human rights operation, but progress has been very slow. With donor funding, new prisons have been built, slightly improving the plight of the detainees. In October 1995 a Supreme Court was also established by an act of parliament. To catch the leaders who are abroad, either in camps in neighbouring countries or in Europe, an international war-crimes tribunal on Rwanda was created in November 1994. It will be convened in Arusha under the leadership of the well-known South African judge, Richard Goldstone. The tribunal, which has the same prosecutor (Goldstone) and the same appeal judges as the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, is not expected to try more than 20 suspects per year. The vast majority of cases will have to be investigated and prosecuted by the Rwandese judiciary (Amnesty International, 1995). Its first indictment, was signed only on 23 November 1995. The internal political situation As stated above, the RPF took over the command of Rwanda in July 1994. To show its preparedness for compromise, the RPF included in the new government Hutu moderates who had survived the massacres. Thus, Faustin Twagiramungu became, as had been agreed in the Arusha negotiations, Prime Minister. Other prominent Hutu politicians in the government were the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Justice. However, the difficulties encountered in finding funds for running the government and the administration, increasing incursions directed from refugee camps outside the country, the problems of finding proper settlements for returning refugees, particularly the increasing discontent of surviving Tutsi, especially those emigrating from Burundi, is straining the government's ability to hold together and to implement the professed reconciliatory policies of the RPF. It appears that the Tutsi community is increasing its pressure on the government for a more Tutsi-"friendly" policy. On 28 August, Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu resigned from office. A new Prime Minister, Pierre-C‚l‚stin Rwigyema and a new government were appointed on 30 August. The current political situation gives little hope for a peaceful long-term development of Rwanda. In a seminar held in Uppsala in early April 1995, Catherine Newbury summarized the preconditions for reconciliation, and thereby peace, under the following headings:
Most observers of present-day Rwanda firmly argue that a solution to the political problems of the country must be found in a regional context. The social and political dynamics - intensified by cross-border flows of refugees, weapons, warriors and ideas - cannot be stressed enough when considering possible solutions to Rwanda's problems. This annex will therefore discuss Rwanda in the region, historically and at present, and with a particular emphasis on recent developments in Burundi. First follows a presentation of the kinyarwanda-speaking people and their close relationship and similar development. Second, recent developments in Burundi are discussed and compared with those in Rwanda. The interrelations and interactions between events and developments in the two countries, an important factor all through the 20th century, must be kept in mind. Finally, the national dialogue in Burundi is presented as an example of the efforts made to reach national reconciliation in that country over the last two years. The Banyarwanda The Central African Great Lakes region shares a common history, based on co-existence between agriculturalists and pastoralists prior to the major state formations. Historians discuss the development of the region under four headings: the Kitara complex (most of present Bunyoro, Toro and neighbouring portions of Nkore, Mubende and Buganda), the Kintu complex (Buganda, Busoga and Mount Elgon region), the Ruhinda complex (Kigezi district, Ankole, Bukoba district and parts of Burundi and Rwanda) and the Rwanda complex. The term "complex" has been used to emphasize both the multi-ethnic nature of the region and the confluence of cultural traditions that constitutes its history. The four complexes are interconnected and merge into a general history of the region (Ogot, 1984). Although different, they show considerable similarities. The very violent developments over a long period of time in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire are often interrelated and can be investigated and reconciled only in a regional context. Rwanda had developed into a geopolitical entity possibly already by the 16th century (Ogot, 1984). However, over time the Banyarwanda, i.e. the people who speak the language of Rwanda, kinyarwanda, have been - and are still - spread over Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. The Banyarwanda, close relatives of the Banyankole and Bakiga in Uganda and the Barundi in Burundi, are thus East Africa's largest ethnic grouping. Outside Rwanda itself, the Banyarwanda in Uganda form the biggest sub-group, and are also the best documented (Watson, 1991). In 1991, they numbered slightly over 1.3 million and fell into three categories: - One third were truly Ugandan Banyarwanda, whose families lived inside Uganda when the colonial boundaries were finally drawn in 1910. The settlement of the colonial borders added Banyarwanda population in the south-west of Uganda, the so-called Bafumbira. They were mostly Hutu agriculturalists, but intense land-pressure has since driven thousands to migrate to Kampala. Other Banyarwanda, mostly Tutsi, have long been living in Ankole. - About half were descendants of migrants who came to Uganda in search of a better life between 1920 and 1959, i.e. before the so-called peasant revolt and the process to independence in Rwanda. They came as labourers, responding to the acute lack of manpower following the introduction of cash crops in Uganda. Life is reported to have been easier there than in Rwanda (and Burundi). Baganda employers paid twice the rate compared to those in Rwanda, work and food were plentiful and corporal punishment rare. Both Hutu and Tutsi migrated. Hutu, however, appear to have assimilated more easily. - Finally, some 15% were refugees, mostly Tutsi, who had arrived mainly between 1959 and 1964. Ugandan authorities have over time ruled that the offspring of these refugees are also to be considered refugees, thus increasing the original count threefold in the early 1990s. Although supported by UNHCR, many of them were able to feed themselves and produce a surplus for sale. The settlements were solid and permanent - more like villages than refugee camps. By and large, the second generation acquired education and moved into towns or to Europe or North America. This level of education (often gained through scholarships from UNHCR) and relative "success" distinguished the refugees from the other two groups of Banyarwanda in Uganda. The distinction caused resentment from the local population, but also kept them aware of their heritage and was a basis for their strong urge to return to Rwanda. This was also strengthened by the fact that as refugees - and in spite of their education - they were excluded from employment in the Ugandan public service. They tried to influence the world community to let them return by peaceful means, and when this did not succeed they took to arms (Watson, 1991). The Habyarimana regime (and its predecessor) had to pay a high price for a policy of more than 20 years of neglect of the "political" Tutsi refugees in Rwanda's neighbouring countries. The desire of the latter to return to their country of origin was heavily underestimated. That urge was strengthened by a continuous feeling of insecurity in the host countries, not least in Uganda. The refugees never abandoned their wish to become first-class citizens again. The massive return in a short period of time of Rwandese Tutsi from Burundi and Uganda after the take-over by RPF in July 1994 was impressive. A similar enthusiasm was displayed by a great number of Burundian Hutu - many of whom had been refugees for more than 30 years - who returned, mainly from Tanzania, to their home country after the election victory of a Hutu President in June 1993. A similar story could be told about the Banyarwanda from Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania. Their situation in Zaire resembles closely that in Uganda. The Banyarwanda of Zaire also fall into three categories, and the last group of political refugees also ran into difficulties with the local population. Relations were at times very violent (in the 1960s and in the early 1990s) (Reyntjens, 1994; Braeckman, 1992, and Pabanel, 1993). The Banyarwanda of Burundi and Tanzania, however, only comprised the later category of political refugees. By and large, the refugees in all three neighbouring countries, mostly Tutsi, have now returned to Rwanda, while the original Banyarwanda and the older migrants are citizens of or have been integrated into these countries. To summarize, people living in the countries surrounding Rwanda have a
history similar to that of Rwanda. They comprise groups speaking the same
language and who are of the same culture as those in Rwanda. Furthermore,
migrants moving from one country to another is nothing new to the region. History also gives evidence of groups who have assimilated with
their new surroundings, and of other groups who kept their identity and
eventually returned "home". Thus, cross-border flows of refugees and
ideas have been a continuous phenomenon for as long as records show.
Rwanda and regional organizations Rwanda is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Development Bank (ADB). As such, Rwanda also participates in a number of specialized agencies of these organisations, such as the Scientific, Technical and Research Commission (STRC) and the African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT) of the OAU and the Pan-African Documentation and Information Service (PADIS), which was established by the ECA in 1980. Rwanda is also a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which replaced the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) in 1993. Closer to home, Rwanda is a member of the Economic Community of Central African States/ Communaut‚ Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC), which was founded in 1983 and began operations in 1985. In line with the OAU Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, CEEAC aims at abolition of trade restrictions, erection of a common external tariff, integration of commercial banking and establishment of a development fund. Membership comprises Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, along with Burundi, Rwanda, SÆo Tom‚ and Pr¡ncipe, and Zaire. (Angola has observer status.) These organizations are of a more general nature. Other cooperation efforts in the region are: 1) The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries/Communaut‚ ‚conomique des pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL), which was founded in September 1976, in Gisenyi (Rwanda) by Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. The idea behind CEPGL was to reconstruct the traditional links between the member countries that existed prior to independence. The main objective of the CEPGL is to establish a regional common market and to ensure economic security of the member states through coordination and harmonization of economic, financial, commercial, social, cultural, political, military, scientific, technical and tourism policies. So far, a Monetary Arrangement between the central banks has been signed. The member countries have also agreed upon a Social Security Convention, including specific arrangements on the free movement of officials and businessmen and on postal organization. CEPGL comprises five Specialized Technical Commisssions, dealing with: 1) political and juridical matters; 2) social and cultural matters; 3) planning, industry, agriculture and natural resources; 4) commerce, finance, immigration and tourism; and 5) public works, transport and energy. In addition, there are three specialized agencies within the CEPGL framework: 1) the Development Bank of the Great Lakes States/Banque de d‚veloppement des Etats des Grand Lacs (BDEGL), located in Goma, Zaire; 2) the Energy Organization of the Great Lakes Countries/Organisation de la CEPLG pour l'Energie (EGL) at Bujumbura, Burundi; and 3) the Institute of Agricultural Research/Institut de Recherche Agronomique et Zoologique (IRAZ) situated in Gitega, Burundi. In addition, there are four joint enterprises of the CEPGL, producing electric power, glass bottles, cement and hoes. 2) The Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin/Organisation pour l'am‚nagement et le d‚veloppement du bassin de la riviŠre Kagera (KBO) was established in August 1977 at Rusumo (Tanzania-Burundi) by the Presidents of Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. The Agreement was amended in May 1981, with the accession of Uganda. The objective of the KBO is the integrated development of the water and land resources of the Kagera River Basin, including hydro-electricity, telecommunications and transport. Its activities include the construction of a 80.5 MW hydroelectric dam at Rusumo Falls on the Rwanda-Tanzania border; a 2,000-km railway network between the member countries; a telecommunications network to link the four member states; road construction; agricultural and irrigation projects; river transport; and a polytechnic institute. Although efforts have thus been made to exploit the potential for regional cooperation, progress has in practice, however, been scant and leaves little room for optimism for improved economic cooperation in the near future. Rwanda and Burundi in crisis: comparative and regional perspective For a period of 25 years (1965-1990), Rwanda benefitted from a better reputation within the international community than Burundi. On the one hand, both countries were governed by authoritarian one-party regimes supported by specific urban, regional and ethnic groups. On the other, Rwanda was governed by a Hutu majority (about 85-90% of the population in both countries), whereas in Burundi a minority (Bahima) within the Tutsi minority (10-15% of the population) was holding power. The Burundian minority regime attempted to legitimize itself by publicly denying the existence of ethnicity. The Rwandese authorities, conversely, tried not to endanger their position by emphasizing ethnicity. Whereas in Rwanda the internal Tutsi minority was also discriminated against, its presence in the administration, army, courts and schools was more or less assured through a system of ethnic quotas (since 1973). The half million "political" Tutsi refugees (figures for 1990) who had fled Rwanda in the period 1959-1966, mainly to Uganda, Zaire and Burundi, and who were called "Africa's oldest refugees", were treated less favourably. They were simply denied the possibility to return home. Burundi, as mentioned, was politically and militarily governed by a sub-group of a Tutsi ethnic minority of 2%. The Hutu majority was on several occasions (1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1991) the victim of true massacres (Reyntjens, 1995:1). Party and army constituted an entity in Burundi. A major part of public means was allocated to defence. The armies of both Burundi and Rwanda, however, were not trained to act against an external enemy, but rather against possible internal unrest. The success of the RPF provides a good illustration of the relative lack of preparedness of the authorities to face an external threat. In fact, Rwanda had a very small army (5,000) in October 1990, due to the fact that priorities were elsewhere and the international community encouraged Rwanda not to spend too much on defence (Reyntjens, 1994). Economically, both countries had reached their limits towards the mid-80s. The consequences of the dramatic fall of international coffee prices (down 75% between 1986 and 1992) illustrated the extent to which Rwanda and Burundi, as small but densely-populated, mainly rural and mono-culture countries, depended on external developments. Burundi, having pursued a less stringent economic-monetary policy than Rwanda, was compelled already in the beginning of the 1980s to adhere to a structural adjustment programme. Rwanda was to follow in 1990. Politically, developments in Burundi and Rwanda became influenced by the consequences of the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War. International aid to both countries has since then been increasingly linked to democratization, good governance and respect for human rights. The reputation of the Burundian army and the Jean-Baptiste Bagaza regime had resulted in an international black-listing of the country already in the period 1984-1988. Political conditionality was applied to Burundi by aid donors in August 1988. A combination of domestic and external pressures made President Pierre Buyoya decide at the end of 1988 to follow a path of reconciliation and democratization. It is to his credit that he did so before formal application of political conditionality by the donor community, and that he respected the democratic rules after his defeat in the Presidential elections of June 1993. Four years after the violent popular repression under the Jean-Baptiste Bagaza regime, Burundi adopted a new constitution that was to lead to a government of national unity. The Melchior Ndadaye government that was constituted in June 1993 reflected this unity. The dissatisfaction within army circles and by militant Tutsi with the new political situation led, however, to the coup and the tragic events on and after 21 October, 1993. The coup, which was the most successful in a row of four (1989-1993), was the expression of the disagreement in Tutsi/Bahima army and political circles with the reconciliation policies of Pierre Buyoya and his successor, Melchior Ndadaye, who planned the inclusion of Hutu and other Tutsi groups in the administration, schools, armed forces and the judicial system to break the Bahima power monopoly (Reyntjens, 1995:1). The passive response demonstrated by the international community in both Burundi (October-November 1993) and Rwanda (April-May 1994) has seriously weakened the potential of any future external political conditionality. To a certain extent, through its non-intervention, the international community has rewarded extremist elements that aim to obstruct any change in the existing system by means of violence. Since Western governments have not been prepared to risk the lives of their soldiers to restore peace and security in the region, and save the lives of local people, the effect of Arusha and other internationally-imposed politico-judicial arrangements in the future is not likely to go beyond the texts. The economic problems for the peasants (i.e. 90% of the populations) were greater in Rwanda than in Burundi. Starvation in the south of the country in 1989 indicated that food security had become a major problem. The economic crisis and increasing corruption in government circles also led to an accumulating dissatisfaction with the Habyarimana regime and its policies. The one-party system and lack of democracy were seen as the main reasons for the economic crisis. There is no doubt that by the end of the 1980s, the Burundian one-party minority regime as well as the Rwandese MRND regime were contested. Strong donor signals led to the acceptance by Habyarimana of a structural adjustment package and to the launching of a democratization process in September 1990, i.e. before the RPF invasion. As in Burundi, a national unity charter was to be written that was to lead to the drafting of a new constitution. The invasion of October 1990 speeded up the process. Already in mid-1991 Rwanda adopted a new constitution and formally established a multi-party system. Like other events and evolutions in the past, the democratization process was launched differently in Rwanda and Burundi. In both cases, reduction of power privileges were at stake. However, in Rwanda a majority regime was put under military pressure to change the system, whereas in Burundi a relatively unchallenged minority regime opted for reconciliation and democratization. Developments in one of the two countries often have quick repercussions on the other country's political situation. In a number of important events discussed above, developments in Burundi have had serious implications in Rwanda. The most recent case in point is that of the Tutsi refugees who have returned from Burundi to Rwanda and who belong to the most radical and ethnically-extreme factions of the RPF due to their long contacts with the former Burundian single-party (UPRONA) regime. The national dialogue in Burundi: a way towards conflict resolution? A number of serious peace and reconciliation efforts have been undertaken by the OAU, different UN agencies, bilateral donor countries and NGOs in Burundi in the past two years. Many of them are commendable and have had positive effects on the fragile peace process and long-term stability of the country. Below follows one of these examples, which has been closely followed by the authors of this report. It illustrates an effort to forestall a major crisis, rather than react to its potential consequences. The international conference on a national dialogue, held in Bujumbura 15-18 May, 1994, was a follow-up to a Geneva symposium on Restoration of Peace and the Process of Democracy in Burundi, which took place on 10-12 December, 1993 at the request of the Burundi government. The Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden, undertook the task of securing political and financial support for the proposal and agreed to hold the conference under its auspices. Financial contributions were received from the governments of Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The special representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Ould Abdallah, undertook responsibility for local arrangements (Cervenka & Legum, 1994). This section will discuss this effort by the Burundian people to find ways and means for national reconciliation. The initiative was taken by the Burundians themselves and was supported by groups from the two major political parties as well as by the international community. Progress has been made, but the forces of divergence and the enormous obstacles in terms of mistrust and fear are at the same time formidable, and the outcome of the dialogue thus very uncertain. The objectives of the national dialogue were described as follows: To provide a forum for a discussion on crucial issues facing the Burundian society - peace, security and confidence-building measures to attain protection of human rights, strengthening of democracy, reconciliation and co-existence, national unity and restoration of confidence in the institutions of the Government (Cervenka & Legum, 1994). The main themes of the conference were: Confidence-building measures leading to stability and strengthening of democracy, national security concerns, the restoration of confidence in the institutions of government, ways and means of promoting human rights, the protection of minorities and national unity, and the role of the international community in support of democracy in Burundi (Cervenka & Legum, 1994). However, the discussions during the five sessions of the conference largely focused on the following hotly-debated issues in Burundi: the origins of the current crisis, the role of the army, the impunity of the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, the way out of the crisis, and the role of the international community. The national dialogue was attended by an average of 180 people each day. On the day when the role of the army was debated, more than 200 people attended. This was the first occasion on which ministers, senior army officers, opposition leaders and academics, as well as international representatives, met together in an open forum - a fact of considerable importance in developing a dialogue. The exchanges were frank and often hard-hitting. The discussions were reported daily on television and in the press and were broadcast live. A special statement was adopted at the conclusion of the conference containing a number of resolutions, including the following:
On 1 July 1994, 10 weeks after the national dialogue conference, Burundi celebrated its 32nd year of independence. Marking the occasion, interim President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya addressed a public rally at the Prince Louis Rwagasore stadium in Bujumbura, where he reiterated the importance of a meaningful national dialogue and said: "We opted for consultations, understanding, discussions and truth". He referred to the initiators and sponsors of the national dialogue by describing them as "people whom we need because they have revived hope for Burundians so that we can find solutions to our problems". At the time of his speech, the national dialogue focused on the restoration of the institution of the Presidency. The three-month period of interim Presidency was due to expire on 12 July, but no agreement had been reached on the crucial issue of selecting a new President to succeed President Cyprien Ntaryamira, who was killed with the Rwandese President Habyarimana in that fateful plane crash at Kigali on 6 April 1994. President Cyprien Ntaryamira's predecessor, Melchior Ndadaye-the first democratically-elected President had been killed in October 1993, three months after he was sworn in, by a small group of Tutsi extremists in the army. Their aim was to create conditions to reverse the process of democratization. In military terms, the coup was a success. However, in political terms, the action by the military extremists was a failure since it did not, at least not in the short term, achieve its major objective of displacing the democratically-elected government. Significantly, the army hierarchy disassociated itself from the action of the Tutsi extremists, which was also condemned by prominent members of the Tutsi establishment. After the wave of ethnic revenge killings in October 1993 followed a period of relative calm. New waves of violence erupted in the suburbs of Bujumbura in the middle of 1994 and were followed by many more. There was grave concern about a spill-over effect from Rwanda. About 200,000 Rwandese refugees entered Burundi, causing security problems in regions adjacent to Rwanda. At first, the events in Rwanda had a traumatic effect on Burundi and appeared to have contributed to the preservation of a fragile peace in the country. But not for long. Clashes between armed groups of Hutu, the army and the police resumed. The situation was aggravated by broadcasts of a Hutu pirate radio station called Rutomorangingo (the Radio which Speaks the Truth), which called for the arming of civilians and propagated ethnic hatred. Rutomorangingo is modelled on the extremist Rwandese station RTLMC (Radio T‚l‚vision Libre des Mille Collines). The FRODEBU government had problems in reasserting its control. By the end of July 1994, the dialogue between the FRODEBU coalition and the opposition parties came to a halt. The opposition, counting on the support of the army and still dominating the civil service, press, banks and judiciary (only 13 out of 241 magistrates are Hutu), continued to demand even more concessions. The process started by the national dialogue eventually led to the signing, on 10 September 1994, of a National Convention by nine opposition parties and the ruling four parties of the FRODEBU coalition, and the election of the new President, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, 20 days later, on 30 September 1994. According to the Convention, the opposition parties shall get 45% of the ministerial posts in the government, including the post of Prime Minister. In the same proportion, the opposition filled the posts of governors of provinces, local administrators and ambassadors of Burundi to foreign countries. The National Convention contains an agreement on the implementation of a number of recommendations made at the national dialogue conference. They include:
In order to appreciate the magnitude of the concessions yielded by FRODEBU to the opposition, it should be recalled that the opposition parties in Burundi, with the exception of the former governing party, UPRONA, are tiny groupings (less than 1% of the vote), making their way into the negotiations by the potential threats they represent, and not on the strength of any significant popular support. Furthermore, with the exception of UPRONA, which includes some Hutu, all the opposition parties are exclusively composed of Tutsi. The reason for the influence of the minority groups lies in the tacit support of the army, which uses them as proxies, and in the moderation of the FRODEBU leaders. They maintain that peace has no price and that civil war would be suicidal. However, their view has not been shared by some FRODEBU parliamentarians and Hutu extremists, who contest the compromises made. The continuing debate between the opposition and governing parties continues to reflect the discussions that took place at the national dialogue conference in May 1994. It focuses on the balance of power between the Tutsi-dominated army and the Hutu population, and the need for a modus vivendi between Hutu and Tutsi in an environment of terror and fear. The problems are enormous and progress extremely slow. Still, as long as the discussions continue, there is hope. Thus, on 20 March 1995, the establishment and installation of a technical committee vested with the important duty to prepare the forthcoming national debate took place. It was hoped that the debate itself would start in June/July 1995, despite strong opposition from extremist groups and their press. On 29 March 1995, the Prime Minister presented his plan of action before parliament and in the presence of the President of the Republic. On 3 April, when parliament opened for its spring session, the Speaker supported the plan. In mid-April, a nation-wide reconciliation campaign, with the President, the Prime Minister, ministers and parliamentarians travelling all over the country in mixed (majority and opposition) groups, was launched. This campaign has continued throughout the year. The date for the proposed major meeting is, however, still not set. |
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