Study 1

Part IV

 Part I  Part II  Part III  Part IV  Part V Part VI  Part VII

Evolution of the conflict

As has been shown above, since the beginning of the 1990s the Habyarimana regime had been facing strong internal and external political and military pressure for liberalization (e.g. for a multi-party system, more respect for human rights, good governance and fair settlement of the refugees). Such reforms could lead only to a reduction of the power and privileges enjoyed by the supporters of the one-party system in MRND, the army, local and national administrations, public enterprises etc. One could therefore expect a strong opposition from those groups to the restructuring process.

Below, we will deal first with the positive developments during the conflict period, i.e. the delicate peace-making process between the regime and the opposition. We will describe the different stages of the process and the content of the agreements reached on 4 August 1993. This will be discussed at some length, as it might constitute an important basis for future conflict resolution. Second, we will show why the outcome of the Arusha negotiations never deserved to be called a peace agreement, but were rather a political agreement. In the light of knowledge about the tragedy that hit Rwanda after 6 April 1994, we will deal with the systematic obstruction, mainly by regime supporters, to most reforms. Human rights groups' reports illustrate the systematic use of terror against assumed ethnic and political opponents of the regime. Ethnicity finally poisoned not only the different political parties, but also major segments of Rwandese society.

The Arusha process
After November 1990 there was a stalemate in the military conflict between the RPF and the Rwandese army. A military solution was thus not in sight. The conflict between the political parties and the difficulties in establishing the first real transition government (without RPF) in April 1992, or 18 months after the RPF invasion, also indicated the difficulties in reaching a negotiated solution. Indeed, the Nsengiyaremye-led government that started negotiations with the RPF on a peace treaty in Arusha on 10 August, 1992 was regularly obstructed by the President and the MRND. Systematically, Habyarimana would veto any breakthrough in negotiations that could lead to a substantial decline of MRND power. It took a lot of international pressure to make the President agree each time. Also important underlying factors were RPF military advances, deterioration of the economy and the increased number of internally displaced persons (from 80,000 in late 1990 to 350,000 in May 1992 after the Byumba offensive and to 950,000 in February 1993).

The preliminaries (October 1990-April 1992)
Seventeen days after the RPF invasion, under mediation by Belgian and Tanzanian officials, President Habyarimana and President Museveni of Uganda agreed in Mwanza (Tanzania) on an OAU- and UNHCR-supervized regional conference on the refugee problem and to continue the talks their governments had had since 1988.

In Mwanza, Habyarimana and Museveni also agreed on direct negotiations with the RPF. Consequently, the RPF was recognized by Habyarimana as a discussion partner. Also important was the continuing dialogue between Habyarimana and Museveni, despite the former's accusation of the latter's active pro-RPF involvement in the conflict in Rwanda.

Until the involvement of the major domestic opposition parties in the Rwandese government (5 April,

1992), little progress, however, was achieved in the mostly-mediated talks between the government and the RPF. No fundamental agreements that would lead to a sustainable peace were signed, but only those, such as cease-fires, that would solve immediate problems.

Chronologically, cease-fires were signed and renewed after consecutive violations: on 26 October 1990 (Gbadolite, Zaire) after active Belgian diplomacy; on 20 November 1990 (Goma, Zaire), confirming and extending the Gbadolite agreement; mid-February 1991 (Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania); and on 29 March 1991 (Nsele, Zaire). The last-mentioned cease-fire was amended twice: on 16 Septem- ber 1991 in Gbadolite at an OAU summit and on 12 July 1992 in Arusha. The latter amendment led to the creation of a so-called security zone between RPF-held territory and the rest of Rwanda.

Notwithstanding the agreement at the Goma talks to send a 55-man OAU observer force (GOMN, Groupement des Observateurs Militaires Neutres) to oversee implementation of the cease-fire, by September 1991 only 15 officers had arrived.

The fundamentals (May 1992-August 1993)
About one month after the inauguration of the new government, preliminary talks took place in Brussels and Paris (May and June 1992) between the MDR, PSD and the PL on the one hand and the RPF on the other. Agreement was reached to start peace negotiations (in Arusha), not only to restore the Nsele cease-fire, but also to discuss further democratization, integration of the RPF in government, and military reforms.

Peace negotiations between the Rwandese government and the RPF started on 10 August 1992, and were greatly facilitated by Tanzania and President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and his Ambassador, Ami Mpungwe. Observers from the neighbouring countries of Burundi and Zaire and from Belgium, France, Germany, the United States, Senegal and the OAU would be present at the consecutive Arusha negotiations. The negotiations continued for one year before final agreement was reached on a total package of protocols on:

• the principle and creation of rule of law (18/8/92);

• power-sharing, the enlargement of the transition governement (i.e. with the RPF) and the creation of a transition parliament (30/10/92 and 9/1/93);

• the re-integration of refugees and internally-dislocated persons (9/6/93);

• the creation of a national unified army (i.e. merger of RPA and FAR, stipulations on commanding posts, 3/8/93);

Rule of law
According to the protocol of 18 August 1992, Rwanda should honour the principles of national unity, democracy, pluralism and human rights. All citizens should enjoy the same rights and possibilities irrespective of their ethnic, regional, religious or sexual identity. An implicit consequence was the lifting of the quota system, which attributed power and positions according to a perso- - s ethnic identity. All refugees should have the right to return. The multi-party system should be one of the cornerstones of democracy. All former agreements (Nsele, confirmed in Gbadolite and Arusha) on creation of an enlarged transitional government should be honoured. The protection of human rights should be guaranteed and supervized by a national commission.

The first protocol was concluded in a short period of time. It can be characterized either as a summary of results from earlier negotiations or as a list of more general principles. The situation was different for the negotiations on the ensuing protocols. Real power distribution was then at stake.

Power-sharing and transitional institutions
The texts include stipulations on the transitional institutions (Presidency, government, parliament, courts) and on the power distribution between and within the last three (Communiqu‚ 18/9/92; Protocol 30/10/92; Protocol 9/1/93).

The government should be extended to include the RPF and be composed of 21 ministers: 5 MRND (including Minister of Defence), 5 RPF (including the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior), 4 MDR (including Prime Minister and Minister of Finance), 3 PSD, 3 PL and 1 PDC. CDR was thus excluded. The new government should in principle decide by consensus.

The transitional parliament would be composed of 11 members each from MRND, MDR, PSD, PL and RPF, 4 members from PDC and 1 member each from the other recognized parties. President Habyarimana would remain head of state. However, he would have to cede certain powers to the Prime Minister and the government. Presidential and parliamentary elections would be organized at the end of the period of transition. A commission would be given the task to draft a new constitution, which would be the object of a referendum.

Three key ingredients to the agreement need to be stressed:

1) the exclusion of CDR;

2) the switch from a primarily Presidential system to a primarily parliamentary system in the

distribution of power; and

3) the requirement that the concurrence of at least four parties would be required to reach a majority vote even though the rhetoric suggested the cabinet would try to work by consensus.

Refugees and internally displaced persons
On 9 June 1993, the government of Rwanda and the RPF reached agreement on a solution for the refugees and the internally dislocated persons who had fled the area north of Byumba and Ruhengeri and who numbered about 1,000,000 in February 1993 (Protocol 9/6/93).

Six months after inauguration of the enlarged transitional government, a number of repatriation areas should be identified and equipped. Three months later, a first group of refugees would be allowed to settle in Rwanda. As far as land rights are concerned, it was advised that land that had not been claimed during the previous 10 years should not be considered as property by the returnees. UNHCR and OAU should be asked to convene a donors, conference to discuss the financial implications of the refugee programme.

Military reforms
On 24 June 1993, negotiators from the government and RPF agreed on a definite cease-fire, the inclusion of the RPF in a merged national army (Arm‚e Nationale), including the gendarmerie. The RPF would obtain a ratio of 40% of all troops and 50% of all commanding posts. It was also specified that the enlarged transitional government would rule the country for at least one year (later specified as a maximum of 22 months). Parliamentary elections would be organized at the end of the transition period (Protocol 24/6/93).

Agreement was further reached at Kinihira on an army of 13,000 troops and a gendarmerie of 6,000 men (Articles 25/7/93). As regards the army, this would imply a considerable reduction compared to the number of troops at that moment: about 28,000 in the FAR and 20,000 in the RPA - in both cases a considerable increase since 1990 (UN Reconnaissance mission to Rwanda, August 1993). The Arm‚e Nationale would be headed by a FAR commander, the gendarmerie by a RPA commander.

It was also agreed that 600 RPA men (an armoured battalion) would be allowed to see to the protection of the RPF people in Kigali who would participate in the transition government and administration, and to safety in the capital in general. A neutral international force (UN blue helmets) or an enlarged GOMN under UN supervision, would be in charge of the overall security in all Rwanda and, more specifically, operate along the border with Uganda, in the demilitarized zone and in Kigali. That international force would further be in charge of supervision of the inauguration of the enlarged transition government, the transitional parliament, military reforms, demobilization and the preparation of elections. The installation of this force was a precondition for implementation of the Arusha agreements.

Designation of the post-Arusha Prime Minister
At Kinihira in June 1993, agreement was reached to nominate Faustin Twagiramungu (MDR) as Prime Minister of the enlarged transitional government. However, at the moment of his designation, he was excluded from his party. The immediate reason was that he, as MDR chairman, had consented to President Habyarimana's decision to have Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye replaced by Agathe Uwilingiyimana as of 17 July 1993.

Legally, Dismas Nsengiyaremye's mandate as Prime Minister expired on 16 July. Politically, the President saw in the nomination of Agathe Uwilingiyimana a means to exploit frictions within the MDR and to divide the main opposition party. One MDR faction was centred around Dismas Nsengiyaremye and opposed to fundamental reforms (the so-called PowerGroup, said to follow the former Parmehutu ideology). The second faction supported MDR chairman Faustin Twagiramungu.

On 23 July 1993, a majority of members at an extraordinary congress of the MDR decided to exclude its chairman and Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the new Prime Minister (Reyntjens, 1994). This would not prevent the Prime Minister, and the political parties present in Kinihira, from deciding on Faustin Twagiramungu as prospective Prime Minister two days later. For the newly-formed "PowerGroup" within the MDR, led by Jean Kambanda, an agreement had been signed without the consent of the MDR, which argued that the Prime Minister did not belong to their party, whereas the Arusha negotiators had always agreed on a MDR politician as Prime Minister.

In the following period, the split within the MDR would remain, probably not to the dissatisfaction of the President, who could refer to the absence of consent within political parties in order to fail to inaugurate an enlarged transition government in accordance with the Arusha agreements. Whereas the rivalry within the MDR was at the start basically a struggle between several persons, the dispute became more and more dominated by ethnicism. The "PowerGroup" used more and more an anti-Tutsi language, whereas politicians such as Faustin Twagiramungu were open to compromise with other political and ethnic groups.

Non-implementation (August 1993-April 1994)
The actual Arusha agreements signed on 4 August 1993 by President Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe comprise the above protocols plus a series of intermediary and ad hoc agreements, such as the different cease-fire texts and the stipulations.

Already during the negotiations, substantial delays were encountered before the more fundamental questions were agreed upon. The President showed great unwillingness to go along with many conclusions. Habyarimana would veto, or postpone his consent to, agreements between the government and the RPF on several occasions: in mid-November 1992, and in January, June and July 1993.

After signing of the agreements, a number of interlinked factors would contribute to non-implementation of the Arusha accords by 6 April, 1994: the delayed arrival of UN troops, internal disputes with- in different parties and basic unwillingness by the President and his regime to go along with the major changes. The final Arusha texts provided for the operation of the (Faustin Twagiramungu) government at most 37 days after the signing (i.e. by 10 September) pending the arrival of UN blue helmets. As the UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda) mandate was not yet approved by the UN Security Council, the caretaker government led by Agathe Uwilingiyimana had to remain in place.

The general political climate was far from peaceful, in particular after the murder on the night of 20-21 October 1993 of the first democratically-elected Hutu President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, by Tutsi soldiers of the Burundian army. Most observers point to this event as a decisive factor for the ensuing tragedy in Rwanda. This is expressed by Linden as follows:

Perhaps the single most important trigger enabling those who were determined to abort the process to win the day was ironically an assassination in Burundi on 21 October 1993, that of the new "Hutu" president, Melchior Ndadaye, one of the first fruits of a process of democratiation of its "Tutsi" regime. Tens of thousands died in the wake of the coup and some 70,000 Burundian "Hutu" fled into southern Rwanda. The message of these events to many around Habyarimana was doubtless that the Tutsi would never genuinely accept (Hutu) majority rule within the context of a government of national unity. In other words, the extremists were right: Arusha was too much, too far, too fast (Linden, 1995).

And by Lemarchand:

(Ndadaye's) death at the hands of an all-Tutsi army carried an immediate and powerful demonstration effect to the Hutu of Rwanda (...) The message came through clear and loud: 'Never trust the Tutsi!' (Thus), with Ndadaye's death vanished what few glimmers of hope remained that Arusha might provide a viable forum for a political compromise with the RPF (Lemarchand, 1995).

If one adds to the above the absence of real reconciliation between conservative and reform-oriented persons and groups, the massive spread of weapons in the country and the harsh economic situation, one will better understand the difficulties in implementing the Arusha accords.

Still, most observers thought in November 1993 that the Arusha agreements would slowly but certainly lead to a more stable situation. Donors tried hard to give their support to a peaceful development. UNDP's preparation (September 1993-April 1994) of a "Round-Table Conference for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the war and the social reintegration of the demobilized soldiers" is a case in point. After the formal approval on 5 October 1993 by the UN Security Council (Resolution 872) to station 2,500 blue helmets in Rwanda by the end of March 1994, the first troops arrived at the end of October 1993. The final formal obstacle of the 22-months period of the transition government had thus been overcome.

One of the first tasks for the blue helmets was to escort the 600 RPA soldiers and the designated RPF ministers and staff members to Kigali (on 28 December 1993; Operation Clean Corridor). Other tasks were to guarantee the safety of the capital, the border area with Uganda and the demilitarized zone in the north. In 1994, the UN troops would be in charge of the supervision of military reforms, demobilization and demilitarization. In 1995, their attention was to be focused on the process that would lead to municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections during the last six months of the transition.

However, the enlarged transitional government, the cornerstone of the agreement on which most other activities depended, never came into existence. Rwanda's Prime Minister was still Agathe Uwilingiyimana on the fatal date of 6 April, 1994. After the arrival of the blue helmets, the reasons for delay were internal, accentuated by the violent aftermath of the murder of Melchior Ndadaye in Burundi on 20 October 1993.

The inauguration of a new government and parliament was planned first for 5 January, 1994, later for 23 February and then for 24 March, but did not take place. In the eyes of the President, the different parties were too internally divided to provide for a stable government that he could support. As long as no government was acknowledged, part of the opposition boycotted the installation of a new parliament.

Faustin Twagiramungu, who was proposed as Prime Minister, lacked the support of the majority of his party, which was strongly divided. In the aftermath of the murder of Ndadaye, accusations of corruption and of ethnicism increased. The MDR, the PL and the PSD split politically, between those ready for power-sharing (the moderates) and those who were ready to go to the utmost extremities to retain power (the so-called "Power" fractions). Each side accused the other of complicity with either the MRND or the RPF. For instance, Faustin Twagiramungu (a pro-reform Hutu) was accused of siding with the RPF and of having been corrupted. That accusation allowed the "PowerGroup" within the MDR to adopt a harsher pro-Hutu stance. Within the PL, its chairman, Justin Mugenzi, was accused of anti-RPF positions, whereas the Minister of Social Affairs, Ndasingwa, was accused of siding with the RPF.

In the meantime, in mid-February, Jacques Booh-Booh, the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Rwanda, had seriously warned of the massive spread of weapons among citizens and supporters of the militias.

Manipulation of ethnicity
As noted above, in the early 1990s the Habyarimana regime had attempted to establish a broad Hutu-dominated front. The strategy adopted by at least part of the regime's supporters was to create a political climate that would result in a political and military marginalization of the RPF and, broadly speaking, of the whole Tutsi population. Political and ethnic polarization was clearly a strategy from the start of the conflict (Reyntjens, 1994). This has been confirmed in a number of reports by different international human rights organizations (Africa Watch, 1992; Amnesty International, 1992; F‚d‚ration Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993; Africa Watch, 1993; Human Rights Watch/Arms Project 1994; African Rights, 1994).

One of these reports, from March 1993, written by a group of international human rights committees, gives a detailed description of offences against human rights. The report gives an idea of the increasing extremism within and around the Presidency and the MRND (F‚d‚ration Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).

Some examples are: In mid-October 1990, a group of Hutu, agitated by local authorities, take revenge on a group of Tutsi in the region of Kibilira (Gisenyi), killing 300 people and causing a massive flight of refugees (Africa Watch, 1992). Citizens, mainly Tutsi, accused of sympathizing with the RPF, are sentenced to death. More than 8,000 citizens are arrested without clear motives. International diplomatic and NGO pressure results in lifting of the death penalty and the release of the prisoners. After a temporary territorial success for the RPF in the Ruhengeri area, military and civilian authorities take revenge on the Bagogwe, a Tutsi sub-group, causing at least 500 deaths. The Bagogwe were to become further victims of terror during the conflict (December 1991 and November/December 1992).

From the end of 1991, the south of the country became involved in the conflict for the first time (F‚d‚ration Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993). The violence that occurred in Bugesera is indicated by several sources as the dark turning-point in the anti-reform strategy of Habyarimana's supporters. "The 1992 Bugesera massacre marked an important turning point in the development of the methods of killings, because of the central role played by extremist propaganda. For four months before the killing started, extremist politicians and ideologues had been active in the area, inciting the Hutu populace" (African Rights, 1994). Rwambuka, the mayor of Kanzenze who belonged to the central committee of the MRND, was the driving force behind the terror. Five hundred persons were arrested after the events, but in most cases released without charges (F‚d‚ration Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).

Similtaneous and similar patterns of violent conflicts against Tutsi and reform-minded Hutu at different places (e.g. Kibilira in March 1992; Kibilira, Kayoya, Mutura in November/December 1992) reveal a particular strategy and plan adopted by local authorities, with strong support from the highest levels. Increasing involvement of party militias, multiplication of the number of FAR soldiers by five over a 16-months period, escalating hostile ethnic-political propaganda by highly-placed officials against presumed opponents of the regime (Hutu and Tutsi in opposition parties and RPF), and a deliberately-created climate of insecurity and unsafety, are different indications of an organized agressive attitude against any opponents of the MRND regime (F‚d‚ration Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).

To give an example from the build-up of the party militias (interahamwe = "those who work together"): They were first seen in action during a massacre carried out at Bugesera in March 1992. "Specific details of the establishment of these militias are found in a Ministry of Defence memorandum dated September 1991. This envisaged at least one armed man for every 10 households and one policeman per sector". While at that date "the mobilization was to be restricted to the northern areas close to the front line", "the 'home guard' project was overtaken by the mass mobilization of party militia throughout the country under the control of very senior politicians and military officers. It is likely that one motivation for this was that, as opposition political parties mobilized, lines of authority from the Presidency to every rural commune began to dissolve. This made it more essential to mobilize a militia whose sole loyalty was to the hard-liners". "Interahamwe were recruited widely across Rwanda. Many were unemployed young men". "The arming of the interahamwe intensified after the February 1993 offensive by the RPF", notwithstanding several prior demands from the Prime Minister (Dismas Nsengiyaremye) "to the MRND and the CDR to adhere to the law on political parties, and disband the militias" (African Rights, 1994).

The gradual political, military and ethnic escalation benefitted from at least the tacit support of the President. Habyarimana is held personally liable for the death of at least 2,000 people in the period October 1990-January 1993. He never objected, e.g. in speeches, either to the increasingly ethnic-extremist attitude of local authorities or to the increasing involvement of party militias in the gradually-widening conflict since November 1991. One of the main conclusions is that there is a similarity between the different acts of violence committed by regime supporters between October 1990 and February 1993 (F‚d‚ration Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).

Already in 1993, some members of human rights groups concluded in the report that, since the conflict with the RPF began, the Tutsi population had been exposed to a massacre: "Tutsi have been killed, mutilated, harassed, made to disappear, frightened, only because of their ethnic identity." Bearing the dramatic events of April/May 1994 in mind, little doubt can exist that political manipulation of ethnicity had been on the rise in Rwanda for quite some time (F‚d‚ration Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).

In November 1992, when an agreement was reached in Arusha, political violence by Habyarimana supporters escalated. In February 1993, the RPF attacked and occupied part of the area of Ruhengeri-Gisenyi, as a direct response to stalling by the President of the negotiations in Arusha, but also as a response to the ethnic harassement of Tutsi by Hutu militias in north-western Rwanda, in which more than 300 people died (Africa Watch, 1993).

The RPF attack caused an internal flow of displaced persons of one out of seven Rwandese, who felt forced to leave areas containing the most fertile soils in the country. The number of internally displaced persons thus increased to about 950,000 in 1993, compared to an estimated 350,000 in mid-1992. After 8 February 1993, the RPF had doubled the size of its occupied territory in Rwanda, thereby infringing one of the basic elements of the cease-fire agreement with the Rwandese government, i.e. the "neutrality" of the buffer zone between "RPF territory" and the rest of Rwanda.

The RPF attacks brought massive protest in and outside the country. In Rwanda, the President and the Prime Minister denounced the latest acts of violence in a joint communique. The European Union, in particular Belgium, France and Germany, expressed its discontent in a similar way. France decided to increase the number of its troops by 300, to discourage the RPF march towards Kigali. Reyntjens (1994) strongly doubts whether the RPF, after its only half-successful invasion of October 1990, really planned to attempt a take-over of Kigali. The February 1993 offensive should rather be seen in the same light as the one in May 1992, when the RPF launched an attack on Byumba to express its discontent with lack of progress at the negotiations with the government. The strategy would be to demonstrate its military strength and superiority to convince the other parties of the necessity of a political agreement with the Front.

New talks were held between the RPF and all the parties of the government save MRND in Bujumbura from 25 February to 2 March 1993, leading to the Dar-es-Salaam cease-fire agreement of 9 March (after promises on the withdrawal of the French troops). This cease-fire agreement was important since it included stipulations on an international force (OAU or UN) to replace the French troops, a demilitarized zone and a resumption of the Arusha talks.

After the agreements of 4 August 1993 were signed, hostility did not diminish. On the contrary, Rwandese society tended to polarize more and more in anti- and pro-RPF (and Tutsi) parties and groups. As described above, the unity of the MDR, the PSD and the PL was put under enormous pressure from Habyarimana's supporters, who tended to equate opponents of the MRND regime with enemies of the Hutu people. Parallel events in neighbouring Burundi added to the polarization.

The political violence that plagued Rwanda throughout 1993 and the first months of 1994 was increasingly fueled by influential media, which agitated the Hutu population against their presumed enemies. On 8 July, 1993, Radio-T‚l‚vision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC) started to broadcast, officially to counterbalance Radio Muhabura (RPF) and the official Radio Rwanda (Reyntjens, 1994). According to African Rights (1994), "RTLMC played a key role in inciting violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu... (It) fervently opposed the Arusha Accords". Among the RTLMC promotors one found influential people belonging to the right wing of the MRND (e.g. Kabuga) and the CDR: Hassan Ngeze, director of the very pro-CDR newspaper Kangura (established already in 1989) and Ferdinand Nahimana, Director of the National Information Services. The latter was even dismissed for his ethnic and regional excesses.

This illustrates the attitude of groups of major regime supporters throughout the conflict. First, creation of a poisoned political climate and of ethnicism had been planned since the beginning of the conflict. Second, direct means (use of militias; spreading of weapons; creation of extremist movements; political assassinations and planned massacres) as well as indirect means (permanent climate of terror and fear; propaganda via the media) were strategically used, certainly from 1992 on. Third, the planning emanated from the highest-ranking persons in the army, the Presidential guard, the administration etc. who had benefitted from the one-party regime (Lemarchand, 1995; African Rights, 1994).

Chapter 5

April 1994 and its Aftermath

The genocide

At 8:30 p.m. on April 6 1994, the control tower at Kigali airport cleared for landing the President's MystŠre Falcon aircraft returning from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Aboard were the President of Rwanda, Juv‚nal Habyarimana, as well as the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira. They were travelling from a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, where implementation of the power-sharing agreement of August 1993 had been discussed and the implementation agreement finally signed. When the plane was approaching the airport, it was hit by a rocket and exploded. All passengers and crew were killed.

So far, the truth about the shooting down of the aircraft has not been established. Many have been blamed: the RPF, the Belgian government, the Presidential Guard and senior officials from the regular Rwandese Army (African Rights, 1994). The immediate major suspect, however, was the Presidential Guard, who feared the prospect of being dissolved.

Commentators on the event are divided. Some believe that the plane crash unleashed the wave of massacres. Others point to the fact that the killings were planned well ahead, with the aim of physically eliminating the Hutu opposition and Tutsi in general and, thus, argue that the plane crash was an excuse and formed an integral part of a plan to instigate the violence. In the words of Lemarchand:

Who actually fired the missile that brought down Habyarimana's plane may never be known, any more than who ordered the missile to be fired. But if the circumstantial evidence is any index, there is every reason to view the shooting of the plane as an eminently rational act from the standpoint of the immediate goals of Hutu extremists (Lemarchand, 1995).

The violence that followed is one of the worst in the history of humankind. Within a period of less than three months, at least 500,000 people were killed*; thousands and thousands were maimed, raped and both physically and psychologically afflicted for life; two million fled to neighbouring countries; and one million became internally displaced.

There is no question that these massacres took place. Eye-witnesses in Rwanda and all over the world, with their own eyes or on TV, could see how floating bodies filled the rivers and lakes along the borders of Rwanda. Journalists flocked into the area and reported extensively: some 50 publications have already been published on the massacres (Guichaoa, 1995; Braeckman, 1995:1; Prunier, 1995; Verschave, 1994; Brauman, 1994). The most thorough account so far is the report by African Rights of September 1994. The authors of that report have done their utmost to verify what happened during the months of the massacres by interviewing hundreds of people who were victims of or witnesses to the killings. There may well be reason to question some of the conclusions, but no researcher we have confronted questions the account of the killings made in that report; in fact, most others support it (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3).

The massacres were implemented in such a meticulous way that it is difficult to conclude that they were not organized in advance. Most Rwanda-watchers agree that the massacres were carried out according to a plan well-prepared by higher officials in the local and national government, the army, the Presidential Guard and the MRND party. The African Rights report is based on that conviction and points to several bits of evidence proving that this was the case. The establishment of military and para-military forces and the Hutu extremism during the early 1990s are discussed above. As for the main killers, African Rights states:

The men (and a few women) who brought down the apocalypse on Rwanda are known. And, while some deny that any killing occurred, others are often shamelessly frank about their role and eager to justify genocide.

The killers include the professional interahamwe, soldiers, gendarmes, Presidential Guardsmen and local government officials who actually supervised and carried out the killings. Some of these people have been witnessed, with their clothes literally drenched in blood, at the scene of massacres or at roadblocks. And, above them, there are the architects of genocide - the men who held the highest offices in the land, who controlled the government , army and radio stations, and who planned and implemented the killings from on high. Few of these people actually wielded machetes or even guns, but it was their policies and words that put guns and machetes in the hands of so many people in Rwanda. Some travelled the country inciting hatred, or spoke on the radio, others were active behind the scenes encouraging the extremists and lending them logistical, financial, political and diplomatic support (African Rights, 1994).

Likewise, Lemarchand identifies the actors and the structures behind the genocide as follows:

By 1992, the institutional apparatus of genocide was already in place. It involved four distinctive levels of activity, or sets of actors: a) the akazu ("little house"), that is the core group, consisting of Habyarimana's immediate entourage, i.e. his wife (Agathe), his three brothers-in-law (Prot‚e Zigiranyirazo, Seraphin Rwabukumba and Elie Sagatwa) and a sprinkling of trusted advisers (most notably Joseph Nzirorera, Laurent Serubuga and Ildephonse Gashumba); b) the rural organizers, numbering anywhere from two to three hundred, drawn from the communal and prefectural cadres (pr‚fets, sous-pr‚fets, conseillers communaux, etc.); c) the militias (interahamwe), estimated at 30,000, forming the ground-level operatives in charge of doing the actual killing; and d) the Presidential Guard, recruited almost exclusively among northerners and trained with a view to providing auxiliary slaughterhouse support to civilian death squads (Lemarchand, 1995) (Cf. also Prunier, 1995).

It thus seems that the killings were no spontaneous outbursts, but followed instructions from the highest level. This is also the only conclusion that can be drawn after having studied the sequence of the massacres. Almost immediately (i.e. the same evening) after the crash of the aircraft, a selective assassination of opposition politicians, of which most were Hutu from parties opposing the party in power, began. The most apparent act was the killing of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, along with 10 Belgian UN soldiers who were assigned to protect her. The President of the Constitutional Court and the Minister of Information were other prominent immediate targets. The leadership of every opposition party was hit in a similar way (African Rights, 1994).

The second target group for assassination, once the leading politicians had been killed, were dissenting civilians, Hutu as well as Tutsi. These included journalists, human rights activists, representatives of non-governmental groups and civil servants. African Rights lists as an example, by name and occupation, 27 journalists who were reported killed immediately after April 6.

Following the killing of the opposition, the generalized massacre of Tutsi starts. This is documented by African Rights, 1994, pr‚fecture by pr‚fecture; with special accounts dealing with attacks on women and children, on churches and hospitals etc, etc. There is no end to the realism and horror of the accounts by the witnesses interviewed. Although there are accounts of people who tried to help victims of the massacres, most people willingly, by force or by coercion, seem to have participated in the killings.

The first targets were Tutsi men and boys. Even the smallest boys were not spared. Educated Tutsi men and women were particularly at risk and the university was "cleansed" (African Rights, 1994). Rape was used extensively. There are many reports of women who were both tortured and raped while others who had been wounded were also raped. Children were not spared and many Tutsi children were killed, others maimed and left with physical and psychological scars for the rest of their lives.

The killings were carried out with extraordinary cruelty. People were burnt alive, thrown dead or alive into pit latrines and often forced to kill their friends or relatives. The survivors were hunted all over the country, even into hospitals and church compounds. Some of the worst massacres were directed against people seeking refuge in churches.

Another factor seen by many observers as evidence that the massacres were pre-planned and controlled from above is the very successful strategy in sowing confusion during the period immediately following the plane crash, so that neither Rwandese nor foreigners knew what was happening. The objective was to create fear and ignorance. The strategy included establishment of roadblocks, a nation-wide curfew and the disruption of telephone links, and was implemented almost immediately. In addition, a very efficient and effective campaign of disinformation was being waged by the most active media at that time, RTLMC and Radio Rwanda. For consumption of the foreign community, the Rwanda crisis was blamed on the RPF and its alleged breaking of the cease-fire agreements.

It took the international press almost three weeks to really grasp the magnitude of the killings taking place in Rwanda, in particular in the rural areas. During the first days, international attention largely focused on the plight of foreigners. The next focus was on the battle for Kigali and the role of the UN. Very few reported on the massacres taking place in rural areas. Only when refugees started to arrive in Burundi in the last week of April did the journalists comprehend what really went on.

It has been stated that the objective of the most extreme of the leaders of the massacres went beyond the physical extermination of every Tutsi - the idea was also to transform the collective identity of the Hutu. Those who hold that view point to the systematic killing of moderate Hutu leaders and Hutu who protected their Tutsi friends or relatives, and deliberate efforts to get as many as possible of the ordinary Hutu people to participate in the killings and lootings, voluntarily or by force. Even if this theory is not fully substantiated, the results of the massacres and the political/ psychological effects are the same.

An interim government was proclaimed on 9 April, based on the MRND and the factions of the other parties that supported it. Th‚odore Sindikubwabo, the former Speaker of the parliament, was appointed President and Jean Kambanda Prime Minister. On 13 April, the interim government moved from Kigali to Gitarama on the grounds that order had collapsed in the capital. The interim government did very little to stop, or even oppose, the massacres going on in the country. On the contrary, from the documentation available in the form of interviews and statements over the radio, government representatives rather denied or played down the evidence of killings, and sometimes even encouraged them (cf Th‚odore Sindikubwabo's speech in Butare on 19 May, 1994) (African Rights, 1994; Prunier, 1995).

Churches

Above it was explained that the leading church representatives were close to the Habyarimana regime. During the massacres, these leaders did nothing to discourage the killing. At a press conference in Nairobi as late as early June 1994, the Anglican archbishop refused unequivocally to denounce the Rwandese interim government (Linden, 1995). The Catholic archbishop even moved with the interim government from Kigali to Gitarama. Furthermore, significant numbers of prominent Christians were involved in the killings, sometimes slaughtering their own church leaders. At the same time, there is also evidence of incidents of martyrdom, heroic self-sacrifice and courage shown by Rwandese Christians (including some foreign missionaries).

The question of complicity of the church must be set in the context of a divided church, split by ethnicity and regionalism. The church (Catholic as well as Anglican) was far from neutral in its sympathies. At another level, "complicity" was about the failure of many church leaders to disassociate themselves enough from and work against the hold that ethnicity had gained over the church in time to speak out strongly against the regime's human rights violations (Linden, 1995).

The civil war

The civil war resumed after the killings began. The 600-strong RPF battalion in Kigali left its headquarters on 7 April and the forces in the north of the country launched an offensive on 8 April. The RPF had kept its forces alert to be able to act swiftly if the peace agreement were to derail. From the slight delay, however, it seems that they were taken by surprise by the shooting down of the plane.

Once the RPF had launched its offensive, it progressed rapidly. After only a short time, the major military base at Byumba was taken, allowing for the re-supply of arms and ammunition. RPF advanced all through April and May, but not fast enough to halt the massacres. An important advance was made when the international airport at Kigali and the nearby Kanombe base were occupied on 22 May. Kigali was taken on 6 July and on 18 July, 1994, RPF declared the war to be over. It announced a cease-fire and formed a new government headed by Pasteur Bizimungu, as President and Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister, both Hutu. Real power, however, rested in the hands of the Tutsi commander of RPF, General Paul Kagame, who became Vice-President and Minister of Defence.

The war was won through a combination of superior fighting skills, higher morale (in part from the need to halt the massacres), discipline and ammunition (African Rights, 1994). The experience from participating in the war in Uganda was important, particularly as regards the tight discipline required of the RPF soldiers. However, human rights groups have reported abuses and excessive violence towards civilians by RPF soldiers during the offensive. Accounts are given, for example, of civilians killed in a mosque in the Bugesera region, of a large number of civilians killed in Kayove (NW Rwanda), of some killings of refugees on May 18 (Rwanda-Tanzania border) and of church groups (Rwantanga near Uganda; Byumba prefecture) (Guichaoua, 1995; African Rights, 1994; Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:2 and 1994:3).

 Part I  Part II  Part III  Part IV  Part V Part VI  Part VII